Pearn v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 20643.
| Decision Date | 26 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 20707.,No. 20704.,No. 20643.,20643.,20704.,20707. |
| Citation | 148 Ohio App.3d 228,2002 Ohio 3197,772 N.E.2d 712 |
| Parties | PEARN, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION et al., Appellants and Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Dean A. Young, Akron, for appellee.
Michael P. Gilbride and Brian D. Sullivan, Cleveland; Michael Romanello, Columbus, for appellants.
Ronald Towne, Akron, for appellant Rolling Acres Dodge, Inc. CARR, Judge.
{¶ 1} Appellants Rolling Acres Dodge, Inc. ("Rolling Acres") and DaimlerChrysler Corporation ("Chrysler") appeal from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This court affirms.
I
{¶ 2} This case begins with the purchase of a 1996 Chrysler Sebring Coupe by Donna Sawicki in Detroit, Michigan. Sawicki had numerous problems with the brakes on the Sebring. Chrysler repurchased the vehicle from Sawicki in September 1997 because it was a "lemon" within the meaning of Michigan's lemon law, due to repeated brake failures. The vehicle was then sent to the Detroit Auto Auction, where it was sold at a Chrysler-only auction. At a Chrysler-only auction, only Chrysler vehicles are sold and Chrysler officials oversee the auction. The bill of sale for the Sebring indicated that the vehicle was not to be sold to an Ohio dealer. In spite of the notation, Rolling Acres purchased the Sebring at the auction. Rolling Acres then transported the Sebring to Ohio and sold it to the appellee, Angela Pearn ("Pearn").
{¶ 3} Pearn went to Rolling Acres in November 1997, intending to purchase a Dodge truck. When financing could not be obtained for the truck she wanted, Craig Theiss, a salesman at Rolling Acres, showed Pearn other vehicles, including the Sebring. Theiss told Pearn that the vehicle was a demo and that she would be its first owner. Theiss did not tell Pearn that the Sebring was a buyback, nor did he tell her that the vehicle had a special extended warranty from Chrysler because it was a buyback. Theiss had Pearn sign some preliminary paperwork, and then he took her to the finance department, where Dominick Macreno had her sign the remaining paperwork to complete the transaction.
{¶ 4} Pearn began having trouble with the brakes in the fall of 1998. After taking the Sebring in for several repairs on the brakes, Pearn decided to trade in the vehicle. On September 13, 1998, Pearn went to Falls Dodge to look at vehicles for which she could trade in the Sebring. When a salesman at Falls Dodge ran the Sebring's vehicle identification number through the computer, he discovered it was a buyback vehicle. Holmes, a manager at Falls Dodge, then informed Pearn that the vehicle was a buyback.
{¶ 5} Pearn then brought this action against Rolling Acres and Chrysler, alleging the following against each defendant: (1) violations of the Consumer Sales Practices Act, (2) breach of warranty, and (3) fraud. Pearn also sought punitive damages.
{¶ 6} The case was tried to a jury. At the close of Pearn's case, both Rolling Acres and Chrysler moved for directed verdict. The trial court denied both motions for directed verdict. The jury found (1) for Pearn against Rolling Acres for $6,900 for Consumer Sales Practices Act violations, (2) for Pearn against Rolling Acres in the amount of $2,000 for breach of warranty, (3) for Pearn against Rolling Acres for $13,000 for fraud and $75,000 for punitive damages, (4) for Pearn against Chrysler for $16,100 for Consumer Sales Practices Act violations, (5) for Chrysler for breach of warranty, and (6) for Pearn against Chrysler for $9,200 for fraud and $150,000 for punitive damages.
{¶ 7} On December 27, 2000, the trial court entered judgment based upon the jury's verdict but ruled that the matter was not final until a determination was made as to attorney fees awarded by the jury. On July 7, 2001, the trial court found that both Rolling Acres and Chrysler were liable for $224,250 in attorney fees and $876 in costs. The trial court further found that Rolling Acres was responsible for only twenty-five percent of the fees and costs.
{¶ 8} On June 21, 2001, Rolling Acres moved for a new trial and partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of punitive damages. On July 6, 2001, Rolling Acres moved for relief from judgment based on newly discovered evidence and fraud. The trial court denied Rolling Acres' motion for new trial and partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict on July 16, 2001. On July 24, 2001, Rolling Acres requested a hearing on its previously filed motion for relief from judgment. The trial court denied both Rolling Acres' request for hearing and motion for relief from judgment on August 8, 2001.
