Payne v. Satterfield

• Decision Date: 14 January 1905
• Citation: Payne v. Satterfield, 84 S.W. 800, 114 Tenn. 58 (Tenn. 1905)
• Parties: PAYNE v. SATTERFIELD.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 800

84 S.W. 800

PAYNE v. SATTERFIELD.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

January 14, 1905.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Sumner County; B. D. Bell, Judge.

Action by L. B. Payne against W. G. Satterfield. From an order sustaining a demurrer to a part of plaintiff's amended declaration, both parties prayed and were granted an appeal in the nature of a writ of error. Dismissed.

W. W. Pardue and Seay & Seay, for plaintiff. W. A. Guild, for defendant.

BEARD, C. J.

The plaintiff in error sued the defendant in error to recover damages for the deceit alleged to have been practiced by the latter upon the former in the purchase of certain real estate. To the original and amended declarations seven grounds of demurrer were alleged, all of which were overruled except the fourth ground, which was directed to that part of the declaration which sought a recovery for attorney fees incurred by the plaintiff in error in a certain action instituted by a third party against him, seeking to recover commission as real estate agent in and about the sale of the land, with regard to which it is alleged in the declaration the deceit was practiced by the defendant in error. In other words, that ground of demurrer was directed to only a part of the claim of the plaintiff, and not to the whole of his declaration. Both parties, being dissatisfied with the action of the trial judge in disposing of the demurrer, prayed and were granted an appeal in the nature of a writ of error. The record thus presents the question of prematurity in the granting of the appeal.

It is a well-settled rule, save where changed by statute, that questions arising in a course of legal proceedings cannot be reviewed in an appellate court until a final decision in the cause has been rendered below. Evans v. Shields, 3 Head, 71; Kendall v. Lassiter, 68 Ala. 181; Lester v. Berkowitz, 125 Ill. 307, 17 N. E. 706; Pistor v. Hatfield, 46 N. Y. 249; Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 147 U. S. 337, 13 Sup. Ct. 356, 37 L. Ed. 194. This rule was designed to avoid the delay and confusion arising from multiplied and successive appeals from interlocutory decisions on matters arising in the progress of the cause before final judgment. It is insisted, however, that there is to be found in section 4889 of Shannon's Code a provision which modifies this rule, so as to remove the objection that the present appeal is premature. That section is as follows: "The chancellor or circuit judge may in his discretion allow an appeal from his decree in equity causes, determining the principle involved and rendering an account for a...