Peabody Coal Co. v. Helms

• Decision Date: 04 October 1988
• Docket Number: No. 88-1004,88-1004
• Citation: 859 F.2d 486
• Parties: PEABODY COAL COMPANY and Old Republic Insurance Company, Petitioners, v. Lessie L. HELMS and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 486

859 F.2d 486

PEABODY COAL COMPANY and Old Republic Insurance Company, Petitioners, v. Lessie L. HELMS and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Respondents.

No. 88-1004.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 24, 1988.

Decided Oct. 4, 1988.

W.C. Blanton, Ice Miller Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, Ind., for petitioners.

Jack N. VanStone, VanStone & Krochta, Evansville, Ind., for respondents.

Before POSNER and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and WILL, Senior District Judge. ^*

COFFEY, Circuit Judge.

Petitioners Peabody Coal Company and its insurer, Old Republic Insurance Company (collectively "Peabody"), petition for review of a decision of the Benefits Review Board of the Department of Labor. The Board affirmed the decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) awarding respondent Lessie L. Helms benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. Sec. 901 et seq. (the Act). We reverse and remand.

I

Lessie L. Helms (Helms) worked as a coal miner for a total of 24 years and was approximately 56 years old when he first applied for benefits under the Act. He began working for Peabody on September 22, 1971, and continued employment with that company until his official retirement in November 1979 although he had not actively worked since November of 1978 when he stopped because of breathing difficulty. ¹ Helms' medical history is a litany of hospitalizations, tests, and examinations that disclose a host of physical problems. He had a heart attack in 1979 and a cardiac catheterization and open heart surgery in May of the same year. Eight years before his open heart surgery and while he was still working, Helms had an aortic valve implant. Since that time he has suffered from an irregular duodenal bulb, arteriosclerotic heart disease, cardiomegaly, arthritis, hypertension and moderate obstructive lung disease. He also had a total hip replacement.

Helms smoked at least one pack of cigarettes a day from the time he was a teenager and continued to smoke, at a reduced rate, after his open heart surgery in 1979. He testified that he quit smoking sometime after his 1979 heart surgery but could not remember exactly when he stopped.

Helms filed his initial application for black lung benefits with the United States Department of Labor on February 15, 1979 (several months before his open heart surgery). This application was denied by an examiner. On December 18, 1979, this time with assistance of counsel, Helms filed a second application for benefits. The examiner determined that Helms was entitled to benefits on the basis of the second application and the benefits award was affirmed by a deputy commissioner of the Division of Coal Miners Workers' Compensation, United States Department of Labor. Thereafter, Peabody requested a de novo hearing before an ALJ, and, after the hearing and submission of post-hearing evidence, the ALJ awarded Helms black lung benefits.

The ALJ based his decision on the invocation of an "interim presumption" of total disability due to pneumoconiosis (black lung disease) arising out of coal mine employment and found Peabody failed to rebut the presumption under any one of four rebuttal methods delineated in 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(b). ² Peabody appealed the ALJ's decision and the Benefits Review Board (the Board) affirmed the holding that the decision of the ALJ was supported by substantial evidence. Peabody now petitions this court for review of the Board's decision. ³

Although this appeal is from a decision of the Board, we review the judgment of the ALJ. Dotson v. Peabody Coal Co., 846 F.2d 1134, 1137 (7th Cir.1988); Old Ben Coal Co. v. Prewitt, 755 F.2d 588, 589 (7th Cir.1985). Our review is limited to whether the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence, is in accord with the law, and is rational. Old Ben Coal Co. v. Luker, 826 F.2d 688, 691 (7th Cir.1987). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a rational mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoted in Smith v. Director, OWPC, 843 F.2d 1053, 1057).

The only issue on appeal is whether the ALJ erred in ruling that Peabody failed to rebut the initial presumption of disability due to pneumoconiosis ⁴ under 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(b)(3). ⁵

II

Peabody argues that the ALJ erred by improperly disregarding medical evidence establishing that Helms' disability was caused by his heart disease and cigarette smoking and not "in whole or in part out of [his] coal mine employment." See 20 C.F.R. 727.203(b)(3). Drawing inferences from the evidence is part of the ALJ's role as factfinder, Smith v. Director, OWCP, 843 F.2d 1053, 1057 (7th Cir.1988), but the ALJ must consider all relevant medical evidence, cannot substitute his expertise for that of a qualified physician, and cannot simply disregard the medical conclusions of a qualified physician. Dotson, supra, at 1137, citing Wetherill v. Director, OWCP, 812 F.2d 376, 382 (7th Cir.1987). We agree with Peabody that the ALJ did not consider all the relevant medical evidence in this case and reverse and remand the ALJ's decision with instructions to consider all the medical evidence.

