Peanut Growers' Exchange, Inc. v. Bobbitt

• Decision Date: 08 October 1924
• Docket Number: 97.
• Citation: 124 S.E. 625,188 N.C. 335
• Parties: PEANUT GROWERS' EXCH., INC., v. BOBBITT.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

124 S.E. 625

188 N.C. 335

PEANUT GROWERS' EXCH., INC., v. BOBBITT.

No. 97.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

October 8, 1924

Appeal from Superior Court, Halifax County; Sinclair, Judge.

Action by the Peanut Growers' Exchange, Incorporated, against A E. Bobbitt. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. New trial.

Defendant did not waive right to challenge juror, who was member of plaintiff association, by refusal to accept plaintiff's offer to excuse juror without exercise of peremptory challenge, on court's ruling that incompetency of juror was not ground of challenge open to plaintiff.

Travis & Travis, of Halifax, and R. H. Parker, of Enfield, for appellant.

C. E Peters, of Norfolk, Va., Daniel & Daniel, of Weldon, Dunn & Johnson, of Enfield, and George C. Green, of Weldon, for appellee.

STACY J.

The first exception appearing on the record is as follows:

"The defendant challenged the juror Cherry on the ground that he was a member of the plaintiff, Peanut Growers' Association. The defendant had already exhausted his peremptory challenges. The court examined the juror Cherry and being of the opinion that he was an impartial juror, in its discretion refused to stand him aside. The plaintiff's attorneys, while the jury was with the plaintiff, announced to the defendant that Cherry was a member of the Peanut Association and proposed to excuse him. The defendant refused to accept the plaintiff's offer to excuse the juror and objected that his being a member of the association was not a ground of challenge open to the plaintiff, which objection was sustained by the court. At the time the defendant asked the juror, if, notwithstanding his being a member of the association, could he, after hearing the evidence, give a fair and impartial trial, to which he replied that he could. Exception by defendant."

The incompetency of the juror Cherry must be conceded; and the exception is properly presented. State v. Levy, 187 N.C. 587, 122 S.E. 386. The juror was a member of the plaintiff association and necessarily interested in the litigation. Speaking to a similar question in Bank v. Oil Mills, 150 N.C. 683, 64 S.E. 883, Walker, J., said:

"The defendants, having exhausted their peremptory challenges, objected to a juror, Samuel Bear, who admitted that he is a stockholder in the plaintiff bank. The court, upon evidence, found that, notwithstanding the fact of his being a stockholder, he was 'a fair and unbiased juror,' and overruled the challenge. In this ruling, we think, there was error. It is very true, the cause of challenge is not one of those specified in the statute, but they are merely cumulative, and it was not the intention of the Legislature to repeal the fundamental principle of the common law forbidding a person to sit in judgment when his own interests are involved. Whether there are any circumstances which will justify a departure from this elementary rule by reason of the necessity of the case, we need not consider, as no such necessity arose in the trial of the present action. The only question presented is, was the juror competent to sit in the case? He was a stockholder of the plaintiff bank, and therefore had a direct pecuniary interest in the result of the trial. This cannot well be questioned. He was therefore made a judge in his own cause without any sufficient reason in law to sustain the ruling of the court. whether he

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