Payne v. Metz

• Decision Date: 01 January 1855
• Citation: 14 Tex. 56
• Parties: D. F. PAYNE v. V. G. METZ.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

14 Tex. 56

D. F. PAYNE

v.V. G. METZ.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1855.

Where parties proceed under the act of April 25, 1846, (Hart. Dig., p. 89,) to arbitrate their controversy, and by their agreement stipulate that there shall be no appeal, either party may object to the entry of the award as the judgment of the court on the ground of fraud, partiality, misconduct, or gross mistake on the part of the arbitrators to the manifest injury of the party complaining.

Such objection is properly made before the entry of the award by petition setting forth the facts which constitute the ground of objection.

Where there is a waiver to the right to appeal in an agreement to arbitrate under the statute, in order to authorize the District Court to interfere as a court of equity, there must appear to have been fraud, partiality, misconduct, or gross mistake committed on the part of the arbitrators to the manifest injury of the party complaining. (Note 13.)

Where an award under the statute (an appeal being waived) is found on objection thereto to be liable to the charge of fraud, partiality, misconduct, or gross mistake on the part of the arbitrators, the court should not only refuse to enter it as the judgment of the court, but should set it aside, and if the case is one proper for judicial cognizance, having obtained jurisdiction, should proceed to a final adjudication and settlement of the rights of the parties. (Note 14.)

Error from Colorado. This was a submission to arbitration under the statute (Hart. Dig., p. 89) of the statement of account between the parties as partners in trade. It was agreed there should be no appeal. The award was filed with a motion that it be entered as the judgment of the court. Before it was so entered Metz filed a petition in which he alleged gross mistakes, stating the particulars, on the part of the arbitrators, which resulted in great injury to him, and prayed that the award be not entered as to the judgment of the court, but be set aside, and the account be referred to an auditor to be correctly stated, and for general relief. The petition was verified by the plaintiff's affidavit. The court heard the evidence, and made an order overruling the motion to enter the award as the judgment of the court, and condemning the defendant to pay the costs of the motion, and both parties to pay the balance of the costs equally. Writ of error by the defendant.G. W. Smith, for plaintiff in error. This being a proceeding under the statute of arbitration, (Hart. Dig., arts. 7 to 15, inclusive,) and the provisions of the law having been strictly complied with, the right of appeal being excluded, it is contended that the award of the arbitrators ought to have been entered up as the judgment of the court. (Officiers v. Dirks, 2 Tex. R., 461; Owens v. Withee, 3 Tex. R., 161; Cox. v. Giddings, 9 Tex. R., 44; Hall v. Little, 11 Tex. R., 404.)

The court erred in permitting the defendant to introduce evidence to controvert the award. It cannot be questioned but that the jurisdiction of the District Court was completely divested by the action of the parties in resorting to a domestic tribunal for the adjudication of their rights. The District Court cannot go behind an award if the proceedings have been in conformity with the statute. The law is imperative that where an award is filed “a judgment shall be entered thereon at the first regular term of the court thereafter.” (Hart. Dig., art. 13.) No discretion is left to the court in its action, and the award is an obstacle to any further proceedings. (Cox v. Giddings, 9 Tex. R., 44.) “Courts of equity formerly exercised a larger jurisdiction in matters of awards,” “but by means of statutes the jurisdiction has become greatly narrowed and is now of rare occurrence.” (Story's Equity, 2 vol., ch. XL, sec. 1450.)

How completely the jurisdiction of the District Court is ousted by an award made pursuant to the statute will be seen by reference to the construction of the statute 9 and 10 Will. III, ch. 15. (Bac. Abr., ARBITRAMENT AND AWARD, B; 2 Story's Equity, sec. 1450, note.) In the last cited authority is the opinion of Lord Chancellor Brougham in reference to the English statute, in which he says “that the statute is undoubtedly repealed in its most express provisions if the jurisdiction continues to reside in this court after the parties have resorted elsewhere under the statute.” A party will not be permitted to come into court and say that judges of his own choosing have not done him justice.

But though the jurisdiction of the court be divested by the resort of the parties to an extraordinary tribunal, if the award should have been obtained by corruption or undue practice, the injured party is not remediless. (Jones v. Frosh, 6 Tex. R., 202.) But he will not surely be permitted on the filing of an award to surprise his opponent by attempting to controvert the judgment of judges of his own selection, in whose discretion, ability, and intelligence both parties had apparently placed implicit confidence.

Jones & Ballinger, for defendant in error.

WHEELER, J.

The appellant did not controvert the allegations of the appellee charging the commission of gross mistakes on the part of the arbitrators, and flagrant injustice and iniquity in the award. He insisted on having the award made the judgment of the court, not because it was not as inequitable, unjust, and iniquitous as it was charged to be, but simply because it was the award of the arbitrators, and the parties, confiding in their integrity, impartiality, and intelligence as the judges of their own choice, had not reserved in their submission the right of appeal, but had expressly waived it. But though no appeal was reserved, and though the right of appeal was expressly waived, that was not a waiver of the right to have an award which should be free from the just imputation of fraud, partiality, or flagrant injustice and wrong. Nor does the fact that the arbitrators were the judges of the...