Payne v. Lee, 34255.

• Decision Date: 05 July 1946
• Docket Number: No. 34255.,34255.
• Citation: 222 Minn. 269,24 N.W.2d 259
• Parties: PAYNE v. LEE.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

24 N.W.2d 259

222 Minn. 269

PAYNE v. LEE.

No. 34255.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 5, 1946.

Original proceeding by Lucien Payne, as administrator with the will annexed of estate of Isabelle McCorquodale, deceased, against William Lee, as judge of Probate Court in and for the County of Yellow Medicine, for a writ of prohibition commanding respondent to desist from hearing and determining any and all matters at issue in such estate.

Writ of prohibition made absolute.

Lauerman & Pfeiffer of Olivia, for relator.

Salmer N. Knutson, of Granite Falls, for respondent.

MATSON, Justice.

Relator, Lucien Payne, as administrator of the estate of Isabelle McCorquodale, deceased, petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition directed to respondent as judge of the probate court in and for Yellow Medicine county, commanding him to desist and refrain from hearing and determining any and all matters in said estate now in issue. In particular, the contested matters before the probate court which relator seeks to restrain respondent from determining are:

(1) The final account of a former special administrator, A. F. Koch, to which account relator has duly filed objections.

(2) A claim for $320 against decedent's estate filed by Dean Rogers for board, lodging, and transportation furnished decedent, to which claim relator has duly filed objections.

(3) An order to show cause issued by respondent directing relator to appear before respondent on March 25, 1946, and show cause why relator's letters of administration herein should not be revoked.

On March 19, 1946, a writ of prohibition issued out of this court commanding respondent to desist and refrain from all proceedings herein until the further order of this court and to show cause here on March 28, 1946, at 9:30 a. m. why he should not be permanently restrained from further proceeding in said estate.

This controversy relates back to respondent's appointment of said A. F. Koch as special administrator and subsequently as general administrator with the will annexed of said estate notwithstanding the opposition thereto of relator and the residuary devisees. Relator appealed from such orders of appointment to the district court of Yellow Medicine county, which subsequently reversed the probate court, vacated its orders of appointment, and directed the appointment of relator as administrator with the will annexed in said estate.

Relator contends that respondent is disqualified from acting further as a judge in said probate proceedings by reason of prejudice or bias, and that he is further disqualified on the ground that he may be a necessary witness in controverted matters involved therein. If bias or prejudice exists and constitutes a ground for disqualification, it will not be necessary to consider whether sufficient showing has been made to establish the second ground, namely, that respondent is or will be a necessary witness in the proceedings. Respondent, in answer to relator's petition and supporting affidavits, makes no specific or general denial of bias, except to deny that he has any interest in the estate, in the appointment of any person as representative, in the allowance or disallowance of the final account, or in the allowance or disallowance of any claim against the estate.

We note that as a result of the litigation herein a good deal of bitterness has been engendered between relator, his attorneys, and the residuary devisees on the one hand, and respondent on the other, with sharp correspondence passing between them and culminating in respondent's order directing relator to show cause why he should not be removed as such administrator. No purpose will be served by a detailed review of the showing of fact indicating the growth and existence of mutual antagonism. It is sufficient to note that the resulting atmosphere has been tense and anything but conducive to the maintenance of that neutral state of mind so necessary to the adjudication of controversial issues. Whether either party has been at fault or whether a natural antipathy exists, we need not decide. It is enough that, for one reason or another, a condition has arisen that will indeed make it difficult, if not impossible, for respondent to assume in fact and appearance a role of unquestioned impartiality in determining the matters in dispute. Under the circumstances, it appears that bias or prejudice exists in fact. We therefore turn to the question as to whether bias or prejudice constitutes a ground for disqualification.

