Peacock v. Peacock

• Decision Date: 28 March 2016
• Docket Number: c/w No. 73150-5-I,No. 71953-0-I,71953-0-I
• Parties: In re the Marriage of: JANETTE R. PEACOCK, Respondent, and WILLIAM R. PEACOCK, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

In re the Marriage of: JANETTE R. PEACOCK, Respondent,

and

WILLIAM R. PEACOCK, Appellant.

No. 71953-0-I

c/w No. 73150-5-I

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE

March 28, 2016

UNPUBLISHED

COX, J. — William Peacock appeals the decree of dissolution and the order denying his CR 60(b) motion to vacate that decree. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either decision, we affirm.

Janette Wells¹ and William Peacock married in 1994. Wells petitioned for dissolution of marriage in 2012. Peacock requested appointed counsel "pursuant to GR 33 due to cognitive and mental [health] impairments." The trial court granted this request, appointing Elise Buie to represent him.

In January 2014, Buie e-mailed the trial judge's bailiff for guidance, stating there were no remaining funds, which were disbursed on the basis of her appointment, to take Wells's deposition. Further e-mail communications between counsel and the bailiff ensued.

The next day, the bailiff e-mailed both counsel to schedule a pre-trial conference. At the conference, the trial judge discussed with counsel how the case should proceed due to the case's "unusual trajectory" and approaching March 2014 trial date. The judge stated that she was authorized to grant Buie a limited amount of additional attorney fees and that counsel needed "to move as efficiently as possible."

The judge was also concerned about the scheduled mediation. She stated that it may be "most efficient" for her to hear and decide the case, and that the parties were "free to negotiate on their own." The judge ultimately waived the mediation.

She also prohibited depositions without her prior approval, stating she did not "see a reason for a deposition [of Wells] in this case" and that "a lot of money and time and energy has already been spent."

At Peacock's request, the judge granted his motion for new counsel, who was substituted for Buie. The judge also extended the discovery deadline.

The trial judge heard the case on March 17 to 19. The judge entered findings, conclusions, and a decree of dissolution on April 18, 2014. Peacock appealed.

He later moved under CR 60(b)(11) to vacate the dissolution decree. A different judge heard this motion. The motion judge denied Peacock's request for relief and awarded Wells attorney fees for responding to the motion. Peacock also appealed this order.

We consolidated both appeals for decision.

Peacock's dissatisfaction with the trial judge's distribution of property is at the core of these appeals. Accordingly, we first address his challenges to the findings, conclusions, and decree of dissolution.

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS

Peacock argues that the overall distribution of assets is inequitable because it does not leave the parties in similar positions. We hold that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion in distributing the parties' assets.

In dissolution proceedings, the trial court "has broad discretion to make a just and equitable distribution of property based on the factors enumerated in RCW 26.09.080."² We defer to trial courts "because '[t]he emotional and financial interests affected by such decisions are best served by finality . . . .'"³ Additionally, the "'policy interest favoring finality in property settlements' militates against setting aside dissolution decrees, except in . . . 'extraordinary circumstance[s].'"⁴

Under RCW 26.09.080, courts must equitably distribute the parties' property and liabilities after considering all "relevant factors." The factors listed in the statute "are not exclusive."⁵

Each spouses' economic circumstances upon dissolution is "of 'paramount concern.'"⁶ The court "is not required to place the parties in precisely equal financial positions . . . ."⁷ "A just and equitable division 'does not require mathematical precision, but rather fairness, based upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the marriage, both past and present, and an evaluation of the future needs of [the] parties.'"⁸

We review for abuse of discretion the trial court's disposition of property.⁹ The trial court abuses its discretion when its "decision is 'manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.'"¹⁰ A trial court's "decision is based 'on untenable grounds' or made 'for untenable reasons' if it rests on facts unsupported in the record or was reached by applying the wrong legal standard."¹¹ We do not decide witness credibility or reweigh the evidence on appeal.¹²

Here, the trial judge awarded Wells the former marital home together with certain retirement accounts and other personal property. The judge also awarded Peacock other retirement accounts and other personal property. In making these allocations, the trial judge stated in her findings that she considered the parties' ages, health, and current financial circumstances. We see nothing in this record that undercuts the judge's stated approach in distributing assets.

