Pavey v. State
| Decision Date | 21 October 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 484S139,484S139 |
| Citation | 498 N.E.2d 1195 |
| Parties | Clarence PAVEY, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, June D. Oldham, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant Clarence Pavey was convicted, after jury trial, of the murder of his wife. Of the various issues raised in his direct appeal, we need address only the trial court's refusal to give defendant's voluntary intoxication instruction. The underlying legal question is whether our decision in Terry v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1085, shall be given retroactive application in this case.
Defendant's tendered instruction No. 1 was virtually identical to the voluntary intoxication instruction previously reviewed in both Williams v. State (1980), Ind., 402 N.E.2d 954, and Poe v. State (1983), Ind., 445 N.E.2d 94.
In reviewing the refusal of a tendered instruction, we must determine: (1) whether the tendered instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; and, (3) whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions which are given. Williams, supra; Davis v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 476, 355 N.E.2d 836.
A robbery conviction was reversed in Williams because of the trial court's refusal to give the tendered instruction regarding voluntary intoxication. Finding that robbery as charged was a specific intent crime, Williams held that intoxication may be a defense, and that the tendered instruction was "not an erroneous statement of the law." 402 N.E.2d at 955. Apparently in response to the Williams decision 1, the Indiana General Assembly amended Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-3-5(b) to provide that voluntary intoxication is a defense "only to the extent that it negates an element of an offense referred to by the phrase 'with intent to' or 'with an intention to'." Acts 1980, P.L. 205, Sec. 1. 2 Thereafter, in Poe, supra, we applied the intervening statutory change and held that a trial court properly refused the same voluntary intoxication instruction previously approved in Williams, because the offense of arson was not defined to require commission "with an intent to" or "with an intention to." 445 N.E.2d at 98. Such was the state of the law on July 1, 1983, when the jury was instructed in the instant case.
Subsequently, however, in Terry v. State, supra, (DeBruler, J., concurring in result) this Court held:
Any factor which serves as a denial of the existence of mens rea must be considered by a trier of fact before a guilty finding is entered. Historically, facts such as age, mental condition, mistake or intoxication have been offered to negate the capacity to formulate intent. The attempt by the legislature to remove the factor of voluntary intoxication except in limited situations, goes against this firmly engrained principle. We thus hold Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-3-5(b) is void and without effect.
465 N.E.2d at 1088. Defendant urges that our determination in Terry should be given retroactive effect, thus rendering erroneous the trial court's refusal to give defendant's voluntary intoxication instruction.
The issue of retroactive application of a new judicial rule was extensively addressed and definitively resolved in our recent unanimous decision in Rowley v. State (1985), Ind., 483 N.E.2d 1078, in which we held that retroactive effect is required where the new rule "is directly designed to enhance the reliability of criminal trials rather than when the rule has only a tangential relation to truth-finding at trial." 483 N.E.2d at 1082. In Rowley, we concluded that for retroactive application to be required, "[t]he alleged flaw which affects the fact finding process must directly and persuasively affect the determination of defendant's guilt or innocence." 483 N.E.2d at 1083.
We find that the judicial rule adopted in Terry clearly meets this requirement. By correcting prior law which precluded a defendant's right to offer a voluntary intoxication defense, the Terry holding corrected a flaw which directly and persuasively affected the fact finding process and the determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence. We therefore conclude that defendant's tendered voluntary intoxication instruction correctly stated the law.
To determine whether refusal of the instruction was error, we must next review the evidence to determine if it supported the giving of the instruction. A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any defense which has some foundation in the evidence. Warren v. State (1984), Ind., 470 N.E.2d 342; Harrington v. State (1980), Ind.App., 413 N.E.2d 622; Cyrus v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 461, 464, 381 N.E.2d 472, 474, cert. denied, 441 U.S. 935, 99 S.Ct. 2058, 60 L.Ed.2d 664 (1979).
The record contains evidence that defendant may have consumed 17-19 beers during the period of approximately nine hours before Mrs. Pavey was killed. She died during a volatile argument wherein the defendant shot his wife, and then shot himself. Defendant's consumption of alcohol was more or less continuous until just a few minutes before he shot his wife. Approximately one hour later, hospital technicians took a sample of defendant's blood which was found to contain the blood alcohol level of 0.17. In proceedings charging the offense of driving while intoxicated, a blood alcohol level of 0.10, or more, is statutory prima facia evidence of intoxication. 3 We do not suggest that the legislature's determination of the intoxication level beyond which driving ability is presumed impaired serves as an appropriate standard for determining the defense of voluntary intoxication in a murder trial. It is not. However, for our purposes in determining whether or not the evidence presented sufficient facts to warrant defendant's voluntary intoxication defense, it is helpful.
As we observed in Terry, "a defendant should not be relieved of responsibility when he was able to devise a plan, operate equipment, instruct the behavior of others or carry out acts requiring physical skill." 465 N.E.2d at 1088. However, under the facts of the present case, the evidence was sufficient to create a factual issue which entitled defendant to a jury determination of his voluntary intoxication defense. We...
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...the constitutional principles expounded in Terry to be so fundamental that we gave its rule retroactive application. See Pavey v. State, 498 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (Ind.1986) (applying Terry retroactively because its holding "corrected a flaw which directly and persuasively affected the fact fin......
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...U.S. Constitutions required voluntary intoxication to be available as a defense to any crime.15 We subsequently held in Pavey v. State, 498 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (Ind.1986) that Terry applied retroactively and, accordingly, reversed a pre-Terry conviction because the evidence there supported an......