Pearson v. Allen

• Decision Date: 26 February 1890
• Citation: 151 Mass. 79,23 N.E. 731
• Parties: PEARSON v. ALLEN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

151 Mass. 79

23 N.E. 731

PEARSON v. ALLEN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Nantucket.

February 26, 1890

COUNSEL

J. Brown, for plaintiff.

Chas Almy, for defendant.

OPINION

HOLMES J.

The plaintiff and defendant are both owners of building lots sold with reference to the same plan, which displays a large tract cut up into house lots and ways. The only public way near the tract is North street, which is shown on the west side of the plan. The plan shows ways leading directly to this street from the plaintiff's lots. Her lots, also are drawn as abutting upon a way called "Grant Avenue," from which there is delineated, extending in an opposite direction from North street, a way called "Centre Avenue," which begins directly opposite two of the plaintiff's lots, at a distance of 55 feet, on the other side of Grant avenue, and leads 181 feet, to another way, laid down as "Cliff Avenue." Neither Centre avenue nor Cliff avenue leads to any public street, but from Cliff avenue there is an agreeable view of the sea, without, however, any access to it. The defendant owns all the land on the north of Centre avenue, and has inclosed about one-quarter of it in width throughout its whole length. He also has inclosed a triangle at the corner of Centre and Cliff avenues, which on the plan appears inclosed by dotted lines. The two sides of the triangle on the streets continue the lines inclosing the streets in the same directions until they meet at the corner, but the rest of the street lines are unbroken. The plaintiff seeks an injunction against such inclosures or obstructions.

The only question worthy of discussion is whether the private rights of way, if any, to which the plaintiff is entitled by reason of the reference to the plan in her deeds, extend to Centre avenue. We are of opinion, on the whole, that they do not. The cases here and elsewhere show that there are limits to the easements raised in this way by implication, even if there are not limits to the power of creating easements when it is attempted by express words. A reference to a plan like this, laying out a large tract, does not give every purchaser of a lot a right of way over every street laid down upon it. In Regan v. Gas-Light Co., 137 Mass. 37, a case somewhat like the present, it was held that the defendant could close a whole series of streets shown on a plan, leaving open the private ways adjoining the plaintiff's lots to the highway in one direction, and to the next side street in the other. No doubt a grantee sometimes may be entitled to have ways kept open which his land does not touch, if they are necessary or convenient in order to reach a highway. Fox v. Sugar Refinery, 109 Mass. 292. And he may have like rights in a way which his land does touch, on the side not leading to the highway. Rodgers v. Parker, 9 Gray, 445. But Centre avenue does not lead to a highway, and the plaintiff's land does not touch it. We do not mean that these circumstances would be conclusive in all cases. If Cliff avenue were on the border of the ocean, there would be strong reason for saying that, in a plan for a sea-side resort, access to the ocean was very nearly as important as access to the public streets. See Higginson v. Nahant, 11 Allen, 530, 535. But the plaintiff does not make out that case. The most that she alleges is "that the land on Cliff avenue is nearest the water, and in full view thereof," and that the right to use that avenue and the triangle, in connection with her cottages, is of substantial pecuniary value. With some hesitation, we feel bound to decide that the value of a right of access for purposes of prospect is not a sufficient reason to extend her right of way over Centre avenue.

It follows a...