Pearson Kent Corp. v. Bear

• Citation: 322 N.Y.S.2d 235,28 N.Y.2d 396,271 N.E.2d 218
• Parties: , 271 N.E.2d 218 In the Matter of PEARSON KENT CORPORATION, Respondent, v. Franklin BEAR et al., Constituting the Nassau County Planning Commission, Appellants.
• Decision Date: 26 May 1971
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 235

322 N.Y.S.2d 235

28 N.Y.2d 396, 271 N.E.2d 218

In the Matter of PEARSON KENT CORPORATION, Respondent, v. Franklin BEAR et al., Constituting the Nassau County Planning Commission, Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 26, 1971.

Joseph Jaspan, Co. Atty. (F. Stuart Darrow, New York City, of counsel), for appellants.

John F. Coffey, Hempstead, for respondent.

BERGAN, Judge.

The case involves the statutory powers of the Nassau County Planning Commission under the County Government Law (Charter) of that county. The frame of its authority is broadly stated. Jurisdiction is vested over all territory of the county outside cities and villages ( § 1610). The same section requires the approval of the commission for development of any plat for a subdivision of land. The legislative intent is to grant to the commission 'the powers necessary for guiding and accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted and harmonious development of the county, which will * * * best promote health, safety, and the general welfare' ( § 1610, subd. 3, Laws 1936, c. 879 as amended by Laws 1950, c. 198).

In exercising its authority to grant or deny approval of a subdivision under the same section it may consider the impact of the proposed development on adjacent territory and property within its jurisdiction. The fact that portions of the Charter and Real Property Law are addressed to approval or disapproval internal to the subdivision itself does not negate the broader powers of the commission (see, e.g., § 1610, dealing with the regulations directed by the board of supervisors as to land 'shown on a plat' and 'public places shown upon the plat', and Real Property Law, Consol.Laws, c. 50, § 334--a, 'area embraced within said map'). These matters are the routine functions of the commission.

The commission denied petitioner's development approval, not because it regarded the plan itself as intrinsically not acceptable but because the project was so located as to create danger to nearby residents in the inadequate approaches to the development from the greatly increased demands to be exerted on the existing approaches. These reasons are set forth in extensive detail in the resolution of the commission which denied approval to petitioner's plan.

The grounds may be summarized by saying that the roads through which petitioner would 'channel traffic' are very narrow and 'inadequate' to accommodate 'the additional traffic' and in the absence of sidewalks will 'increase the hazards to young children' going to school; that the Town of Oyster Bay advised the commission it is 'not feasible' to widen the existing road system without destroying the character of existing residences.

Finally, the commission found petitioner had created its own problem by purchasing the premises knowing it had no other access and it might have purchased additional land for that purpose from its grantor who had other access. The opinion at the Appellate Division concluded that the commission was without legal power to refuse approval on this ground. The determination 'was erroneous * * * There is, however, no statutory provision * * * to require improvements on streets outside a...