Peacock challenges this distribution on two bases: first, on what he claims is the ratio of distributed shares of property to each other; second, on the trial judge's valuation of the former marital home. Neither claim has merit.

First, he claims the distribution favors Wells by a ratio of 42/58. He states that the judge's "rigid division of separate and community property did not take into account the relative health and earning capacit[ies] of the parties."

This claim is unsupported by the record. For example, unchallenged findings 2.21.3 and 2.21.5 detail Peacock's health challenges, his work history, and his expectation to not work again. We also note that the trial judge denied Wells's request for attorney fees at trial based on Peacock's alleged intransigence. The court denied fees because Peacock's health issues did not evidence intransigence.

It is noteworthy that the trial judge found that Peacock "diminished community assets imprudently," finding that he "used and/or lost" $30,000 of community funds. Because this finding is unchallenged on appeal, it is a verity.¹³

Assets disposed of before trial cannot be distributed at trial.¹⁴ But in In re Marriage of Griswold, Division Three of this court found no abuse of discretion where the trial court characterized the proceeds from the wife's sale of her wedding ring before trial as community property and assigned the value to the wife.¹⁵ Division Three of this court found no abuse of discretion by doing so even though the ring, and presumably the proceeds, did not exist at trial.

Here, the $30,000 did not exist as trial, and the judge credited Peacock with these community funds after finding that he "demonstrated financial mismanagement" and "used them for his separate benefit or lost them." Thus, the trial judge's claimed lack of equitable distribution is based, in part, on his squandering of community assets. This determination by the trial judge is not an abuse of discretion.

Peacock cites, without meaningful discussion, other cases in which a trial court awarded a greater share of community property either to an older, sicker spouse or a spouse with lesser earning capacity.¹⁶ Of course, the fact that other courts, based on the facts and circumstances of other cases, chose to divide assets in ways other than the trial judge did in this case falls far short of showing that this trial judge abused her considerable discretion in distributing assets.

Peacock also argues that he received no "offset" for contributing to the children's Uniform Gift to Minors Act accounts. But he cites no authorityindicating that an offset is required. Accordingly, we need not consider this argument.¹⁷

Peacock also argues that the trial judge failed to take into account his "exceptionally hard work over the years, which greatly benefited the community." He cites In re Marriage of Williams¹⁸ as support, asserting that the trial court in that case offset the wife's waste of marital assets with her income contribution to the community.

That case is distinguishable because the husband did not want the wife's gambling debts included in their total liabilities.¹⁹ The trial court balanced the wife's "extra income against her excessive spending" and included her gambling related debts in the total liabilities.²⁰ That is not the case here. So, the case does not support Peacock's argument.

Peacock also argues that Wells is younger, in good health, and should be able to obtain full-time employment. Conversely, he argues that he is in significant debt and will "most likely" be unable to work again.

He cites In re Marriage of Tower²¹ to support his argument. In that case, this court determined that "a disproportionate community property award in favor of the . . . spouse with any significant earning capacity would be an abuse ofdiscretion were it not balanced by long-term maintenance [to the other spouse]."²² Peacock uses this case to argue that the trial court did not award him maintenance to "ameliorate the inequitable property division."

But that case is distinguishable because the trial court "endeavored to fairly distribute the parties' limited assets without jeopardizing" the wife's eligibility for social security disability benefits.²³ Further, in this case, Peacock received "a secure and greater income and was awarded substantial cash assets, whereas [Wells] received the house, which benefits the children." And she was not working at the time of trial. Thus, the case he cites does not support his argument.

The second reason Peacock cites for the allegedly inequitable distribution is the trial judge's decision to value the former marital home based on the evidence presented by Wells. The judge's view of the evidence Wells offered is a credibility determination that we do not review.

In sum, Peacock has failed to show this is an extraordinary case that compels us to overturn the trial judge's exercise of her considerable discretion in dividing the parties' assets.

MOTION TO VACATE DECREE

Peacock claims the motion judge...