Paz v. State of California

• Citation: 22 Cal.4th 550,93 Cal.Rptr.2d 703,994 P.2d 975
• Decision Date: 20 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. S068742.,S068742.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: Francisco PAZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

93 Cal.Rptr.2d 703

22 Cal.4th 550

994 P.2d 975

Francisco PAZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. S068742.

Supreme Court of California.

March 20, 2000.

Albert F. Coombes, Encino, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

William M. McMillan, Anthony J. Ruffolo and Lynette G. Chatman, Los Angeles, for Defendants and Respondents State of California and California Department of Transportation.

James K. Hahn, City Attorney, G. Daniel Woodard and Katherine J. Hamilton, Assistant City Attorneys, Lisa S. Berger, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent City of Los Angeles.

Collins, Collins, Muir & Traver, Brian K. Stewart, Pasadena, Tomas A. Guterres and Matthew S. Urbach for Defendant and Respondent Katz, Okitsu & Associates.

Washburn, Briscoe & McCarthy and James P. Corn, Sacramento, for Consulting

Engineers and Land Surveyors of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent Katz, Okitsu & Associates.

Fred J. Hiestand, Sacramento, for the Association for California Tort Reform as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent Katz, Okitsu & Associates.

Baraban & Teske, Jeffrey H. Baraban and James S. Link, Pasadena, for Defendants and Respondents Stoneman Corporation and Hugh Temple.

CHIN, J.

This case concerns the duty private contractors owe the general public when they undertake work that might affect an allegedly dangerous condition of public property. Consequently, we consider the negligent undertaking theory of liability articulated in Restatement Second of Torts, section 324A (section 324A), and its application in this context.

As we recently stated in Artiglio v. Corning Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 604, 613, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 479, 957 P.2d 1313 (Artiglio), the section 324A theory of liability—sometimes referred to as the "Good Samaritan" rule—is a settled principle firmly rooted in the common law of negligence. Section 324A prescribes the conditions under which a person who undertakes to render services for another may be liable to third persons for physical harm resulting from a failure to act with reasonable care. Liability may exist if (a) the failure to exercise reasonable care increased the risk of harm, (b) the undertaking was to perform a duty the other person owed to the third persons, or (c) the harm was suffered because the other person or the third persons relied on the undertaking. (Artiglio, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 612-613, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 479, 957 P.2d 1313.)

Here, Francisco Paz (plaintiff) was injured in a traffic accident at an intersection controlled by a single stop sign. He asserted the intersection was dangerous because of obstructed sight lines. The private party defendants were to design and install traffic signals at the intersection as a condition of approval of a new condominium development. They did not obtain the permits necessary to complete the traffic signals' installation until after plaintiffs accident. Plaintiff alleged that they negligently delayed providing the traffic lights that would have negated the intersection's dangerous condition before his accident.

The Court of Appeal majority found that under Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (Biakanja), the private party defendants owed plaintiff a duty of care as a result of their agreement to provide traffic signals. The court concluded the agreement imposed on them a duty to motorists to install the signals in a reasonable and timely manner, and that their alleged failure to do so allowed the preexisting dangerous condition to contribute to plaintiffs injuries.

We conclude that under the circumstances of this case, defendants did not owe plaintiff a duty simply by undertaking work that may have alleviated an allegedly dangerous condition on public property. A contract for a public project does not create a general duty to third persons that gives rise to negligence liability, with respect to an allegedly dangerous condition the contract work may correct, if the requirements for application of section 324A are not otherwise satisfied.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was injured on January 12, 1991, in an accident at the intersection of Foothill Boulevard and Osborne Street in Los Angeles. He was riding a motorcycle westbound on Foothill Boulevard when he collided with an automobile driven by Lloyd Trafton. Trafton had been traveling southbound on Osborne Street and was turning left onto eastbound Foothill Boulevard. Plaintiff struck Trafton's automobile as Trafton completed his turn. Osborne Street ends at Foothill Boulevard in a "T" intersection. Near the south side of the intersection is the driveway for a 35-unit condominium project. At the time of the accident, the intersection of Osborne Street and Foothill Boulevard was controlled by a single stop sign on Osborne. Plaintiff alleged that a dangerous condition existed at the intersection because "there was a blind curve obstructing the view of southbound drivers making a left turn from Osborne Street onto Foothill Boulevard so that they could not see traffic headed westbound on Foothill Boulevard. And, vice versa, traffic headed westbound on Foothill Boulevard could not see traffic emerging from Osborne Street."¹

