PBA v. City of NY
| Decision Date | 20 December 2001 |
| Citation | 767 N.E.2d 116,740 N.Y.S.2d 659,97 N.Y.2d 378 |
| Parties | PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK INC. et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Appellants, and NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Michael D. Hess, Corporation Counsel of New York City, Brooklyn (Linda H. Young, Leonard Koerner, Marilyn Richter and Pamela Seider Dolgow of counsel), for City of New York, appellant.
Steven C. DeCosta, New York City, for Board of Collective Bargaining and another, appellants.
Kaye Scholer, L. L. P., New York City (Peter M. Fishbein, Jay W. Waks, Jeffrey A. Fuisz, Rachel H. Yarkon and Aaron R. Pam of counsel), and Gleason, Dunn, Walsh & O'Shea, Albany (Ronald G. Dunn and Michael P. Ravalli of counsel), for Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of City of New York, Inc. and another, respondents.
Gary Johnson, Albany, and Sandra M. Nathan for New York State Public Employment Relations Board and another, respondents.
In this declaratory judgment action arising from an ongoing collective bargaining dispute between the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York (PBA) and the City of New York (City), the primary issue presented is whether chapter 641 of the Laws of 1998, which amended the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Civil Service Law § 200 et. seq. [Taylor Law]), violates the home rule provisions of the State Constitution (NY Const, art IX, § 2). If chapter 641 is constitutional, a related issue is which agency, the State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) or the City Board of Collective Bargaining (BCB), has jurisdiction to determine the scope of mandatory collective bargaining in negotiations between the City and the PBA.
We hold that because chapter 641 is a "special law" that serves a substantial State concern, the home rule requirements were not implicated and thus the statute is constitutional and enforceable even absent a home rule message. We further hold that once a police or fire union opts to seek impasse resolution by PERB and PERB declares an impasse, chapter 641 gives PERB exclusive jurisdiction to resolve such an impasse.
An overview of the statutory framework is necessary to a complete understanding of the issues involved. The Taylor Law is a State-wide comprehensive scheme for regulating relationships between public employers and public employees at all levels of government. With the enactment of the Taylor Law, the Legislature created PERB, an independent board empowered to resolve employment disputes between public employers and the collective bargaining representatives of public employees (Civil Service Law § 205). PERB was authorized to determine when impasse had been reached and to render assistance in resolving the impasse (Civil Service Law § 209). The Taylor Law includes a "local option" that permits local governments to enact their own procedures and to establish their own impartial administrative bodies to replace designated portions of the Taylor Law and their administration by PERB (Civil Service Law § 212). Such local collective bargaining laws are required to be substantially equivalent to the provisions and procedures applicable to the State set forth in the Taylor Law. These administrative bodies, one of which is the BCB, are the local equivalent of PERB and are commonly referred to as "mini-PERBs."
Section 212 of the Civil Service Law draws an express distinction between the City and all other local governments. Other than the City, local governments that wish to establish a local administrative body and enact local procedures must apply to PERB for determination that their procedures are substantially equivalent to those set forth in the Taylor Law. Exempt from this requirement, the City's procedures and provisions of local law need not be submitted to PERB for approval and are deemed effective unless adjudged otherwise in an action brought by PERB (Civil Service Law § 212; City of New York v Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn., 89 NY2d 380, 386 [1996] [City v PBA]). Since the enactment in 1967 of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law (Administrative Code of City of NY, tit 12, ch 3, § 12-301 et seq. [NYCCBL]), and section 1171 of the New York City Charter, which created the BCB, PERB has not sought a judicial declaration that the City law is not substantially equivalent to the Taylor Law (see, City v PBA, supra, 89 NY2d at, 386).
