Paulsen v. Manson

• Decision Date: 19 May 1987
• Docket Number: No. 12708,12708
• Citation: 203 Conn. 484,525 A.2d 1315
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Ronald E. PAULSEN v. John R. MANSON, Commissioner of Correction, et al.

Page 1315

525 A.2d 1315

203 Conn. 484

Ronald E. PAULSEN v. John R. MANSON, Commissioner of Correction, et al.

No. 12708.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 10, 1987.

Decided May 19, 1987.

Kevin M. Doyle, Sp. Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was John A. Connelly, State's Atty., Waterbury, for appellants (respondents).

John D. Palermo, Certified Legal Intern, with whom, were Todd D. Fernow, Hartford, and, on the brief, C. Frank Figliuzzi, Certified Legal Intern, for appellee (petitioner).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, SANTANIELLO and JACOBSON, JJ.

SHEA, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from the granting of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the Superior Court. The petition alleged that, because the record of the plea hearing failed to include a factual basis for the crime of assault in the first degree, the petitioner's plea of guilty to that offense was accepted in violation of his rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. We find error in the conclusion of the habeas court that such a factual basis is a constitutional requisite to a valid guilty plea.

The petitioner, Ronald E. Paulsen, was arrested on June 25, 1976, after assisting David Collins in his escape from the federal penitentiary in Lewisberg, Pennsylvania. When the car driven by Collins, in which the petitioner was a passenger, was stopped by state trooper Philip Confer in Middlebury, Connecticut, shortly before the arrest, Collins shot and wounded Confer with a handgun that the petitioner had given Collins.

On July 6, 1976, the petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to each count of the substitute information, which charged him with attempted murder in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54 and larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 53a-123. A second substitute information was subsequently filed, which added a third count of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 53a-59. ¹ When the petitioner, on August 11, 1976, withdrew his prior pleas and entered a plea of guilty to the charge of assault in the first degree, the state entered a nolle prosequi of the remaining charges.

At the August 11, 1976 proceeding, after the petitioner had pleaded guilty, the following interchange occurred between the trial court, Matzkin, J., the petitioner, and assistant state's attorney Walter Scanlon:

"The Court: Have you had an opportunity to discuss with [Raymond, J.] Quinn, your attorney, this particular offense that you are now being charged with and are you satisfied with his advice and assistance?

"Mr. Paulsen: Yes, I am.

"The Court: And, do you understand that by pleading guilty to assault in the first degree, you are admitting that you committed that particular offense with which you are charged in the information?

"Mr. Paulsen: Yes, I do.

"The Court: Have you been advised by Mr. Quinn of the maximum penalty provided by law for this particular offense?

"Mr. Paulsen: Yes, I have.

"The Court: Mr. Scanlon--listen to Mr. Scanlon give the Court a statement of the facts in this case. Please.

"Mr. Scanlon: Yes, your Honor. If your Honor please, he was accompanying one David Collins at approximately 11:35 p.m. on June 25, 1976, at or near the Middlebury-Southbury town line and Route I-84. They were stopped by the police officer as I mentioned, and the police officer was shot in the right arm by this man's companion, Collins. The police officer returned fire and subsequently apprehended them.

"The Court: You agree with that statement of facts, Mr. Paulsen, that Mr. Scanlon has just given to the Court?

"Mr. Paulsen: Yes, I do."

At the sentencing proceeding on September 10, 1976, Paulsen moved to withdraw his guilty plea, but his motion was denied. After sentence had been imposed, he obtained several extensions of time to file an appeal, but no appeal was actually filed by Paulsen, who at that time was proceeding pro se. Paulsen, on July 25, 1980, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the record of the plea proceeding was constitutionally inadequate to support his guilty plea on the charge of assault. The habeas court, Hammer, J., rendered judgment for the state, dismissing the petition on the ground that the petitioner had not carried his burden of establishing that he had not deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of direct appeal. In the appeal that followed, we vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits. Paulsen v. Manson, 193 Conn. 333, 476 A.2d 1057 (1984). By agreement of the parties, the court, Satter, J., conducted the subsequent habeas corpus proceeding solely through review of the records of the plea, sentencing, and prior habeas proceedings. From the judgment granting the petition, the commissioner of correction and the warden of the correctional institution at Somers have appealed to this court.

