Peace & Freedom Party v. Bowen
| Decision Date | 11 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:12–cv–00853–GEB–GEB–EFB.,2:12–cv–00853–GEB–GEB–EFB. |
| Citation | 912 F.Supp.2d 905 |
| Parties | The PEACE AND FREEDOM PARTY, Peta Lindsay, and Richard Becker, Plaintiffs, v. Debra BOWEN, in her official capacity as Secretary of State of California, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Alexandra Robert Gordon, Dept. of Justice, San Francisco, CA.
Robert Edward Barnes, Barnes Law, Malibu, CA, for Plaintiffs.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
California Secretary of State Debra Bowen (“Defendant”) moves for an order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) dismissing with prejudice the claims filed against her by The Peace and Freedom Party, Peta Lindsay, and Richard Becker (collectively “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs allege that the Secretary violated their First, Fourteenth, and Twentieth Amendment constitutional rights by failing to list Peta Lindsay on the presidential primary ballot for the Peace and Freedom Party. Defendant contends Lindsay was not entitled to be placed on the ballot since she is ineligible to serve as president of the United States due to her age.
Decision on a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion requires determination of “whether the complaint's factual allegations, together with all reasonable inferences, state a plausible claim for relief.” Cafasso, United States ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir.2011) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accepts the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Adams v. U.S. Forest Serv., 671 F.3d 1138, 1142–43 (9th Cir.2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955). However, this tenet does not apply to “legal conclusions ... cast in the form of factual allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Therefore, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ ”).
Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate when a “ ‘pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’ ” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir.2012) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir.1995)); see also Klamath–Lake Pharm. Ass'n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir.1983) ().
Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 7); (2) the Order, filed on April 26, 2012, 2012 WL 1455248, denying Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 13); and (3) a letter, dated February 13, 2012, from the Peta Lindsay for President 2012 Campaign (the “Campaign”) to Defendant, in which the Campaign's attorney recounts that in a conversation with a representative from Defendant's office he “admitt[ed] that Ms. Lindsay is 27–years–old.”
As a general rule, a district court “ ‘may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’ ” United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir.2011) (quoting Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir.2001)). However, judicial notice may be taken of the existence of court filings, which are not subject to reasonable dispute over their authenticity. E.g., Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 866 (9th Cir.2002); Lee, 250 F.3d at 690. Accordingly, Defendant's first and second requests for judicial notice are granted.
A court may also take judicial notice of non-hearsay evidence that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(2); United States v. Isaacs, 359 Fed.Appx. 875, 877 (9th Cir.2009). Plaintiffs neither contest the accuracy of the letter of February 13, 2012, nor the fact that it was from the Campaign's attorney. Further, there can be no dispute that the Campaign's attorney, who wrote the letter to Defendant advocating for Lindsay's inclusion on the ballot, acted on behalf of Plaintiff Lindsay. Accordingly, the attorney's statement “admitting that Ms. Lindsay is 27–years–old” is judicially noticeable non-hearsay since it “is offered against an opposing party” and “was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a statement on the subject” or “was made by the party's agent ... on a matter within the scope of that relationship.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(C)–(D). Plaintiffs argue that consideration of Lindsay's age “is not appropriate at this stage of the case” since it is “outside the pleadings.” (Opp'n 5:3.) However, Plaintiffs cannot preclude dismissal by selectively omitting this crucial fact from their pleadings and then arguing that consideration of this judicially noticeable fact is inappropriate at this stage of the case. Accordingly, Defendant's final request for judicial notice is granted.
This lawsuit concerns Defendant's failure to place Lindsay's name on the 2012 presidential primary ballot in California as a candidate for President of the United States. Lindsay filed with Defendant nomination papers for inclusion of her name on the Peace and Freedom Party's presidential primary ballot (the “ballot”) on February 1, 2012. (Compl. ¶ 8.) As Secretary of State, Defendant publicly distributes the names of the Peace and Freedom Party's presidential primary candidates and provides elections officials with the final certified list of such candidates. Cal. Elec.Code §§ 6722, 6951. Defendant did not include Lindsay, who is twenty-seven years old, on the certified list of Peace and Freedom Party presidential primary candidates. (Compl. ¶¶ 10–12; ECF No. 15–1.) The U.S. Constitution states “no person ... shall be eligible to the Office of President ... who shall not have attained the Age of thirty five Years.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
Lindsay subsequently brought suit against Defendant together with the Peace and Freedom Party, and Richard Becker, a California resident who supports Lindsay's inclusion on the ballot. Plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Secretary from excluding Lindsay from the ballot. (Mot. for Prelim. Inj., 1:18–20.) That motion was denied.
Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment claims without leave to amend, arguing that “the Secretary's generally-applicable, even-handed, and non-discriminatory decision not to place Peta Lindsay”—who is ineligible to serve as president due to her age—on the presidential primary ballot is “reasonable and justified” by important state interests such as “protecting the integrity of the election process and avoiding voter confusion.” (Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”) 7:18–19, 7:9–10.) Plaintiffs counter that, by virtue of its use of the word “shall,” Cal. Elec.Code § 6720 requires Defendant to list on the ballot all “generally advocated for or recognized” candidates, and by failing to list Ms. Lindsay, who meets this criterion, Defendant acted outside the scope of her statutorily “cabined discretion” and without “lawful authority.” (Opp'n 4:16, 3:19.) 2
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786–87, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958)). Further, “States may, and inevitably must, enact reasonable regulations of parties, elections, and ballots to reduce election-and campaign-related disorder.” Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997).
When deciding whether a state election law violates First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights, we weigh the “ ‘character and magnitude’ ” of the burden the State's rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State contends justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the State's concerns make the burden necessary. Regulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs' rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest. Lesser burdens, however, trigger less exacting review, and a State's “ ‘important regulatory interests' ” will usually be enough to justify “ ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.’ ” No bright line separates permissible election-related regulation from unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedoms.
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358–59, 117 S.Ct. 1364 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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