Paz v. State
| Decision Date | 17 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 01–15–00979–CR,01–15–00979–CR |
| Parties | Milton Rolando PAZ, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Alexander Bunin, Chief Public Defender, Harris, County, TX, Nicholas Mensch, SBN: 24070262, Assistant Public Defender, 1201 Franklin, 13th Floor, Houston, TX 77002, for Appellant.
Kim Ogg, District Attorney—Harris County, 1201 Franklin, Suite 600, Houston, TX 77002, Dan McCrory, Assistant District Attorney, Harris County, Texas, 1201 Franklin, Suite 600, Houston, TX 77002, for Appellee.
Panel consists of Justices Higley, Bland, and Brown.
Laura Carter Higley, JusticeThe State charged Appellant, Milton Rolando Paz, with capital murder.1 Appellant pleaded not guilty. The jury found him guilty, and an automatic life sentence was assessed. In three issues on appeal, Appellant argues (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress; (2) he suffered egregious harm when the trial court failed to sua sponte include a jury instruction on voluntariness; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain autopsy photographs.
The State filed a motion for rehearing from our August 3, 2017 opinion. We grant the motion for rehearing, withdraw our prior opinion and judgment, and issue this opinion and a new judgment in their place.
We affirm.
In February 2011, Appellant was the father to two young children, a thirteen-month-old girl and a one-month-old girl. During that month, Appellant's wife had to leave town for work. A friend agreed to care for the infant while the wife was away. The wife's work trip got extended. The friend caring for the infant had to return her to Appellant because the friend also had to go out of town. The infant was in good health when returned to Appellant's care other than an upset stomach. Appellant was bothered that he had to care for his infant daughter.
When the friend returned, she drove by Appellant's house to see if Appellant's wife had returned. She saw several men drinking on Appellant's patio but did not see Appellant or his wife.
The next day, Appellant called his wife. He told her the infant was dead, describing her as cold and purple. The wife told him to call 911. Appellant called 911, and an ambulance arrived. The infant was taken to the hospital but could not be revived. A nurse that attended to the infant described him as emotionally flat with zero expression.
The infant had bite marks on her cheeks and extensive bruising across her body, both internal and external. Each of her limbs were fractured. Four ribs were fractured. She had multiple, severe fractures on her skull with hemorrhaging around her skull, brain, and optic nerves. A medical examiner later testified that the skull fractures and hemorrhaging played the primary role in the infant's death.
Lieutenant O. Chandler and Sergeant R. Figueroa first encountered Appellant at the hospital when the medical staff was attempting to revive his daughter. Appellant was asleep when they found him. They spoke with Appellant for about 30 minutes, when Appellant agreed to go with them to his apartment. Appellant allowed them to search his apartment. Afterwards, Appellant agreed to go with the officers to the police station. Lieutenant Chandler drove him to the police station. While there, police photographed Appellant. The officers then took Appellant to a holding facility.
The next day, Lieutenant Chandler and Sergeant Figueroa removed Appellant from the holding facility, and a patrol officer transported him back to the police station. They transferred Appellant to Officer R. Montoya and watched the interaction in another room.
Appellant spoke with Officer Montoya and agreed to provide a voluntary statement. Their conversation was recorded. Near the beginning of the four-hour conversation, Appellant told Officer Montoya that Sergeant Figueroa had called him a "fucking ho." Then the following exchange occurred:
Officer Montoya followed this up by asking Appellant if he knew why he was being investigated. Appellant acknowledged that it was because he was the only one with the girls at the time of his infant daughter's death. Officer Montoya then asked Appellant if he wanted to voluntarily discuss what happened with him. Appellant said yes and discussed another way in which he had cooperated with the investigators to aid the investigation.
During the conversation, Officer Montoya described the process of taking a polygraph test. Officer Montoya talked about people trying and failing to lie and cheat during the test.
About three hours into the conversation, Appellant took a polygraph test. As Officer Montoya began the test, Appellant told him,
Officer Montoya had some difficulty getting Appellant to follow the instructions for the polygraph test. The following exchange occurred:
After a short break, Appellant continued to argue that he had not hurt his infant daughter.
Shortly after that, Appellant took the polygraph test. After the test, Officer Montoya told Appellant he had failed the test and encouraged Appellant to be honest with him about what had really happened. Over the course of the remaining conversation, Appellant admitted to trying to forcefully feed the baby her bottle and shaking her. Appellant admitted that he threw the baby onto the bed, that the baby hit the headboard in the process, that he saw something red that could have been blood, and that he did not investigate further.
At the end of the questioning, Appellant and Officer Montoya referred to each other as "brother." Appellant ended the conversation saying, "Thank you for everything, man."
The State charged Appellant with capital murder. Appellant filed a motion to suppress. He argued that his statement to Officer Montoya should be suppressed because his statement was not voluntary.
Appellant testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. During his testimony, he repeated his claims that Sergeant Figueroa had called him a derogatory name and lunged at him as if Figueroa were going to punch him. He also claimed that, when Lieutenant Chandler and Sergeant Figueroa transported him from the holding facility to the police station, Sergeant Figueroa slapped him while buckling him in the police car. Appellant argued that the derogatory statement, the threatening gesture, the slap, and Officer Montoya's statement that Appellant knew what "they're going to do with" him was enough to overcome his will and render his statement involuntary.
Lieutenant Chandler and Sergeant Figueroa also testified at the hearing. Sergeant Figueroa denied calling Appellant a derogatory name, lunging at him, and slapping him. Lieutenant Chandler denied seeing any of the alleged acts.
The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found Lieutenant Chandler and Sergeant Figueroa credible and Appellant not credible. The trial court determined that the alleged acts by Sergeant Figueroa did not occur and concluded that Appellant's statement was voluntary.
The trial court admitted Appellant's statement during trial. The conversation between Officer Montoya and Appellant was read to the jury.
The State also called A. Lopez...
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