Defendant Stoneman Corporation was the developer of the condominium project and an eight-house development approved for construction near the intersection.² As a condition to obtaining a permit for the condominium project, the City of Los Angeles (City) required that Stoneman install traffic Control signals and modify the roadway striping at the intersection. Stoneman had previously hired Jennings Engineering Company (Jennings), an independent contractor, as the civil engineers for the development project. Jennings in turn hired defendant Katz, Okitsu & Associates (KOA) to design the traffic signals and striping plan and to obtain the permits necessary for installation.

Plaintiff alleged that the governmental entities (the City, the County of Los Angeles, the State of California (State), and the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)) "knew or should have known that a dangerous condition existed" because "there had been numerous prior accidents reported at that location which had led to a public outcry for some kind of warning device or sign to be placed at said intersection."³ In his claims against Stoneman, Jennings, and KOA, plaintiff alleged they were aware of the dangerous condition and, as a condition of being allowed to develop the project, they had obligated themselves to provide an operating traffic light signal to remedy the danger. Plaintiff alleged that defendants "so negligently went about the task of providing operating traffic light signals that said signals were not in operation on January 12, 1991, despite the fact that Defendants had made promises to provide the signals at least two years earlier."

The City's department of city planning had approved Stoneman's proposed condominium project in February 1988, subject to various conditions. One condition provided that "prior to recordation, satisfactory arrangements shall be made with the [City's] Department of Transportation to assure that: ... [¶] d. The developer shall pay all costs for the installation of a new traffic signal and modification of existing striping of the intersection of Foothill Boulevard and Osborne Place if determined to be warranted by the Department of Transportation, East Valley District, and the State Department of Transportation (Caltrans)." In a December 1988 letter, Caltrans notified Jennings that it agreed with the City that a traffic signal was warranted, "based on projected traffic volumes" and the existing traffic volumes on both streets. The study underlying Caltrans's conclusion did not find the traffic signal warranted by the intersection's accident experience in the 12-month period reviewed.

Stoneman promptly notified Jennings that it should take the steps necessary to have the signals installed. Early in 1989, Jennings employed KOA under a verbal contract to design the traffic signal and striping plan. The contract had no time-line requirements or deadline for completion. KOA submitted its first plans for the work at the end of May 1989. The City's approval process ran its normal course, and construction began in June 1990. Although KOA's contract with Jennings had no time requirements, KOA experienced some pressure from Stoneman because the traffic signal project was delaying the opening of its development.

On August 24, 1990, Caltrans shut down the project because it had not issued a permit to encroach on the State's right-of-way on Foothill Boulevard or approved the striping plans. At that point, only two more days of work were needed to complete construction of the traffic signals. On September 13, 1990, KOA submitted to Caltrans an application for an encroachment permit on behalf of Stoneman. Caltrans issued its encroachment permit on January 17, 1991, five days after plaintiffs accident. As of November 2, 1990, the City had not applied for its own encroachment permit, which was needed to operate and maintain the signal system. Caltrans did not issue the permit to the City until January 30, 1991.

Walter Okitsu, a partner in KOA, stated that before the Caltrans field engineer stopped the work, KOA thought a Caltrans encroachment permit would not be necessary because Foothill Boulevard was to be transferred from the State to the City. According to Okitsu, Caltrans and the City disagreed on how the intersection should be striped and whether a bicycle lane should be provided. Those disputes had to be resolved before Caltrans would issue its encroachment permit.⁴

KOA and Stoneman moved for summary judgment. KOA argued that it owed no duty to plaintiff and that its failure to apply for the encroachment permit at the outset of the design phase of the project was not negligence. Plaintiff opposed the summary judgment...