Pearce v. Village of Edina

• Decision Date: 05 October 1962
• Docket Number: No. 38464,38464
• Citation: 118 N.W.2d 659,263 Minn. 553
• Parties: Katherine Elizabeth PEARCE et al., Respondents, v. VILLAGE OF EDINA, Minnesota, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 659

118 N.W.2d 659

263 Minn. 553

Katherine Elizabeth PEARCE et al., Respondents, v. VILLAGE OF EDINA, Minnesota, Appellant.

No. 38464.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Oct. 5, 1962.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Municipal zoning ordinances affecting interests in real property must be in interests of public health, safety, or welfare. Where they bear no relationship to such interests; where they are discriminatory or rest upon intent to protect enterprises from competition or create monopolies within certain areas; or where they are enacted primarily in adherence to esthetic concepts of municipal planning commission, they will be held invalid.

2. Where evidence reasonably supports finding that in enacting zoning ordinance municipality acted in excess of police power, courts will hold ordinance invalid. In deciding issue, courts may weigh evidence and draw inferences therefrom as in other cases involving questions of fact. Likewise, courts may consider uses or classifications of property adjacent to that involved, and where it is apparent that challenged zoning ordinances have resulted in surrounding such property by commercial or industrial operations prohibited to it, courts may hold ordinances invalid as applied thereto. The courts may also give consideration to gross differentiation in valuation of property resulting from classifications under zoning ordinances in deciding whether action of municipality in adopting such ordinances was arbitrary or unreasonable.

3. On appeal from decision of district court holding zoning ordinances invalid, functions of this court require its consideration of all evidence submitted in proceedings and its determination as to whether such evidence, when considered in light most favorable to prevailing party, supports district court's findings therein. Duty rests upon courts to insure that zoning ordinances do not constitute an arbitrary or discriminatory exercise of legislative prerogatives, particularly where they destroy valuable property rights.

4. Evidence examined and held adequate to support district court's findings and conclusions (1) that defendant's zoning ordinances as applied to plaintiffs' property were invalid; (2) that zoning ordinances adopted by defendant on February 13, 1961 classifying plaintiffs' property for office building uses were not in compliance with, nor a good-faith attempt to comply with, the district court's decision that such property was adaptable to community store purposes under defendant's zoning ordinances and that plaintiffs were entitled to use it for such purposes; (3) that as to plaintiffs' property the zoning ordinances of February 13, 1961, were even more arbitrary, discriminatory, unreasonable, and confiscatory than were the previous ordinances held invalid by the court; (4) that defendant's zoning ordinances as they relate to plaintiffs' property were adopted by defendant pursuant to its design to protect present enterprises in the area from competition; and (5) that such ordinances had rendered the commercial use of plaintiffs' property practically valueless and as to the triangular strip they had the effect of completely confiscating it without making just compensation therefor.

Judgments affirmed and case remanded with directions that district court retain jurisdiction to insure compliance with decision under which it determined that plaintiffs were entitled to use their property for community store purposes as prescribed by defendant's zoning ordinances in effect on July 24, 1959, and that as to the triangular parcel, either some practical and reasonable commercial use thereof be authorized or that plaintiffs be compensated for the reasonable value thereof.

Dorsey, Owen, Barber, Marquart & Windhorst and Maynard B. Hasselquist and Edward J. Schwartzbauer, Minneapolis, for appellant.

J. E. Brill, Sr., Brill & Brill, Minneapolis, for respondents.

Keith M. Stidd, City Atty., and D. J. Shama, Asst. City Atty., Minneapolis, for City of Minneapolis.

Orville C. Peterson and David J. Kennedy, Minneapolis, for League of Minnesota Muncipalities.

THOMAS GALLAGHER, Justice.

Plaintiffs, Katherine Pearce and Marie Pearce, sisters, bring this action against defendant, village of Edina, for a declaratory judgment invalidating certain zoning ordinances of defendant under which their real property in the village has been zoned for Office building purposes with building restrictions which limit the use of such property in many respects and which deny them the right to construct thereon a shopping center or community stores similar to those in the adjacent area. They contend that the ordinances are discriminatory, arbitrary, and confiscatory; that they destroy valuable interests in their property without due process or without just compensation therefor; and that they deny to them uses thereof which other ordinances authorize for similar adjacent property. The trial court ordered judgments in plaintiffs' favor on all issues. Defendant appeals from these judgments as hereinafter outlined.

