Pearl River Val. Water Supply Dist. v. Wood, 43478

• Decision Date: 22 February 1965
• Docket Number: No. 43478,43478
• Citation: 172 So.2d 196,252 Miss. 580
• Parties: PEARL RIVER VALLEY WATER SUPPLY DISTRICT v. Hazel A. WOOD.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 196

172 So.2d 196

252 Miss. 580

PEARL RIVER VALLEY WATER SUPPLY DISTRICT v. Hazel A. WOOD.

No. 43478.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Feb. 22, 1965.

Watkins, Pyle, Edwards & Ludlam, Clifford C. Chittim, Jackson, for appellant.

Lee, Moore & Countiss, Jackson, Ray, Spivey & Cain, Canton, for appellee.

BRADY, Justice:

The Pearl River Valley Water Supply District, hereinafter referred to as District, on October 18, 1962, filed with the Circuit Clerk of Madison County, Mississippi its application for the condemnation of 113.8 acres, more or less, situated in Section 6, Township 7 North, Range 3 East owned by the appellee, Mrs. Hazel A. Wood. Before the date fixed by the clerk of the court for the organization of the special court of eminent domain, the appellee, also hereinafter referred to as landowner, filed a petition for writ of prohibition, and a temporary writ of prohibition was issued. While the temporary writ of prohibition was pending, the Madison County Circuit Court, acting upon a stipulation between the parties, entered an agreed order on the 29th day of March, 1963, whereby there was dismissed from the writ of prohibition 31.7 acres of land, more or less, which land was being acquired by conveyance to the United States of America for the relocation of the Natchez Trace Parkway.

Approximately six months had elapsed from the time of the filing of the original application and the entering of the agreed order for dismissal of a portion of the land. Upon the trial covering the 31.7 acres in the special court of eminent domain on May 29 and 30, 1963, the jury rendered a verdict and a judgment was entered thereon in the amount of $35,000. From this judgment the District appealed to the circuit court, where the cause was assigned No. 781 on the docket for trial de novo.

Since it was necessary to acquire the lands for the relocation of the Natchez Trace Parkway, the District, in conformity with Mississippi Code Annotated section 2766(b) (1956), on June 22, 1963 deposited with the clerk of the court a sum equal to double the amount of the award, and thereupon entered upon the 31.7 acres and began its enormous operations. Appellee sought a trial on the appeal case covering the 31.7 acres at both the June and September 1963 Terms of the Circuit Court of Madison County, but was unsuccessful.

Upon the trial covering the 82.1 acres in the special court of eminent domain, the jury rendered a verdict in the amount of $78,200 in favor of the landowner, and judgment was entered on March 27, 1964. The appellant appealed this judgment to the Circuit Court of Madison County for trial de novo.

When the two appeals to the circuit court came on for hearing, upon application of the District and upon a stipulation between the parties in the case at bar through their attorneys, they were reconsolidated for trial de novo as one case as originally filed, subject to the conditions of the stipulation agreed upon when appellee consented to the consolidation of the cases upon appellant's motion. Paragraph two of the stipulation is as follows:

'That all rules of evidence pertaining to eminent domain proceedings in trials de novo shall be followed and based on this date, June 1, 1964, and that it is agreed that June 1, 1964 is and shall be the effective date of this taking, and all rules of evidence pertaining to said taking shall be applicable as if this or these cases hed never been tried.'

In the trial in the circuit court of said county, the jury rendered a verdict in the sum of $103,800. In accordance with the stipulation between the parties that the court should add to the verdict of the jury the interest accrued at the rate of six percent from and after June 2, 1963 on all monies which in its discretion it decided should be allocated to the 31.7 acres which the District had already taken, the court entered a judgment against the District in the total amount of $105,510. After appellant's motion for a new trial was overruled, appellant appealed from this judgment.

Appellant urges that the court erred as follows:

1. In excluding from the consideration of the jury all evidence of enhancement or diminution in the value of Appellee's land arising after March 19, 1959 from the initiation and construction of the Pearl River Dam and Reservoir project.

