The Casco
| Decision Date | 24 January 1916 |
| Docket Number | 1441.,1440 |
| Citation | 230 F. 929 |
| Parties | THE CASCO. THE NO. 21. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Martin Gilbert, of Boston, Mass., for libelant.
The Eastern Dredging Company owned the dredge Casco and dump scow No. 21. It is a Maine corporation, and involuntary proceedings in bankruptcy were instituted against it in the district of Maine on December 3, 1915. On those proceedings a receiver was appointed by the United States District Court for that district on December 3, 1915; and on the next day an ancillary appointment of receiver was made by this court covering the property of the bankrupt in this district. The receivers at once took possession of said dredge and said dump scow. Thereafter, on January 5, 1916, the T. A. Scott Company filed these libels in rem against said vessels, which at that time were in this district in the custody of the receiver. The libels are founded on salvage services rendered to each vessel prior to the institution of the bankruptcy proceedings. The libelant moves that the order of this court in the receivership proceedings, restraining all persons from interfering with property in the possession of the receiver be so modified as to permit the marshal to arrest the vessels in order that these salvage claims may be tried out here in the admiralty court. The receiver, acting on an order of the District Court for the district of Maine opposes the motion. The motion is filed in the admiralty cases only, but as the merits have been fully argued I shall treat it as if made in the ancillary bankruptcy proceedings also.
If the vessels had been seized under the admiralty process, before the bankruptcy proceedings were begun, the admiralty court would not surrender them. The Philomena, 200 F. 859 (Dist. Ct. Mass.). In a case in which the admiralty court took possession of the vessel after the institution of the bankruptcy proceedings, but before the adjudication, this court denied a petition by the receiver in bankruptcy that the proceeds of the sale of the vessel be turned over to him, and proceeded with the admiralty case. The Bethulia, 200 F. 862 (Dist. Ct. Mass.). In The Geisha (D.C.) 200 F. 864, a similar petition was denied in a case where the libel was filed before the bankruptcy proceedings began, but possession of the vessel was not taken by the marshal under his warrant until after the adjudication in bankruptcy had been ordered, the vessel being apparently still in the bankrupt's possession. If a vessel in the possession and control of receivers in equity, and being operated by them, becomes liable for a maritime tort, it was held that the admiralty court ought not to be prevented by the equity court from taking possession of the vessel and determining the claim against her. Paxson v. Cunningham, 63 F. 132, 11 C.C.A. 111 (C.C.A. 1st Circuit). See, too, The Jonas H. French, 119 F. 462 (Dist. Ct. Mass.).
In the present case the alleged liability of the vessels arose before the bankruptcy proceedings were begun, but possession of them had been taken by the receiver in bankruptcy before the libel was filed; and the question is whether he shall be ousted to allow the admiralty court to proceed.
It is settled that the admiralty jurisdiction over vessels is not of such exclusive and fundamental character that, for the purpose of enforcing maritime liens against them, they will be taken from anybody in whose possession they may be found. The admiralty court has no right to seize vessels in the custody of another court without that court's permission. Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 584, 15 L.Ed. 1028. It is clear that the libelant is not entitled to the desired order as a matter of right.
The utmost that the libelant can claim is that, as a matter of sound discretion, this court should permit the seizure of the vessels in the admiralty cases. It is not clear that the court has authority to grant such permission. In the first place, the property in question is being administered by the District Court for Maine, and it is doubtful whether this court has any authority to direct the Maine receiver, although he has an ancillary appointment here, to relinquish property in his possession.
' Day, J., Acme Co. v. Beekman Co., 222 U.S. 300, 307, 32 Sup.Ct. 96, 100 (56 L.Ed. 208).
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Millenium Seacarriers, Inc.
... ... Hellenic I, 38 B.R. at 996 (citing Ciel Y Cia S.A. v. Nereide Societa Di Navigazione per Azioni, 28 B.R. 378, 1983 A.M.C. 1192, 1194 (E.D.Va.1983)); see The Casco, 230 F. 929 (D.Mass.1916); Landers, supra, at 493-94; see also In re McLean Indus., Inc., 857 F.2d 88, 90 (2d Cir.1988) (dismissing without prejudice bankruptcy appeal brought by seamen seeking to enforce lien priority upon vessels in custody of High Court of Singapore in order to permit that ... ...
-
Butler v. Ellis
... ... The Casco (D. C.) 230 F. 929, involved the question as to whether a court of bankruptcy of ancillary jurisdiction would surrender property in its possession to a court of admiralty in order that admiralty liens might be declared and enforced by the latter, not whether the court which had taken possession of ... ...
-
Lamprecht v. Cleveland-Erieau S. S. Co.
... ... Paris ... Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259, 18 Sup.Ct. 62, ... 42 L.Ed. 458; In re People's Mail Steamship Co., Fed ... Cas. No. 10970; In re Hughes (D.C.) 170 F. 809; ... The Falcon (3 C.C.A.) 177 F. 916, 101 C.C.A. 196; The Jonas ... H. French (D.C.) 119 F. 462; The Casco (D.C.) 230 F. 929 ... These authorities support these propositions, but there are ... respectable dicta to the contrary. No opinion is expressed by ... us on this point because it is unnecessary so to do in view ... of our conclusion upon the first proposition ... Nor is ... any ... ...
-
West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Dillman
... ... In the absence of any act of Congress fixing the procedure in such cases, the question presented is not without difficulty. The Bethulia (D. C.) 200 F. 862; The Casco (D. C.) 230 F. 929. Courts of admiralty and bankruptcy courts are by statute given exclusive jurisdiction within their peculiar spheres, but the jurisdiction of both is vested in the District Courts of the United States. Each of these divisions of the court below had jurisdiction of the ... ...