Pearce v. G. R. Kirk Co., 46161
| Decision Date | 08 November 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 46161,46161 |
| Parties | Sandra L. PEARCE, Respondent, v. G. R. KIRK COMPANY, a Washington Corporation, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malanca, Peterson & O'Hern, Thomas L. Fishburne, William T. Lynn, Tacoma, for petitioner.
Smith, Redman & O'Hare, Thomas C. O'Hare, Silverdale, for respondent.
This is an action for treble damages, brought under RCW 64.12.030. The trial court found that the defendant willfully cut 426 trees on plaintiff's land. According to the findings, the plaintiff had planned to market these trees at retail and she had in fact sold at retail 57 of the 65 trees remaining on her land. The court found that, had the plaintiff been able to take the trees which were cut to market, she would have realized the sum of $3 per tree, less the cost of transportation to market and the costs of sale. The stumpage value, proven by the undisputed testimony of a witness for the defendant, was considerably less than this amount. The court awarded damages of $3,678.40, less the expenses which it found that the plaintiff would have incurred in the marketing of the trees. Judgment was given for treble the amount of damages.
In the Court of Appeals, the defendant urged again a theory which it had pressed upon the trial court that RCW 79.40.070 provides the exclusive remedy for the cutting of Christmas trees. That statute authorizes the recovery of $1 per tree, trebled if the cutting was willful. The Court of Appeals rejected this theory, as the trial court had done. It approved the measure of damages utilized by the trial court, but modified the judgment to correct two errors in the computation of damages. Pearce v. G. R. Kirk Company, 22 Wash.App. 323, 589 P.2d 302 (1979).
We granted the defendant's petition for review of two questions: whether the "Christmas tree statute" affords the plaintiff her only statutory remedy and whether the proper measure of damages was applied.
Examining RCW 64.12.030 1 and RCW 79.40.070, 2 we find that neither was intended to provide an exclusive remedy, and we affirm the interpretation adopted by the Court of Appeals. It is true that, as the defendant argues, RCW 79.40.070 applies to Christmas trees specifically, while RCW 64.12.030 deals with them only in a general way. Were there a conflict between the two statutes, perhaps we would be forced to hold that the Christmas tree statute applies to the exclusion of RCW 64.12.030. In that event, we would be faced with a possible constitutional infirmity in the latter statute, if it were found to operate to compel the sale of private property at a price less than its true value.
However, we do not find the statutes to be in conflict. The rule is that legislative enactments which relate to the same subject and are not actually in conflict should be interpreted so as to give meaning and effect to both, even though one statute is general in application and the other is special. Davis v. King County, 77 Wash.2d 930, 468 P.2d 679 (1970). Such an interpretation gives significance to both acts of the legislature.
When these two acts are given effect, one permits a person whose trees have been taken to prove his actual damages and recover that amount trebled, if the taking is willful; the other provides a statutory measure of damages, which he may utilize if he chooses and avoid the necessity of proving actual damages. There is no language in either statute making it an exclusive remedy. 3
It is possible to infer an intent to make the remedy exclusive from some of the language used. RCW 79.40.070 provides that a person cutting Christmas trees for commercial purposes "shall be liable . . . for payment . . . at . . . one dollar each." However, it must be remembered that this statute was enacted in 1937, at a time when $1 was a large price to pay for a Christmas tree, even at retail. According to the defendant's evidence in this case, it is still a high price for stumpage. With this in mind, it becomes evident that the words "shall be liable" were intended to impose a punitive liability, even without the imposition of treble damages. Undoubtedly, at that time, the recovery which could be had under this statute was greater than that which could be had by proof of actual damages. Thus, viewed with respect to circumstances existing at the time of its enactment (See State ex rel. Troy v. Yelle, 27 Wash.2d 99 176 P.2d 459 (1947)), this statutory language cannot be held to evidence a legislative intent to deny an owner the right to pursue other more compensatory remedies.
Nor does the fact that the Christmas tree statute was enacted at a later date than RCW 64.12.030 manifest a legislative intent to deprive an owner of the remedy provided in the latter statute.
The policy and purpose of both statutes is to protect the owner against unauthorized cutting of his trees not to limit his right of recovery. We conclude therefore that when the legislature enacted RCW 79.40.070, it did not intend to deprive owners of the remedy previously provided in RCW 64.12.030. The courts below correctly held that the plaintiff could pursue her remedy under the latter statute.
The remaining question concerns the measure of damages adopted by the Superior Court and the Court of Appeals. RCW 64.12.030 provides that, where trees are willfully cut, judgment shall be given for treble the amount of "damages claimed or assessed therefor, as the case may be." In construing this statute, we have said that the amount of damages to be trebled should be compensatory damages only, and should not include the punitive damages awarded in a common-law action for willful conversion, where the converter is allowed no deduction for the value which he has added to the converted property. Bailey v. Hayden, 65 Wash. 57, 117 P. 720 (1911); Grays Harbor County v. Bay City Lumber Co., 47 Wash.2d 879, 289 P.2d 975 (1955). In each of those cases, it was found that to award the plaintiff stumpage (the value of the standing timber) would compensate him for his loss. In neither of those cases, and in no Washington case that has come to our attention, did the plaintiff assert that he intended to cut and market the timber himself as the plaintiff did here.
It was proved to the satisfaction of the trial court here, and the defendant does not question that proof, that the plaintiff planned, with the help of her father, to cut these Christmas trees and sell them at retail. She presented evidence of the profit she would have made. The defendant offered no evidence that she would have realized a lesser amount of profit. With the case in that posture, it is apparent that to award her only the stumpage value would be to deny full compensation for her loss.
The measure of damages for the unauthorized conversion of merchantable timber has quite generally been held to be the stumpage value. See Annots.,161 A.L.R. 549 (1946), 69 A.L.R.2d 1335 (1960); H. Falk, Jr., Timber and Forest Products Law (1958); C. McCormick, The Law of Damages § 126 (1935); H. Oleck,...
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