At the outset we note that it is undisputed that the prosecutor's summation of facts at the plea proceeding was insufficient to satisfy the elements of the crime charged. Indeed, as the habeas court stated, that "statement of facts failed to implicate [the] petitioner in the commission of any crime at all...." While the elements of the crime of assault in the first degree, as set forth in § 53a-59, include the intent to cause, and the causing of, serious physical injury by means of a dangerous weapon, the prosecutor's recitation merely placed the petitioner in the company of Collins, who shot the police officer who had stopped them. "One who is merely present when a crime is being committed by another is not necessarily a participant or accessory. State v. Teart, 170 Conn. 332, 336, 365 A.2d 1200 [1976]...." State v. Battle, 170 Conn. 469, 474, 365 A.2d 1100 (1976).

The habeas court relied upon this court's rulings in State v. Battle, supra, State v. Marra, 174 Conn. 338, 387 A.2d 550 (1978), and State v. Cutler, 180 Conn. 702, 433 A.2d 988 (1980), in concluding that, because the petitioner's guilty plea had not been supported by an adequate factual basis, it had been procured in violation of due process requirements. ² In State v. Battle, supra, we noted, 170 Conn. at p. 473, 365 A.2d 1100, that "[t]he entry of a plea of guilty waives the constitutional right to a trial by jury, the right to confront accusers, and the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination." A waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); D'Amico v. Manson, 193 Conn. 144, 147, 476 A.2d 543 (1984). " 'Consequently, if a defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void.' McCarthy v. United States, [394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) ]." State v. Battle, supra. The habeas court in the present case reasoned that a guilty plea not supported by an adequate factual basis cannot have been entered voluntarily and intelligently.

The United States Supreme Court has delineated standards determinative of the constitutional validity of a plea of guilty. The underlying premise has been indicated in the preceding paragraph. Because a guilty plea "is itself a conviction"; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 583, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927); entailing the simultaneous waiver by a defendant of several constitutional rights, the plea must be entered voluntarily and intelligently. Boykin v. Alabama, supra; McCarthy v. United States, supra. "Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts." Id. "And clearly the plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the defendant received 'real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.' Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 [61 S.Ct. 572, 574, 85 L.Ed. 859 (1941) ]." Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2258-59, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976).

From these holdings, this court has attempted to extrapolate a position on the issue of whether a factual basis is a requisite to the validity of a guilty plea under the federal constitution. We noted in State v. Deboben, 187 Conn. 469, 475 n. 4, 446 A.2d 828 (1982), that "it is not at all clear that such proof is constitutionally mandated." We asserted, nevertheless, in State v. Eason, 192 Conn. 37, 43, 470 A.2d 688 (1984), that "[i]n order for a plea of guilty to be constitutionally valid, the record must affirmatively disclose that there is a factual basis for the plea and that the defendant entered the plea voluntarily and intelligently." See also State v. Cutler, supra, 180 Conn. at 705, 433 A.2d 988 ("[t]he plea, therefore, was not supported by a factual basis and, thus, was not knowingly and intelligently made"); State v. Marra, supra, 174 Conn. at 340, 387 A.2d 550 ("[t]he plea must be supported by a factual basis").

Recent federal case law, however, has provided a clarifying interpretation of due process requirements that is not in accord with that posited by this court in State v. Eason. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said in Hobbs v. Blackburn, 752 F.2d 1079, 1082 (5th Cir.1985), "The state court is under no constitutionally imposed duty to establish a factual basis for a guilty plea prior to its acceptance unless 'the state judge is put on notice that there may be some need for such an inquiry ...' Banks v. McGougan, 717 F.2d 186, 188 (5th Cir.1983)."...