Payne v. Gundy

• Decision Date: 15 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 23057,23057
• Citation: 196 W.Va. 82,468 S.E.2d 335
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Patricia L. PAYNE, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Samuel A. GUNDY, Defendant Below, Appellee.

Page 335

468 S.E.2d 335

196 W.Va. 82

Patricia L. PAYNE, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Samuel A. GUNDY, Defendant Below, Appellee.

No. 23057.

Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia.

Submitted Jan. 23, 1996.

Decided Feb. 15, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "In a civil action for recovery of damages for personal injuries in which the jury returns a verdict for the plaintiff which is manifestly inadequate in amount and which, in that respect, is not supported by the evidence, a new trial may be granted to the plaintiff on the issue of damages on the ground of the inadequacy of the amount of the verdict." Syl. pt. 3, Biddle v. Haddix, 154 W.Va. 748, 179 S.E.2d 215 (1971).

2. "Rule 59(a), R.C.P., provides that a new trial may be granted to any of the parties on all or part of the issues, and in a case where the question of liability has been resolved in favor of the plaintiff leaving only the issue of damages, the verdict of the jury may be set aside and a new trial granted on the single issue of damages." Syl. pt. 4, Richmond v. Campbell, 148 W.Va. 595, 136 S.E.2d 877 (1964).

3. "The concept of equal protection of the laws is inherent in article three, section ten of the West Virginia Constitution, and the scope and application of this protection is coextensive or broader than that of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution." Syl. pt. 3, Robertson v. Goldman, 179 W.Va. 453, 369 S.E.2d 888 (1988).

4. It is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and article III, section 10, of the Constitution of West Virginia for a party in a civil action to purposefully eliminate potential jurors from a jury through the use of peremptory strikes solely upon the basis of gender.

5. To establish a prima facie case of unlawful gender discrimination in the jury selection process through the use of peremptory strikes, the party moving to disqualify the jury must show: (1) that the opposing party has exercised peremptory strikes to eliminate potential jurors of the movant's gender, and (2) that the circumstances raise an inference that the opposing party used the peremptory strikes to exclude from the jury potential jurors solely upon the basis of their gender. The opposing party may defeat a prima facie case of such unlawful discrimination by providing non-discriminatory, credible reasons for using the peremptory strikes to eliminate members of the moving party's gender from the jury. Although the reasons or explanations of the opposing party for striking members of the moving party's gender from the jury need not rise to the level of a "for cause" challenge, the trial court has the discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing upon the motion to disqualify the jury because of unlawful gender discrimination.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Honorable Jay M. Hoke, Judge, Civil Action No. 93-C-12.

Daniel F. Hedges, Charleston, for Appellant.

Samuel A. Gundy, Branchland, pro se.

McHUGH, Chief Justice:

This appeal is before this Court from the final order of the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, West Virginia, entered on March 27, 1995. The appeal involves an action for assault and battery instituted by the appellant, Patricia L. Payne, against the appellee, Samuel A. Gundy. Although the jury returned a verdict against the appellee for $1,000 in punitive damages, no compensatory damages were awarded to the appellant. The appellant filed a motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment upon the jury verdict. W.Va.R.Civ.P. 59. The motion was denied, and this appeal followed.

This Court has before it the petition for appeal, the brief of the appellant and all matters of record. The appellee has not appeared in this appeal. In addition to challenging the adequacy of the jury verdict, the appellant contends that the elimination of women from the jury through the appellee's use of peremptory strikes violated the appellant's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. For the reasons stated below, this Court agrees with the appellant in both respects, and we reverse the final order of the circuit court and remand this action for a new trial.

I

According to the testimony adduced at trial, the appellant and the appellee cohabited in a home in Lincoln County for approximately eighteen years. The appellant was employed as a seamstress and the appellee was largely unemployed. No children were born of the relationship. The appellant indicated that she left the home in November 1992 because of repeated beatings by the appellee and fear for her safety. In January 1993, the appellant instituted an action in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County for assault and battery. The relief demanded in the complaint included both punitive and compensatory damages. The appellee never filed an answer to the complaint.