Plaintiffs' property is comprised of two parcels. The smaller parcel, referred to herein as the triangular parcel, is a tract bounded on the south by the north line of 66th Street and on the north and west by the northwest line of York Avenue as it extends northeasterly from 66th Street into Xerxes Avenue. Its east line is approximately 200 feet west of and parallel to the west line of Xerxes Avenue. The larger parcel, referred to herein as the upper parcel, is rectangular in outline. It has a southerly frontage of 200 feet on the north line of 66th Street. It extends northerly from 66th Street at a width of 200 feet and more for a distance of 400 feet. Its east line is 200 feet west of and parallel to the west line of Xerxes Avenue. Xerxes Avenue separates the village of Edina to the west from the village of Richfield to the east.

In this area 66th Street is a main artery of traffic to Southdale Shopping Center. The latter is bounded on the north by the south line of 66th Street, a portion of it lying directly opposite and across 66th Street from plaintiffs' upper parcel. Its east boundary is the west line of York Avenue. The tract between Xerxes Avenue and York Avenue has been zoned for regional shopping by Edina for a distance of four blocks to the south of 66th Street.

On the southeast corner of the intersection of 66th Street and Xerxes Avenue in Richfield and diagonally across from plaintiffs' property a large tract has been zoned by Richfield for Commercial uses. It is presently occupied by a structure used for an automobile accessory market. Directly opposite it to the west in Edina on the southwest corner of this intersection a large drive-in restaurant has been constructed across 66th Street from plaintiffs' property. To the north of 66th Street and on the east side of Xerxes Avenue in Richfield a large tract is likewise zoned for commercial uses. This tract is now occupied by a service station, a large shopping center, a supermarket, and other commercial structures extending 400 feet north and opposite plaintiffs' two parcels to the west of Xerxes Avenue.

On the northeast corner of 66th Street and France Avenue South, Edina has zoned a large tract for Regional medical uses. On the northeast corner of the intersection there has been constructed a six-story medical building with a large parking area adjacent thereto. On the first floor of this structure there are a number of enterprises, including a large restaurant, a pharmacy, and a photography salon. East of this medical center and north of 66th Street are two small tracts upon which houses were constructed some years ago. They lie between plaiantiffs' upper parcel and the medical center described. Their owners have not participated in these proceedings, and it appears that their property would be more valuable were it zoned for regional shopping or community store purposes in accordance with the plaintiffs' objectives.

Farther to the west, fronting on France Avenue and north of 66th Street, several large tracts have been zoned by Edina for Regional shopping uses. Presently, several commercial buildings or office buildings have been constructed thereon. To the south of 66th Street and adjacent to the west line of France Avenue, opposite Southdale Shopping Center, a large tract of land has been zoned by Edina for Regional shopping uses. Up to the present no structures have been erected thereon.

It is apparent from the foregoing that in the immediate vicinity of plaintiffs' property at the intersection of 66th Street and Xerxes Avenue regional shopping areas and commercial uses have been authorized under the zoning ordinances of Edina and Richfield for all but plaintiffs' property, which in fact is surrounded by a typical regional or community shopping area.

Edina is southwest of Minneapolis. In 1935 it enacted a zoning ordinance which created and established various use districts. Under this ordinance and subsequent amendments thereto, the following classifications are included among others:

1. Multiple residence district. (Plaintiffs' property was zoned for multiple dwelling from 1958 to early in 1961 when it was rezoned for office building uses.)

2. Community store district. (This permits use of property for multiple dwelling and retail establishments.)

3. Regional shopping district. (This permits uses authorized in its community store district but requires a low ratio of building to land.)

4. Regional medical district. (This authorizes construction of hospitals, medical offices, laboratories, and certain retail facilities.)

5. Office building district. (This authorizes the construction of business and professional offices and permits certain enumerated retail sales and service facilities, accessory to the office building. No separate stores may be erected for shopping purposes. Total floor area authorized for such accessory uses may not exceed 10 percent of the gross...