Payne v. Galen Hosp. Corp., 99-1011

• Citation: 28 S.W.3d 15
• Decision Date: 24 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-1011,99-1011
• Parties: (Tex. 2000) Janis Ann Payne, Petitioner v. Galen Hospital Corporation d/b/a Clear Lake Medical Center, Respondent
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Page 15

28 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. 2000)

Janis Ann Payne, Petitioner v. Galen Hospital Corporation d/b/a Clear Lake Medical Center, Respondent

No. 99-1011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

Decided August 24, 2000.

Argued on March 22, 2000

On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas

Justice O'Neill delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner injured her back while working as a hospital nurse and had a prescription filled to treat her injury at the hospital pharmacy, which provides medication only to hospital patients and employees who suffer on-the-job injuries. Petitioner suffered a severe and permanently disabling reaction to the medication, and she sued the hospital for negligence and gross negligence in filling her prescription. The parties agree that the full range of petitioner's injuries are compensable under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, and that she has received and continues to receive full compensation benefits. We must decide whether petitioner is barred by the Act's exclusive-remedy provision from bringing common-law claims against the hospital based upon the pharmacy's alleged negligence. We hold that petitioner's reaction to the medication is a work-related injury for purposes of the exclusive-remedy provision and affirm the court of appeals' judgment.

I Background

Janis Payne was employed as a registered nurse by Galen Hospital when she injured her back. Dr. Green, a physician not associated with the hospital, treated Payne and diagnosed her as having a lumbar strain. When her back pain began to interfere with her ability to work, Green prescribed Toradol, a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug that had been on the market for less than five months. The drug's package insert warned that it was not to be used for chronic pain and was only to be used for "a limited duration."

Payne filled her prescription for Toradol at the hospital pharmacy. The pharmacy is not open to the public, nor is it available to hospital employees in general; it dispenses drugs only to hospital patients and employees requiring medication for on-the-job injuries. As an employee injured on the job, Payne received her medication free of charge.

Payne took Toradol for four and one-half months. Because of this prolonged use she suffered a severe reaction. She developed vasculitis, breathing problems, cataracts, peripheral-nerve damage, joint damage, and severe depression. She is totally and permanently disabled and will be confined to a wheelchair for the rest of her life.

Payne has received and continues to receive workers' compensation benefits for her back injury and for her Toradol reaction. All of her medical treatments for her back injury and for her Toradol reaction have been paid for by the hospital's workers' compensation carrier. She has also received payments for lost wages since she injured her back. As of September 1996, $534,802 had been paid to Payne's healthcare providers and $87,783 had been paid directly to Payne.

Payne sued the hospital, Dr. Green, and Toradol's manufacturer, alleging that their negligence and gross negligence caused her Toradol reaction. The hospital's workers' compensation carrier intervened to recover payments made under the workers' compensation policy. The hospital moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive-remedy provision bars Payne's suit and, alternatively, that by accepting workers' compensation benefits Payne is estopped from proceeding with her common-law claims against the hospital. The trial court granted the hospital summary judgment and dismissed the workers' compensation carrier's claims against the hospital. The trial court then severed the claims against the hospital, leaving only the claims against Dr. Green and the drug manufacturer, which settled.

Payne appealed the summary judgment. The court of appeals originally reversed the summary judgment, but on rehearing withdrew its original opinion and affirmed the trial court's decision. See 4 S.W.3d 312, 313. The court of appeals, with one justice dissenting, held that Payne's Toradol reaction is a work-related injury and that therefore the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive-remedy provision bars her common-law claims against the hospital. See id. at 317.

Payne petitioned this Court for review. She argues that the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive-remedy provision does not bar her common-law claims against the hospital because her Toradol reaction is not work-related and did not result from her employer-employee relationship with the hospital. She further argues that the election-of-remedies doctrine does not bar her common-law claims because the hospital produced no summary judgment evidence that she exercised an informed choice between her possible remedies.

