Paxton Resources, LLC v. Brannaman, No. 03-143

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
• Writing for the Court: VOIGT, Justice.
• Citation: 2004 WY 93,95 P.3d 796
• Docket Number: No. 03-144, No. 03-143
• Decision Date: 12 August 2004
• Parties: PAXTON RESOURCES, L.L.C., Appellant (Defendant), v. DAN M. "BUCK" BRANNAMAN and MARY C. BRANNAMAN, Appellees (Plaintiffs). DAN M. "BUCK" BRANNAMAN and MARY C. BRANNAMAN, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. PAXTON RESOURCES, L.L.C., Appellee (Defendant).

2004 WY 93
95 P.3d 796

PAXTON RESOURCES, L.L.C., Appellant (Defendant),
v.
DAN M. "BUCK" BRANNAMAN and MARY C. BRANNAMAN, Appellees (Plaintiffs).
DAN M. "BUCK" BRANNAMAN and MARY C. BRANNAMAN, Appellants (Plaintiffs),
v.
PAXTON RESOURCES, L.L.C., Appellee (Defendant)

Nos. 03-143, 03-144

Supreme Court of Wyoming. APRIL TERM, A.D. 2004.

August 12, 2004

Representing Paxton Resources, L.L.C.: Kevin D. Huber, Richard Day and P. Craig Silva of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Dan M. "Buck" Brannaman and Mary C. Brannaman: Jay A. Gilbertz and Michael K. Davis of Yonkee & Toner, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

VOIGT, Justice.

[¶1] Dan M. "Buck" Brannaman and Mary C. Brannaman (the Brannamans) sued a coalbed methane gas developer, Paxton Resources, L.L.C. (Paxton), for damages to their real property and for lost income. The complaint stated causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, trespass and negligence, and sought a declaratory judgment and punitive damages. A jury awarded the Brannamans compensatory damages of $810,887.00 for Paxton's breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Paxton appealed the judgment and the district court's denial of its W.R.C.P. 50 and 59 motions for judgment as a matter of law, for new trial, and for remittitur. The Brannamans appealed the district court's dismissal of their trespass and punitive damages claims.

[¶2] We dismiss the appeal and cross appeal because they were not timely filed.

ISSUES

1. Should this appeal be dismissed because it was not timely filed?

2. Did the district court err in refusing to give to the jury Paxton's proposed damages instruction?

3. Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Paxton's expert witness to testify at trial?

4. Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Paxton breached the contract?

5. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Paxton's motion for remittitur?

6. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Paxton's motion for a new trial?

FACTS

[¶3] The relevant facts are those having to do with the chronology of procedural events after the jury trial:

February 7, 2003 Jury verdict February 25, 2003 Post-trial motions filed February 26, 2003 Judgment entered March 31, 2003 Order setting hearing entered June 9, 2003 Hearing on post-trial motions June 27, 2003 Order denying post-trial motions entered July 3, 2003 Paxton's notice of appeal filed July 11, 2003 Brannamans' conditional notice of appeal filed

DISCUSSION

[¶4] The interplay of several court rules dictates the outcome of this case. To begin with, W.R.A.P. 2.01(a) provides that "[a]n appeal from a trial court to an appellate court shall be taken by filing the notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days from entry of the appealable order . . .." Subsection (a)(2) of the same section goes on to provide that "[i]f a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 15 days of the date on which the first notice of appeal was filed." Of particular significance to the present case is the exception to these time limitations found in W.R.A.P. 2.02:

(a) The running of the time for appeal in a civil case is tolled as to all parties by the timely filing of a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b), Wyo. R. Civ. P.; a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact under Rule 52(b), Wyo. R. Civ. P., whether or not alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59, Wyo. R. Civ. P., or a motion for a new trial under Rule 59, Wyo. R. Civ. P.

(b) The full time for appeal commences to run and is to be computed from the entry of any order granting or denying a motion for judgment; a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact; or a motion to alter or amend the judgment, or denying a motion for a new trial. If no order is entered, the full time for appeal commences to run when any such motion is deemed denied.

(Emphasis added.)

[¶5] W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2) governs the district court's hearing of such motions:

A request for hearing may be served by the moving party or any party affected by the motion within 30 days after service of the motion. Absent a timely request for hearing the court may, in its discretion, determine the motion without a hearing. A motion not determined within 90 days after filing shall be deemed denied. A party whose motion has been deemed denied shall have 10 days after the effective date of such denial to serve such pleadings or other papers, if any, as may be required or permitted.

(Emphasis added.) And finally, the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure spell out the consequences of an appeal being filed "too early" or "too late." Under W.R.A.P. 2.04, "[a] notice of appeal filed prematurely shall be treated as though filed on the same day as entry of the appealable order . . .." On the other hand, W.R.A.P. 1.03 specifies that "[t]he timely filing of a notice of appeal . . . is jurisdictional."

[¶6] The following sequence of events sets the stage for our inquiry: the motions were filed, judgment was entered, the order setting the motions for hearing was entered, the ninety-day "deemed denied" date passed, the hearing was held, the thirty-day appeal deadline after the "deemed denied" date passed, the order denying the motions was entered, the notice of appeal was filed. There is no dispute that the appeal was filed more than thirty days after the "deemed denied" date. The sole question is whether the district court's entry of the setting order during the ninety-day period acted to toll the time for appeal or acted as a determination of the motions.

[¶7] Wyoming's case law in this area must be read in the context of the rules in effect at the time. In Brasel & Sims Const. Co. v. Neuman Transit Co., 378 P.2d 501, 502-03 (Wyo. 1963), this Court denied a motion to dismiss the appeal where the appellee argued that the notice of appeal had not been filed within the time required by former W.R.C.P. 59(f) (1966), which provided as follows:

Motions for new trial and motions to alter or amend a judgment shall be determined within sixty days after the entry of the judgment, and if not so determined shall be deemed denied, unless within such sixty days the determination is continued by order of the court or by stipulation.

[¶8] Clearly, the rule as then incarnated provided methods for the parties and the district court to delay determination of such motions beyond the "deemed denied" date. In Brasel & Sims Const. Co., we concluded that the district court and the parties had proceeded as if the court's order, issued at a party's request, extending the time for determination of the motion apparently was to be effective "until the matter was resolved by the trial court." Id. at 503. We further opined, however, that "a lack of clarity of Rule 59(f), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, might well be contended because there is no provision as to what occurs after the continuance therein provided." Id.

[¶9] In McMullen v. McMullen, 559 P.2d 37, 38 (Wyo. 1977), under the same version of the court rule, this Court dismissed an appeal as untimely because it had not been filed within thirty days after a motion for mistrial was deemed denied, and no extension of time for the motion's determination had been...