In 1974, the Legislature amended the Taylor Law to provide compulsory binding arbitration for resolving impasses in bargaining disputes involving police and fire unions not subject to the authority of a mini-PERB (L 1974, chs 724, 725, Civil Service Law § 209). The amendment provided that either party could invoke the assistance of PERB when it believed an impasse had been reached. The City was specifically exempted from this requirement in recognition of its preexisting impasse arbitration procedures (see, NYCCBL former § 1173-7.0 [c], now recodified as § 12-311 [c]; City v PBA, supra, at 385-386), which were supervised by the BCB and available for all categories of employees who reached an impasse in collective negotiations with the City.
Through the enactment of chapter 13 of the Laws of 1996, the State Legislature attempted to transfer to PERB jurisdiction over impasse negotiations for the City police and fire unions. In City v PBA, we ruled that chapter 13 violated home rule principles, because it constituted a special law affecting the "property, affairs or government" of the City and did not implicate a substantial State-wide concern. The Legislature sought to cure the defect in the current statute, chapter 641 of the Laws of 1998, which allows police and fire unions in any municipality with a local impasse resolution system to take their collective bargaining disputes to PERB. Chapter 641 was enacted when only four localities—the City, Nassau, Suffolk and Westchester counties—had existing impasse resolution procedures. Thus, unless the police or fire unions in these four localities opted to use the mini-PERBs, conflicts with the local employer would be resolved by PERB according to the impasse procedures of Civil Service Law § 209.
The most recent collective bargaining agreement between the City and the PBA expired July 31, 2000, the first agreement between the parties to expire since the enactment of chapter 641. During negotiations, the City filed a scope of bargaining petition with the BCB alleging that some of PBA's bargaining demands were not mandatory subjects of bargaining. The challenged demands related mainly to officer discipline and scheduling. The PBA responded by filing a limited answer, claiming that BCB did not have jurisdiction over scope of bargaining, but rather PERB had the final say over whether a subject was within the scope of mandatory bargaining.
PBA next filed a declaration of impasse and a declaratory ruling petition with PERB, seeking to trigger PERB's impasse resolution procedures under Civil Service Law § 209 (4) and to obtain from PERB a determination on whether the subjects of the parties' bargaining dispute were within the scope of mandatory negotiations. The City filed an improper practice charge with BCB, alleging that the PBA had not engaged in good faith bargaining. Next, the City and the PBA each filed declaratory judgment actions. The PBA sought both a declaration that PERB has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes between it and the City concerning scope of negotiations and the existence of an impasse, and an order directing the BCB to dismiss the City's petition. The City sought judgment declaring that chapter 641 is unconstitutional and that BCB has exclusive jurisdiction over collective bargaining impasses and scope of bargaining issues, whether or not the issue arose within the context of an impasse.
The actions were consolidated, with venue placed in Albany County. Thereafter, the City and the PBA each moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court granted the PBA's motion, upholding the constitutionality of the statute. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that chapter 641 is not a special law subject to home rule requirements, but rather is a general law of State-wide application because it "uniformly prohibit[s] every local government from unilaterally preventing its police and fire unions from utilizing PERB." (285 AD2d 52, 56.) The Appellate Division also affirmed Supreme Court's finding that PERB has exclusive jurisdiction over scope of bargaining disputes between PBA and the City. The City appeals as of right on constitutional grounds, and BCB appeals pursuant to leave granted by this Court. We now modify.
The primary issue on appeal is the effect that chapter 641 of the Laws of 1998 has upon the statutory framework for public sector collective bargaining in New York. The City argues that chapter 641 is a special law violating home rule mandates "in that it singles out the City of New York and its three neighboring counties by establishing a new system for them totally at odds with the rest of the State." Relying on City v PBA, where chapter 13 of Laws of 1996 was found violative of the home rule provisions of the Constitution, the City argues that the Legislature's subsequent attempt to transfer impasse jurisdiction of collective bargaining disputes between the City and its police force from BCB to PERB through its enactment of chapter 641 is similarly infirm because, like chapter 13, it targets New York City to deprive it and the three other localities of their right to use a mini-PERB for impasse resolution. The City's reliance on City v PBA is misplaced.
Article IX, § 2 of the State Constitution grants the Legislature authority to enact a "general law" relating to the...
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