The ALJ stated Helms "has a total disability associated with his heart disease, a fact that is uncontradicted in the medical evidence" ⁶ and to rebut the interim presumption under paragraph (b)(3) requires Peabody to establish Helms' disability did not arise out of his coal mine employment. ALJ Decision and Order p. 11 (emphasis added). The present controversy concerns the deposition testimony of Dr. Howard and the medical records of Dr. Getty and Dr. Wilhelmus. These three physicians were the only physicians of record to make direct statements concerning the cause (etiology) of Helms' total disability and all three determined that Helms' disability was not related to his coal mine employment.

The ALJ disregarded Dr. Howard's testimony for two reasons: (1) his opinion that Helms' chronic obstructive pulmonary disease was not due to coal mine dust exposure was not expressed in the magic terms of a "reasonable medical certainty" under the standards set forth in Blevins v. Peabody Coal Co., 6 Black Lung Rep., 1-750 (1983) (Blevins III ); and (2) the ALJ further found Dr. Howard's "remarks concerning the claimant's pulmonary disease and his cigarette smoking were quite equivocal."

Dr. Howard reviewed the medical evidence of record and later testified at a deposition concerning the results of his review. The ALJ applied the standard enunciated in Blevins III to determine whether Dr. Howard's opinion was expressed as a reasonable medical certainty. ALJ Decision and Order p. 12. In Blevins III the Board "stated that testimony must be 'phrased in terms of a reasonable medical certainty '...." Peabody Coal Co. v. Lowis, 708 F.2d 266, 273 (7th Cir.1983) (emphasis added). We have rejected this standard. Id.; Underhill v. Peabody Coal Co., 687 F.2d 217 (7th Cir.1982). Instead, for purposes of rebutting the interim presumption, we have stated that a physician's opinion must be " 'the documented opinion of a physician exercising reasoned medical judgment.' " Amax Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 801 F.2d 958, 963 (7th Cir.1986) (quoting Underhill, supra, at 223) (emphasis added). Applying the reasoned medical judgment standard we reject the ALJ's finding that Dr. Howard's testimony is not acceptable evidence. Although not phrased in the magic reasonable medical certainty language required by Blevins III, Dr. Howard's testimony, when read in its entirety, is clear, direct, unequivocal and well-reasoned.

Helms points to Dr. Howard's statement that "I think it [the chronic obstructive pulmonary disease] has most likely been caused by tobacco abuse," as being equivocal. In its proper context, however, that statement is part of a clear and reasoned medical judgment. When asked directly whether the obstructive lung disease was caused by cigarette smoking, he clearly, emphatically, and succinctly responded, "[i]n my opinion it was."

Dr. Howard gave reasoning and explanation for his opinion. He testified that a pulmonary function study conducted in 1983 showed only mild obstructive pulmonary disease and the decrease in the pulmonary function study values from 1980 to 1983 was, again, "most likely ... caused by tobacco abuse." He answered questions concerning the cause of the disability and stated: "The pulmonary function tests, in my opinion, do not support the presence of the physiologic changes that we would usually see with impairing pneumoconiosis." He also noted that shortness of breath can be a symptom of heart disease and that Helms' heart disease was not related to his coal mine employment. Importantly, he opined that Helms would be able to continue in his last coal mine job but for his heart disease with only minor, if any, restrictions due to breathing difficulty. In Underhill we held "that a physician's opinion, expressed in clear and uncontradicted terms and based on a physical examination, a ventilatory study, chest X-rays and a review of the miner's employment history satisfies the 'reasoned medical judgment' standard." (Peabody Coal Co. v. Lowis, 708 F.2d 266, 274 (1983) (explaining Underhill, 687 F.2d 217)). Dr. Howard considered Helms' employment history and the results of physical examinations, pulmonary function studies, arterial blood gas studies, and chest X-rays. Every item of evidence on which he relies is part of the record and, in fact, is also relied upon by Helms. Thus there is no allowable basis on which the ALJ may disregard Dr. Howard's medical opinion because it is a reasoned medical judgment. As we stated in Peabody Coal Co. v. Lowis, 708 F.2d at 275, "the ALJ violated the mandate of 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(b) that 'all relevant evidence shall be considered' in determining whether the presumption of employment caused pneumoconiosis had been...