Paxson v. Cunningham
| Decision Date | 26 June 1894 |
| Docket Number | 91. |
| Citation | 63 F. 132 |
| Parties | PAXSON et al. v. CUNNINGHAM. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Robert M. Morse and William M. Richardson, for appellants.
C. T. & T. H. Russell, Charles T. Russell, and Charles T. Russell Jr., for appellee.
This was a petition by Edward M. Paxson and others, receivers of the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company, for an injunction against Milford T. Cunningham, to restrain the prosecution of a libel in admiralty. The circuit court sustained a demurrer to the petition, and a decree dismissing the petition was entered thereon. The petitioners appealed.
Before GRAY, Circuit Justice, COLT, Circuit Judge, and CARPENTER District Judge.
This was a petition by the receivers of the property of the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company for an injunction to restrain the prosecution of a libel in admiralty against a steamship in their possession. The allegations of the petition were, in substance, as follows:
On February 20, 1893, the petitioners were appointed, by decree in equity of the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, receivers of the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company, a corporation of Pennsylvania, and of all its railroads, canals, collieries, boats, and vessels, and other property, real and personal, and were authorized to exercise the franchises of the company, and to run and operate its railroads and canals, and to use and employ its mines in the manner that they had been theretofore used and employed; and on February 21, 1893, a like decree was made by the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, appointing them receivers of the property of the railroad company within its jurisdiction. The receivers forthwith exercised the authority conferred by those decrees, and took possession of all the property of the company, including the steamship Williamsport, a steam collier used to carry coal taken from its mines from Philadelphia to Boston; and the use and employment of the steamship was continued by the receivers, and was necessary for the proper management and conduct of the business of the company.
On October 13, 1893, while the Williamsport was in Boston harbor, in the possession and employment of the receivers, she came into collision with the steam tug Bessie B, belonging to Milford T. Cunningham and others. On October 14th, Cunningham, as managing part owner of the tug, filed in the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts a libel in admiralty against the Williamsport, to enforce a maritime lien for damages caused by the collision; and the United States marshal, pursuant to a warrant issued by that court, seized the Williamsport, and took her into his custody and possession, and out of the custody and possession of the receivers. On November 8, 1893, the receivers moved the district court to dismiss the libel, and to deliver the steamship to the receivers, on the ground that the seizure by the marshal was illegal, and that that court acquired thereby no jurisdiction over the steamship. But the motion was denied. Thereupon, on the same day the receivers filed in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts this petition, praying for an injunction to restrain Cunningham from proceeding further with his libel, and to command him to release the steamship from the custody of the marshal, and deliver her into the possession of the receivers, and for further relief. Cunningham demurred to this petition upon the grounds that it did not state such a case as entitled the petitioners to an injunction or other relief, or as authorized the court to grant either, and that the suit which the petitioners prayed to have the respondent enjoined from further prosecuting 'is a libel in admiralty, brought by him as managing part owner of the steam tug Bessie B, in due form, and within the jurisdiction provided by the constitution and laws of the United States, against the said steamship Williamsport, as an offending res, to answer for her default and misdoing within the said admiralty jurisdiction, and the said respondent had the right to institute and has the right to maintain said suit, under the maritime law and under the constitution and laws of the United States, against the said steamship Williamsport.'
The circuit court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the petition, and the petitioners appealed to this court.
The case, as stated in the petition and admitted by the demurrer, is briefly this: After the steamship Williamsport, and all other property of the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company, had been taken possession of by the receivers of that company appointed by the circuit court of the United States, sitting in equity, she came into collision with another vessel, and was libeled by the owners of that vessel in the district court of the United States, sitting in admiralty, to enforce a maritime lien for damages caused by the collision.
The case involves no question of conflicting jurisdiction between the courts of the nation and those of the state, or of conflicting right between different claims existing against the railroad company or its property at the time of the appointment of the receivers. But the question is simply whether the claim of a maritime lien for an injury done by the Williamsport while in the possession and use of the receivers should be tried, in the first instance, in admiralty or in equity.
A maritime lien upon the offending ship for an injury by a collision is a jus in re in the ship herself, and carries with it the right to libel her in an admiralty court of the United States, unless the owners institute proceedings in such a court to limit their liability; and an admiralty court has peculiar rules of its own in some respects,-- such as the priority of this and other liens, and the effect of contributory negligence of the libelant upon the recovery of damages,-- which cannot conveniently, if at all, be applied by a court of equity or of common law. Transportation Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall 104; The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 11 Sup.Ct. 29; The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U.S. 1, 13 Sup.Ct. 498; Moran v. Sturges, 154 U.S. 256, 14 Sup.Ct. 1019; The America, 16 Law.Rep. 264, Fed. Cas. No. 288; Henry, Adm. cc. 3, 4.
Moreover by Act Aug. 13, 1888, c. 866, Sec. 3, 'every receiver or manager of any property, appointed by any court of the United States,...
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New York Dock Co v. the Poznan, 229
...furnished a vessel while in custodia legis. Cf. The Young America (D. C.) 30 F. 789; The Nisseqogue (D. C.) 280 F. 174; Paxson v. Cunningham (C. C. A.) 63 F. 132; The Willamette Valley (C. C. A.) 66 F. 565. But, in the view we take, the case does not turn upon possible exceptions to that ru......
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...furnished a vessel while in custodia legis. Cf. The Young America, D.C., 30 F. 789; The Nisseqogue, D.C., 280 F. 174; Paxson v. Cunningham, 1 Cir., 63 F. 132; The Willamette Valley, 9 Cir., 66 F. 565. But, in the view we take, the case does not turn upon possible exceptions to that rule, as......
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...... court ought not to be prevented by the equity court from. taking possession of the vessel and determining the claim. against her. Paxson v. Cunningham, 63 F. 132, 11. C.C.A. 111 (C.C.A. 1st Circuit). See, too, The Jonas H. French, 119 F. 462 (Dist. Ct. Mass.). . . In the. ......
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...and Paxson v. Cunningham (decided by Mr. Justice Gray in the circuit court of appeals of the United States for the First circuit) 11 C.C.A. 111, 63 F. 132, by both parties to this appeal, have been carefully considered. While those decisions are not directly in point upon the questions in c......