2. In excluding from the consideration of the jury all evidence of general benefits or injuries resulting from the use to which the land taken from Appellee is to be put, that are shared by the general public.

3. In refusing to grant the District's Motion for a New Trial or in the alternative to enter a remittitur upon the ground that the verdict of the jury was so excessive and contrary to the weight of the creditable evidence pertaining to due compensation for the value of the property actually taken and damages to the remainder as to evince passion, prejudice and bias on the part of the jury against the District.

4. In various rulings upon the admission and exclusion of evidence as shown by the Record in this case and more particularly pointed out in Brief of Appellant.

5. In refusing to give Instructions for the Petitioner numbered 1, 2, 4 and 6.

The basic position of the appellant is that never in the history of the state has a project involved the acquisition of land of such magnitude in tracts of predominantly substantial size, as contrasted to strips of rights of way and similar purposes for a project which was immediately reflected in a pronounced and widespread enhancement in the value of neighboring lands. Because of the magnitude of the project it was necessary that the acquisition of the land be undertaked in stages.

Appellant urges, first, that the project became a reality and the boundaries were determined on March 19, 1959, when the District published notice thereof, including a map showing the property within one quarter mile beyond the three hundred foot sea level contour. Second, with the crystallization of the plans and realistic anticipation of their fulfillment, together with a high degree of speculation, land prices increased exorbitantly. It is the major contention of appellant that due compensation to which appellee is entitled is the full fair market value on the date of trial of her property actually taken, together with damages to the remainder, excluding therefrom only the general benefits or injuries shared by the general public from the creation of the Pearl River Reservoir; and that the court erred in excluding from the consideration of the jury (in determining due compensation) all evidence of such benefits or injuries and all evidence of enhancement or diminution of comparable sales prices after March 19, 1959, due to the initiation and construction of the reservoir project.

Appellant contends that the testimony of appellee's witnesses was unrealistic and incredible because it was founded upon the unwarranted assumption of a market in the reasonable future for residential tracts into which appellee's land could be divided. Appellant maintains that the witnesses for the appellee based their values upon sales of other land not comparable to subject land as to size, location, utility and other criteria acceptable under standard appraisal procedures, to be specific, the standard market data approach, and the statistical scientific approach. Appellant finally asserts that, regardless of the other errors and contentions, the court's rulings on the admission and exclusion of certain evidence, and its refusal to give certain tendered instructions, constitute prejudicial error and require a reversal of the judgment and the remanding of this cause.

A detailed resume of the prolix facts of this case need not be outlined. The facts heretofore stated in this opinion, together with such facts as require consideration, will be sufficient for the disposition of this suit.

We will first consider interrelated errors one and two together. At the outset, the fact that this entire eminent domain condemnation is of gargantuan proportions, and therefore somewhat unique in Mississippi, does not per se modify or ameliorate in any manner the basic mandates and prerequisites of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi article 3, section 17 (1890) and the statutory legislative requirements. The many interpretations heretofore made by this Court in construing the constitutional and legislative intent are still operating and controlling.

Mississippi Constitution article 3, section 17 provides as follows:

'Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use, except on due compensation being first made to the owner or owners thereof, in a manner to be prescribed by law; and whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be public shall be a judicial question, and, as such, determined without regard to legislative assertion that the use is public.'

In passing, there is a vast difference between the provisions of said article 3, section 17 and the applicable part of the United States Constitution amendment V, which we quote: '[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.'

By enacting Mississippi Code Annotated section 2760 (1956), the legislature prudently prescribed a basic instruction necessary for the determination of the damages recoverable by a landowner in a special eminent domain court, and required the justice of the peace to sign and give it. The legislature implemented our constitutional safeguard, whether the latter be self-executing or not, and sought to insure in eminent domain courts that due and fair compensation would be paid the landowner and, at the same time, the condemnor's rights would not be violated. Our former decisions reflect careful consideration of the basic legislative objectives and safeguards. In Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Hillman, 189 Miss. 850, 866, 198 So. 565, 569 (1940), we ...