Paulson v. Idaho Forest Industries, Inc.

Decision Date27 February 1979
Docket NumberNo. 12426,12426
Citation591 P.2d 143,99 Idaho 896
PartiesKenneth E. PAULSON, Claimant-Respondent, v. IDAHO FOREST INDUSTRIES, INC., Employer and Workmen's Compensation Exchange, Surety, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
Wynne M. Blake of Blake, Feeney & Clark, Lewiston, for defendants-appellants

Thomas A. Mitchell, Coeur d'Alene, for claimant-respondent.

BAKES, Justice.

The issues presented by this appeal arise under Idaho's workmen's compensation law. I.C. §§ 72-101 to -929. The Industrial Commission ordered defendant appellants Idaho Forest Industries, Inc., and Workmen's Compensation Exchange to provide claimant respondent Kenneth Paulson with medical treatment for his mental condition and to pay Paulson income benefits for temporary total disability. Appellants assign error to the finding that Paulson's work related injuries caused his psychological disorder. They also contest the award of income benefits for temporary total disability, apparently disputing the commission's findings that Paulson's condition was subject to further medical treatment and was not stable and that Paulson was totally disabled. Paulson has filed a motion in this Court for attorney fees. We affirm and grant Paulson attorney fees.

Paulson sustained two lower back injuries while doing physical labor as an employee of Idaho Forest Industries. He fell and injured himself first in October of 1972 and underwent surgery a week after the mishap. He returned to Idaho Forest Industries in July of 1973 to do light work, but a few days later he fell and reinjured his back. He underwent surgery again in November of 1973.

Despite the corrective surgery, Paulson continued to have difficulties. In March and May of 1973, several months after the first operation and before his second accident, Paulson was examined by Dr. William Bozarth. In a letter dated May 4, 1973, Dr. Bozarth noted that Paulson had a history of traumatic injury with pain and numbness in his left leg and back, as well as intermittent bladder dysfunction. However, the doctor indicated that he doubted involvement of the central nervous system and suspected that Paulson might be "depressed or exhibiting findings related to psychological etiology rather than (to) a physical deficit." Dr. Bozarth wrote to Workmen's Compensation Exchange (hereinafter, the surety): "Recommendations would be to support the patient but attempt to make him aware of the possible psychological nature of his difficulties." The surety received Dr. Bozarth's letter on May 14, 1973. In December of 1974, more than a year after Paulson's second operation, Dr. Ronald Vincent, the neurosurgeon who had performed that operation, readmitted Paulson to the hospital. According to Dr. Vincent, Paulson was then in severe pain and was almost totally immobilized. In a memorandum received by the surety on December 10, 1974, Dr. Vincent wrote: "My feeling at this time is that this is primarily a hysterical manifestation, although this man very clearly has had some disabling low back difficulties."

Confronted with Paulson's injuries, operations, and his persisting maladies, the surety provided medical expenses associated with the surgery and the follow up care. It also paid temporary total disability benefits to Paulson until the summer of 1974. Those benefits were terminated when Dr. Vincent rated Paulson's disability at 20% Loss of the leg at the hip. The surety did Paulson ultimately did obtain a psychiatric evaluation from Dr. William Cone. In a letter dated April 20, 1976, Dr. Cone diagnosed Paulson's condition as a hysterical neurosis of the conversion type, noting that such a diagnosis did not exclude the presence of physical problems as well. He indicated that the prognosis with appropriate psychiatric treatment was questionable because the condition had existed for three and a half years. In a subsequent letter dated August 17, 1976, Dr. Cone rated Paulson's disability attributable to the hysterical neurosis at 65% Of the whole man.

not provide Paulson with any psychiatric evaluation or treatment. In May of 1975 Paulson's attorney specifically requested the surety to provide such care, based upon Dr. Bozarth's earlier report, but the surety declined.

The extent of Paulson's disability and his readiness for a permanent disability rating were the subject of a hearing before the Industrial Commission held on August 25, 1976. Paulson himself and Dr. Cone were the only witnesses who personally appeared, although medical reports, including those from Dr. Vincent and Dr. Bozarth, were also admitted into evidence.

