Paulson v. Cosmetic Dermatology, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 17-20094-Civ-Scola |
| Parties | Roxann Paulson, Plaintiff, v. Cosmetic Dermatology, Inc. dba dr. brandt skincare, Stephane Colleu, John Michael Bain, and Tamara Matha, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Plaintiff Roxann Paulson brings this lawsuit against Cosmetic Dermatology, Inc., doing business as dr. brandt skincare ("CDI"), Stephane Colleu, John Michael Bain, and Tamara Matha for unlawful termination and actions taken in furtherance of that termination. This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' partial motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16). For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion to dismiss.
Paulson worked as CDI's Vice President of Marketing and Executive Creative Director from February 2, 2015 until her termination on February 11, 2016. (Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 1.) Paulson reported directly to Colleu, CDI's Chief Executive Officer. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Bain served as Vice President of Sales for CDI and Matha served as Executive Director of Finance and handled CDI's Human Resources. (Id. at ¶¶ 9-11.) According to the complaint, Paulson was "subjected to continuous and escalating harassment" from Bain—harassment that was reported to both Colleu and Matha. (Compl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 1.) Despite Paulson's and other employees' complaints, Bain was never disciplined or terminated for his behavior. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-20, 30.)
At some point during her employment, Paulson terminated Author Gallow, a friend of Matha's. (Id. at ¶ 68.) According to the complaint, this action created a personal rift between Paulson and Matha, leading Matha to "solicit[] staff to change their opinions about Paulson, alleg[e] to staff that Paulson had planned to make personnel changes, [and] imply[] to staff that Paulson had intended to terminate them." (Id. at ¶¶ 31, 68.) On February 11, 2016, Matha informed Paulson of her termination, citing complaints that Paulson was bullying members of her Product Development team. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Later in the evening, Matha received emails from three employees that allegedly contained solicited, false complaints about Paulson. (Id. at ¶¶ 25-26, 28.) Matha sent "a company-wide email notifying staff in the United States and all global countries, that Paulson had been terminated for 'violat[ing] company policy.'" (Id. at ¶ 27.) According to the complaint, "[t]he email went on to note that CDI has 'zero tolerance' for behavior that 'cause[s] another individual any type of harassment and behavior that is unprofessional.'" (Id.)
Paulson alleges that Matha's email defamed her in her professional capacity and amounts to libel per se because it contained "false statements [that] not only impugned Paulson's integrity, character and reputation as a business professional, but also indicate she lacks sufficient ability to perform her professional duties." (Id. at ¶ 59.) Paulson also alleges that Matha's actions in soliciting and obtaining false emails that resulted in Paulson's discharge interfered with Paulson's business relationship with her employer and were part of a conspiracy to interfere with that business relationship. (Id. at ¶¶ 65-75.) The Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that the complaint fails to state a claim for tortious interference with a business relationship against Matha or for defamation per se or conspiracy to interfere with a business relationship against all of the Defendants.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires "a short and plain statement of the claims" that "will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Supreme Court has held that Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations and citations omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Thus, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 679. When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for which relief could be granted. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
The Defendants have moved to dismiss four causes of action in the complaint in their entirety and two causes of action as they are applied to individual defendants. The Court will address each of the counts specifically set forth in the complaint.
Count one asserts that CDI, Colleu and Matha discriminated against Paulson by targeting her for discharge on the basis of her age. (Compl. at 6-7, ECF No. 1.) Count two asserts that CDI, Colleu and Matha discriminated against Paulson by targeting her for discharge on the basis of her gender. (Id. at 7-8.) The Defendants moved to dismiss counts one and two as applied to Colleu and Matha. (Mot. at 2-3, ECF No. 16.) Paulson concedes that counts one and two are not properly asserted against those defendants. (Resp. at 1, ECF No. 19.) Accordingly, counts one and two fail to state a claim against Colleu and Matha upon which relief may be granted. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 830 (11th Cir. 2007) ().
Count three asserts a claim for defamation per se against CDI, Colleu and Matha. (Compl. at 8-9, ECF No. 1.) Paulson asserts that following her termination, Matha "sent a company-wide email notifying staff in the United States and all global countries, that Paulson had been terminated for 'violat[ing] company policy'" and that the email also "note[d] that CDI has 'zero tolerance' for behavior that 'cause[s] another individual any type of harassment and behavior that is unprofessional.'" (Id. at 5.)
To recover for libel under Florida law, a plaintiff must establish that: 1) the defendant published a false statement; 2) about the plaintiff; 3) to a third party; and 4) the party suffered damages as a result of the publication. See Valencia v. Citibank Int'l, 728 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). Libel may be proven two ways: per se or per quod. See Hoch v. Rissman, 742 So. 2d 451, 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Libel per quod requires an additional explanation of, or an interpretation of innuendo suggested by, the words used to demonstrate the defamatory meaning or that the plaintiff is the subject of the statement. See Leavitt, D.O. v. Cole, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2003); Ordonez v. Icon Sky Holdings LLC, 2011 WL 3843890, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2011) (Seitz, J.); Hoch, 742 So. 2d at 457. That is, defamation per quod requires explanation of context. In per quod actions, the words used, given their natural and common meaning, are not inherently injurious, but rather are injurious only as a consequence of extrinsic facts, such as innuendo. See Leavitt, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 1342. Therefore, in per quod actions, the plaintiff must assert actual economic damage. Id.
By contrast, libel per se does not require any additional explanation in order to prove the defamatory nature of the statement. See Leavitt, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 1342; Ordonez, 2011 WL 3843890, at *7. In a per se action, consideration is given only to the "four corners" of the publication and the language used should be interpreted as the "common mind" would normally understand it. See Ortega Trujillo v. Banco Central Del Ecuador, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (King, J.); McIver v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 489 So. 2d 793, 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). In a per se action, the statements are "so obviously defamatory" and "damaging to reputation" that the injurious nature of the statement is apparent from the words in the statement itself and the court consequently takes notice of that fact. See Alan v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 604 Fed. App'x. 863, 865 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Campbell v. Jacksonville Kennel Club Inc., 66 So. 2d 495, 497 (Fla. 1953). The plaintiff is therefore not required to allege general damages, because the harm is readily apparent. See Campbell, 66 So. 2d at 497.
Per se defamatory language may take a variety of forms. The most classic example is language that charges a person with an infamous crime or tends to subject him to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace. See Rubin v. United States News & World Report Inc., 271 F.3d 1305, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001); Adams v. News-Journal Corp., 84 So. 2d 549, 551 (Fla. 1955). Additionally, language that interferes with one's profession can be per se defamatory. Two iterations of this latter form of per se defamatory language appear in Florida case law. One iteration finds actionable any language that "tend[s] to injure a person in [her] office, occupation, business, or employment and which in natural and proximate consequence will necessarily cause injury." See Metropolis Co. v. Croasdell, 199 So. 568, 569 (Fla. 1941); see also Scott v. Busch, 907 So. 2d 662, 667 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Ordonez, 2011 WL 3843890 at *7. Another iteration requires language that "imputes to another...
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