We hold that Payne's reaction to Toradol is a work-related injury subject to the Act's exclusive-remedy bar, and that she may not avoid that bar by claiming that the hospital was not acting as her employer when it filled her prescription. Accordingly, the hospital was entitled to summary judgment. Because we hold that workers' compensation benefits are Payne's only remedy against the hospital for her Toradol reaction, we need not consider whether the election-of-remedies doctrine bars her common-law claims.

II Exclusive-Remedy Provision

A primary purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to relieve employees injured on the job of the burden of proving their employer's negligence and to provide them prompt remuneration for their on-the-job injuries. See Paradissis v. Royal Indem. Co., 507 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. 1974). Because of this purpose, we have liberally construed the Act in the employee's favor. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Sinclair, 984 S.W.2d 958, 961 (Tex. 1999); Lujan v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1988). Under the Act, only injuries occurring "in the course and scope of employment" are compensable. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 8308-1.03(10) (repealed) (current version at Tex. Lab. Code § 401.011(10)).¹ The Act defines "course and scope of employment" as "an activity of any kind or character that has to do with and originates in the work, business, trade, or profession of the employer and that is performed by the employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer." Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 8308-1.03(12) (repealed) (current version at Tex. Lab. Code § 401.011(12)).

To fully effectuate the Act's purpose to provide prompt and certain remuneration to injured employees, "course and scope" has been interpreted expansively to include additional injuries that result from treating on-the-job injuries. See Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gonzales, 518 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Tex. 1975); see also Duke v. Wilson, 900 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1995, writ denied). When considering the extent of a compensable injury, "[t]he full consequences of the original injury, together with the effects of its treatment, upon the general health and body of the workman are to be considered." Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 518 S.W.2d at 526. Thus, if an additional injury occurs "in the probable sequence of events and aris[es] from the actual compensable injury," it is deemed to have occurred in the course and scope of employment for compensation purposes. Duke, 900 S.W.2d at 886. For example, in Western Casualty, the employee injured his finger at work. He became permanently disabled because of pain medication administered to treat his injury. See 518 S.W.2d at 525. We held that he was entitled to compensation for total disability. See id. at 528. Similarly, in Duke, the employee injured her right knee at work. See 900 S.W.2d at 883. Her doctor operated on the wrong knee, and complications resulted in the loss of her left knee cap. See id. The court concluded that the loss of her left knee cap was a compensable injury. See id. at 886.

Drugs prescribed for on-the-job injuries are considered part of an employee's treatment under the Act.² See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. arts. 8308-1.03(20)(E), 8308-4.69 (repealed) (current versions at Tex. Lab. Code §§ 401.011(19)(E), 408.028). In her deposition, Payne testified that when she returned to work after her injury her back was easily irritated, and this interfered with her ability to do her job. Dr. Green prescribed Toradol to treat her back pain, and she filled this prescription at the hospital pharmacy. Payne suffered a severe reaction to the Toradol after taking it for four and one-half months. Clearly, Payne's Toradol reaction resulted from treating her on-the-job back injury; therefore, her injury arose in the course and scope of her employment for compensation purposes.

Payne concedes that her reaction to Toradol is a compensable injury under the Act, and that she has been receiving workers' compensation benefits for her Toradol reaction since February 1993. Necessarily, then, Payne agrees that, at least for compensation purposes, her Toradol reaction arose in the course and scope of her employment. But Payne argues that her Toradol reaction was an independent injury that did not occur in the course and scope of her employment for purposes of the exclusive-remedy provision, which applies only to "work-related injur[ies]." The hospital, on the other hand, contends and the court of appeals agreed, that "compensability" and "exclusivity" are coextensive, and that the recovery of benefits under the Act is the exclusive remedy against a covered employer for a compensable injury.

We have never decided whether an injury arising in the course and scope of employment for compensation purposes is necessarily "work-related" for exclusivity purposes. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 8308-4.01(a) (repealed) (current version at Tex. Lab. Code § 408.001(a)). The Act does not define "work-related injury," and this Court has not construed the term. Courts seem to use the terms "course and scope of employment"...