Paulson testified that he was forty-eight years old, had an eighth grade education, and had been a bus driver for twenty-five years before he started working for Idaho Forest Industries. He indicated that the pain in his back and left leg and his chronic headaches began with his first injury and operation and had remained relatively constant since then, although there had been periods of intensified distress and, particularly after the second operation, of shortlived improvement. Paulson said that he was taking medication to relieve his headaches and reduce his back pain and that about every two weeks the pain would be so great that he had to stay in bed for a couple of days. He indicated that his wife and son did virtually all of the chores around the family home, and he testified that he could not lift, nor could he walk, sit, or ride in a car for very long without aggravating his condition. Paulson's testimony in this regard was consistent with Dr. Vincent's written observations that Paulson "will be incapable of returning to any work similar to what he has been doing" and "will be unable to perform any tasks requiring any lifting, long standing, or sitting." Paulson acknowledged that he could perform work that did not require that he engage in any of the aggravating activities. He said that he had tried to find employment consistent with his limitations, visiting a rehabilitation training center and applying for a position as a radio operator for the sheriff's department, but without success.

Dr. Cone's letter diagnosing Paulson's condition and assessing its disabling effects were admitted into evidence as his direct testimony. On cross examination, counsel for appellants inquired primarily regarding the basis for the doctor's conclusions. The commission also examined Dr. Cone, focusing in particular upon the interplay between physiological and psychological processes in bringing about Paulson's condition.

The Industrial Commission found that Paulson suffered from a hysterical neurosis of the conversion type caused by the injuries he sustained while working at Idaho Forest Industries. The commission further found that Paulson remained totally disabled for work. However, the commission also found that Paulson's condition was subject to further medical treatment, that the full extent of his disability could not be determined until the results of such treatment were known, and that his condition was therefore not then stable and ratable for the purpose of awarding permanent disability benefits. The commission ordered appellants to provide Paulson with further reasonable medical care, including treatment for his mental condition. The commission also awarded Paulson income benefits for total disability, retroactive to the date on which the commission found that the surety had discontinued such benefits and continuing "so long as the claimant is totally disabled for work or until the results of further medical treatment became known."

Appellants contend that the commission erred in three respects. First, they attack the finding that Paulson's injuries at Idaho Forest Industries caused his hysterical neurosis. They argue that there was no competent evidence establishing such a causal link. Second, they challenge the commission's conclusion that Paulson was entitled to total temporary disability benefits from the time that the surety stopped paying those benefits (when Dr. Vincent rated Paulson's permanent partial disability) until Paulson was no longer totally disabled for work or until the results of further medical treatment were known. Appellants argue that, considering the partial disability ratings furnished by Drs. Vincent and Cone and in light of Paulson's own admission that he could perform work consistent with his limitations, the record does not support a finding of total disability. Appellants also maintain that temporary disability benefits were inappropriate after Dr. Vincent and Dr. Cone rated Paulson's disability, because the ratings established that Paulson's disabilities were permanent and that he was no longer in the period of recovery. This last argument amounts, in effect, to a claim that the commission erred in finding that Paulson's condition was still subject to medical treatment and was not stable I. e., that he might improve with psychiatric care.

We observe at the outset that each of appellants' three arguments concerning respectively the cause, the extent, and the susceptibility to successful treatment of Paulson's disability calls into question the accuracy of one of the commission's findings of fact. The scope of our review on appeal from decisions of the Industrial Commission is limited to questions of law. Madron v. Green Giant Co., 94 Idaho 747, 497 P.2d 1048 (1972); Idaho Const. Art. 5, § 9. We may set aside the commission's findings of fact only if the record is devoid of substantial competent evidence to support them. See Gradwohl v. J. R. Simplot Co., 96 Idaho 655, 531 P.2d 775 (1975); I.C. § 72-732(1).

I

The commission's finding that Paulson's work related injuries caused his hysterical neurosis is supported by substantial competent evidence. Allowing that proof of such a causal relationship requires expert medical testimony, See Dean v. Dravo Corp., 95 Idaho 558, 511 P.2d 1334 (1973), the testimony given by Dr. Cone will suffice. Appellant...

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