The complaint, as well as the testimony of the appellant at trial, focused upon three alleged incidents of violence committed against the appellant by the appellee. According to the appellant, the first incident occurred in 1990 wherein the appellee became angry and knocked the appellant to the floor and beat the appellant about the head, neck and shoulders. The appellant described the consequences of that incident as follows: "The bruises were on my shoulders, my back. I had knots on my head. I had bruises on my arm. I couldn't use my left arm. I was off of work for two weeks. I could not lift anything, and it was just a bad time." The second incident occurred in October 1991. As to that incident, the appellant stated that the appellee became angry and "busted my mouth open" and then knocked the appellant unconscious. At trial, the appellant indicated that both the incidents of 1990 and October 1991 resulted in treatment of the appellant by a medical doctor. The third incident occurred in March 1992 and, as the appellant testified, consisted of a threat by the appellee to kill the appellant.

The testimony of the appellee, who appeared pro se at trial, consisted of a general denial of the incidents described by the appellant. The appellee, however, admitted that he struck the appellant on one occasion. The appellee stated, however, that he struck the appellant because she was hitting him. The appellee further asserted that any physical injuries suffered by the appellant were the result of an automobile accident.

The trial was conducted on October 11, 1994. During the trial, the circuit court ruled in favor of the appellant as a matter of law upon the question of liability. The question of damages was submitted to the jury, and the jury was instructed as to both punitive and compensatory damages. Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict against the appellee for $1,000 in punitive damages. However, the jury awarded no compensatory damages to the appellant. The appellant objected to the jury's verdict at trial and subsequently filed a motion pursuant to W.Va.R.Civ.P. 59 for a new trial or, in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment upon the jury's verdict. ¹ As reflected in the final order entered on March 27, 1995, the circuit court denied the motion. This appeal is from the March 27, 1995, order.

II

It should be noted that, the question of liability not being raised in this appeal, the sole issue with regard to the jury verdict concerns the award of zero compensatory damages and the subsequent denial of the appellant's motion for a new trial. In Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc., 194 W.Va. 97, 104, 459 S.E.2d 374, 381 (1995), this Court stated that, as a general proposition, "we review a circuit court's rulings on a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard." See also Coleman v. Sopher, 194 W.Va. 90, 96, 459 S.E.2d 367, 373 (1995); syl. pt. 2, Maynard v. Adkins, 193 W.Va. 456, 457 S.E.2d 133 (1995); syl. pt. 3, In re State Public Building Asbestos Litigation, 193 W.Va. 119, 454 S.E.2d 413 (1994).

Although this Court has stated that in an appeal from an allegedly inadequate damage award "the evidence concerning damages is to be viewed most strongly in favor of the defendant," syl. pt. 1, in part, Kaiser v. Hensley, 173 W.Va. 548, 318 S.E.2d 598 (1983), we have "consistently held that where there is uncontroverted evidence of damages and liability is proven, a verdict not reflecting them is inadequate." Raines v. Thomas, 175 W.Va. 11, 14, 330 S.E.2d 334, 336 (1985). See also syl. pt. 2, Godfrey v. Godfrey, 193 W.Va. 407, 456 S.E.2d 488 (1995); syl. pt. 1, Bennett v. Angus, 192 W.Va. 1, 449 S.E.2d 62 (1994); syl. pt. 1, Linville v. Moss, 189 W.Va 570, 433 S.E.2d 281 (1993); syl. pt. 2, Fullmer v. Swift Energy Co. Inc., 185 W.Va. 45, 404 S.E.2d 534 (1991).

In particular, this Court held in syllabus point 3 of Biddle v. Haddix, 154 W.Va. 748, 179 S.E.2d 215 (1971), as follows:

In a civil action for recovery of damages for personal injuries in which the jury returns a verdict for the plaintiff which is manifestly inadequate in amount and which, in that respect, is not supported by the evidence, a new trial may be granted to the plaintiff on the issue of damages on the ground of the inadequacy of the amount of the verdict.

See also syl. pt. 3, Ellard v. Harvey, 159 W.Va. 871, 231 S.E.2d 339 (1976).

Similar to this action, the circumstances of Hagley v. Short, 190 W.Va. 672, 441 S.E.2d 393 (1994), involved a claim for damages where the defendant struck the plaintiff with his fist. In Hagley, the issue of liability was resolved in favor of the plaintiff prior to trial, and the case was submitted to the jury upon the question of damages. Although the evidence was uncontroverted that the plaintiff lost wages and incurred medical expenses as a result of the incident, the jury awarded the plaintiff no damages. Moreover, the plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied by the circuit court. This Court, in Hagley, reversed and remanded the case for...