1. Bias or prejudice disqualifies a probate judge from hearing a case and imperatively requires that a probate judge from another county be summoned to act in his stead. It is true that in enacting Minn.St.1945 and M.S.A. § 525.05, the legislature did not specify bias as one of the grounds for disqualification, but it should be noted that the grounds given are not exclusive and that others were contemplated as existing. This becomes at once apparent by an examination of the section immediately following, namely, § 525.051, which provides: "When the disqualification, absence, or illness of the resident judge exists, or when in his opinion the interest of the public or of any person interested in any matter requires that the probate judge of another county act in the stead of the resident judge, any other judge may act upon the request of the resident judge, or in the event of his incapacity, upon the request of the presiding judge of the district court in the county wherein such matter is pending." (Italics supplied.)

The words above italicized confer upon the resident probate judge a judicial, and not an arbitrary, discretion, which requires him, in the event of bias toward any party in interest, to recognize his disqualification.¹

Failure to recognize bias as a ground of disqualification is an abuse of discretion and a violation of Minn.Const. (Bill of Rights) art. 1, § 8, which provides: "Every person * * * ought to obtain justice freely and without purchase; completely and without denial * * *." (Italics supplied.)

A concept of judicial administration which leads one to assume that justice can be obtained "completely and without denial" before a tribunal that is partial, biased, or hostile is certainly one alien to our institutions. If we were to assume that complete justice could with any likelihood be so dispensed, it would be a justice which commanded neither the respect nor the confidence of the citizen. Mr. Justice Dunbar in State ex rel. Barnard v. Board of Education, 19 Wash. 8, 17, 52 P. 317, 320, 40 L.R.A. 317, 67 Am.St.Rep. 706, in pointing out the necessity of an impartiality, free of all suspicion, said:

"* * * The principle of impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness on the part of the judge is as old as the history of courts; in fact, the administration of justice through the mediation of courts is based upon this principle. It is a fundamental idea, running through and pervading the whole system of judicature, and it is the popular acknowledgment of the inviolability of this principle which gives credit, or even toleration, to decrees of judicial tribunals. Actions of courts which disregard this safeguard to litigants would more appropriately be termed the administration of injustice, and their proceedings would be as shocking to our private sense of justice as they would be injurious to the public interest. The learned and observant Lord Bacon well said that the virtue of a judge is seen in making inequality equal, that he may plant his judgment as upon even ground. Caesar demanded that his wife should not only be virtuous, but beyond suspicion; and the state should not be any less exacting with its judicial officers, in whose keeping are placed not only the financial interests, but the honor, the liberty, and the lives of its citizens, and it should see to it that the scales in which the rights of the citizen are weighed should be nicely balanced, for, as was well said by Judge Bronson in People v. Suffolk Common Pleas, 18 Wend., N.Y., 550:

"`Next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment, is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge.'"

In Ex parte Ellis, 3 Okl.Cr. 220, 227, 105 P. 184, 187, 25 L.R.A.,N.S., 653, 661, Ann.Cas.1921A, 863, the court said: "* * * No technical refinement of argument can convince the people that a prejudiced judge can fairly try a case between his friend and his foe. Such a thing might occur, but the general public would not look upon such a trial as an administration of justice without prejudice."

Idaho (art. I, § 18) and Oklahoma (art. II, § 6) have similar provisions in their constitutions to the effect that "justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice." It is true that these constitutional provisions expressly include the word "prejudice." By contrast, however, our constitution emphasizes substantially the same requirement for unbiased justice by providing that justice shall be obtained "completely and without denial." The Idaho supreme court in construing its constitutional provision said in Day v. Day, 12 Idaho 556, 562, 86 P. 531, 532, 10 Ann.Cas. 260, 262: "* * * There is no question but what said provision is self-operating, and it is regarded as settled in this country, that all negative or prohibitive clauses in a constitution are self-executing."

The court further said (12 Idaho 563, 86 P. 533, 10 Ann.Cas. 262): "* * * For it cannot be maintained that a judge who is biased or prejudiced in a case on trial before him can administer justice without prejudice. Disregarding said provisions of the Constitution, the ordinary principles of right and justice prohibit or disqualify a judge from trying a case in which he is prejudiced for or against either of the parties to the suit. This provision of the Constitution cannot be brushed aside by saying that it is a mere maxim of the law and means...