{¶ 9} Both Rolling Acres and Chrysler timely appealed. This court will begin with Rolling Acres' assignments of error. Rolling Acres has set forth five assignments of error for review.
II
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 10} "The trial court erred in admitting the testimony of appellee's expert, David Stivers[.]"
{¶ 11} Rolling Acres has argued that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Pearn's expert, David Stivers ("Stivers"). Specifically, Rolling Acres has argued that Stivers's testimony should have been excluded under either Evid.R. 403(A) or 702(A) or both.
{¶ 12} The decision of whether to admit evidence rests in the sound discretion of the court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 431, 436, 715 N.E.2d 546. An abuse of discretion signifies more than merely an error in judgment; instead, it involves "perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency." Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621, 614 N.E.2d 748. When applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Id.
{¶ 13} The purpose of expert testimony is to "assist the trier of fact in determining a fact issue or understanding the evidence." Miller v. Bike Athletic Co. (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 611, 687 N.E.2d 735. According to Evid.R. 702(A), an expert witness's testimony must either "relat[e] to matters beyond the knowledge or experience possessed by the lay person or dispe[l] a misconception common among lay persons." An expert witness "may not express an opinion upon matters as to which the jury is capable of forming a competent conclusion." Burens v. Indus. Comm. (1955), 162 Ohio St. 549, 55 O.O. 436, 124 N.E.2d 724, paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 14} Rolling Acres has argued that, even if Stivers's testimony was admissible as being relevant, it was highly prejudicial to Rolling Acres and was, therefore, inadmissible under Evid.R. 403(A). Evid.R. 403(A) states: "Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury."
{¶ 15} Stivers testified that it is difficult for a car dealer to sell a buyback vehicle if it discloses to the consumer that it is a buyback vehicle. Stivers also testified that if a dealer finds a consumer that will purchase a vehicle after being told it is a buyback, the dealer will not be able to sell it for as much as if the consumer did not know it was a buyback. When questioned as to the value of a buyback vehicle with a history of serious brake problems that was not repairable after numerous attempts, Stivers stated that its value would be "essentially salvage value." Stivers testified that a dealer who chooses not to disclose the fact that a vehicle is a buyback can benefit by getting consumers to pay more for the vehicle than if they knew they were purchasing a buyback vehicle. Finally, Stivers revealed several tactics known as the "five-finger disclosure" used by car dealers to interfere with the consumer's ability to read the paperwork he or she is signing. With the exception of his testimony regarding the value of a buyback vehicle with a history of serious brake problems that were not repairable after numerous attempts, Stivers's testimony was not beyond the knowledge or experience of the jury.
{¶ 16} Assuming without deciding that portions of Stivers's testimony were inadmissible as being within the knowledge of the jury, this court finds that the error is harmless. There was sufficient evidence on which the jury could reach its verdict without Stivers's testimony. Accordingly, this court concludes that the any statements made by Stivers that were within the jury's knowledge were harmless as no prejudicial evidence was obtained thereby.
{¶ 17} Rolling Acres' first assignment of error is overruled.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 18} "The trial court erred in denying appellant Rolling Acres' partial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict[.]"
{¶ 19} Rolling Acres has argued that the trial court should have granted its partial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This court disagrees.
{¶ 20} This court's standard of review on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, pursuant to Civ.R. 50(B), is de novo. Schafer v. RMS Realty (2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 244, 257-258, 741 N.E.2d 155; Reitz v. Akron Aerie No. 555 Fraternal Order of Eagles, Inc. (Nov. 7, 2001), 9th Dist. No. 20454, 2001 WL 1379445. The evidence must be reviewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and where there is substantial evidence to support that side of the case, upon which reasonable minds could reach different conclusions, the motion must be denied. Posin v. A.B.C. Motor Court Hotel (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 271, 275, 74 O.O.2d 427, 344 N.E.2d 334.
{¶ 21} Rolling acres moved the trial court for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict from the jury's award of punitive damages. Rolling Acres has argued that the evidence did not support an award of punitive damages. This court disagrees.
{¶ 22} ...
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