Pearson v. Burditt

• Decision Date: 01 January 1861
• Citation: 26 Tex. 157
• Parties: E. A. PEARSON, ADM'R. v. GILES H. BURDITT.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

26 Tex. 157

E. A. PEARSON, ADM'R.

v.GILES H. BURDITT.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1861.

In an action by an administrator de bonis non to recover land sold by a preceding administrator under an order of the probate court, the plaintiff charged fraudulent collusion in the sale between the former administrator and the defendant, who was the purchaser at the sale; the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations of three years, and set up his deed from the former administrator as one of the links in the title adduced by him in support of his plea: Held, that such deed was sufficient to support the plea, notwithstanding the fraud in the sale may have been proved to the satisfaction of the jury.

See the pleadings in this case for admissions made by the defendant, and held by the court not to constitute fraud in his purchase of land at an administrator's sale.

The case of Burditt v. Silsbee's Adm'r. 15 Tex. 604, referred to and explained.

An administrator's deed for land sold under order of the probate court, voidable for fraudulent collusion between the administrator and the purchaser, is impeachable only by a legal representative of the estate, or by the heirs or devisees; as to all other persons, it is valid to all intents.

A deed from an administrator for land sold at his administration sale, under order of the probate court, and duly confirmed by that court, passes the legal title of the land to the purchaser, notwithstanding such deed may be voidable at the suit of a subsequent administrator, or of the heirs or devisees of the estate, on account of fraudulent collusion in the sale between the purchaser and the former administrator. Consequently, in a suit for the recovery of the land by the subsequent administrator or by the heirs or devisees, such a deed, being voidable only and not void, is sufficient as a link in the title adduced to support the plea of the statute of limitations of three years.

Where it appears from the whole of the record that the appellee was entitled to the verdict he obtained in the court below, the judgment thereon in his favor will not be reversed in this court, for the reason that the verdict was contrary to the charge of the court below.

The leading object and effect of the statute of limitations are, to make the period of prescription mature the inferior title in the hands of the possessor into the superior title.

The terms “intrinsic fairness and honesty,” embraced in the definition of color of title in our statute, relate to the means of proving the right of property in the land, so as to make the title equitably equal to a regular chain.

APPEAL from Williamson. Tried below before the Hon. E. H. Vontress.

This case was formerly before this court under the style of Burditt v. Silsbee, and is reported in the 15th volume of Texas Reports, to which reference is made for a statement of the facts had on the first trial in the court below.

The case having been reversed and remanded on the 16th day of March, 1858, the plaintiff filed an amended petition as follows, to wit:

“And now comes the said plaintiff by his attorney, and by leave of the court first had and obtained, amends his original petition filed in this cause, and says, that the said title set up and pleaded by said defendant, executed by Charles K. Reese, as the administrator of the estate of the said Albert Silsbee, deceased, was and is fraudulent and void, and the plaintiff especially charges, that several months prior to the date of said pretended administrator's deed, the said petition for the sale, and the order of the probate court of Bastrop county thereon, directing said land to be sold, the said defendant and the said Charles K. Reese entered into a private contract for the sale and purchase of said land, whereby the said defendant agreed to pay, and the said Charles K. Reese agreed to receive the price of fifty cents per acre for the same; and that under and by virtue of said private contract, and not under the said sale by said Reese as administrator, but before the same was made, said defendant entered upon and took possession of said land, and has from thenceforth continued to hold and occupy the same, to wit, from the 10th day of June, A. D. 1848; and this plaintiff further charges, that said Reese and said defendant Burditt, in their said private contract, further fraudulently contracted and agreed that said defendant should have said land at the fixed and certain price of fifty cents per acre, and that to consummate said private contract, said Reese should procure an order of sale from the probate court of Bastrop county, directing and authorizing him as administrator to sell said land, and that said Burditt should bid off the same, but that if it should be knocked off to him at a price less than fifty cents per acre, the said defendant Burditt should still pay to him fifty cents per acre, but said Reese should account in his return of said sale for only the sum at which said land should be bid off, and that he should appropriate to his private use the difference at which said land should be bid off by said Burditt, and the fifty cents per acre agreed to be paid as aforesaid; that it was further agreed that if said Burditt should bid off said land at said sale at a greater price than fifty cents per acre, he should only pay fifty cents per acre therefor, and the said Reese should make up the difference. And this plaintiff says, that the reasons given in the petition of said Reese as administrator aforesaid, for the sale of said land, were fictitious and false; that, as appears by the transcript of his said administration from Bastrop county, there were no debts due and owing from said estate whereby it had become necessary to sell said land; that all debts had long previously been paid, if any existed, or were barred by the statute of limitation; and that said Reese had not accounted for the assets in his hands belonging to said estate, as shown in the inventory filed by him as such administrator, and that there were no claims, debts or demands, legally presented and filed against said estate. And this plaintiff charges, that said petition, order of sale, confirmation by the court thereof, and the execution of the deed by said Reese as administrator as aforesaid, were fraudulent contrivances, wherein the said Reese and the said Burditt were to carry into effect their aforesaid private contract; and this plaintiff further charges, that the said private contract was the real contract under which said Burditt purchased said land, and that his purchase at said administrator's sale was only a pretense and colorable; that he paid Reese fifty cents per acre therefor under said private contract, and did not claim the same at twenty cents per acre under said administrator's sale; that said Reese did appropriate to his private use the said thirty cents per acre over and above the twenty cents per acre at which said land was bid off, and that he never did account and pay over the twenty cents per acre for which the same was sold as aforesaid. The plaintiff further charges, that said land was well worth fifty cents per acre and more, and he submits to the court if said Burditt is not estopped from denying that it was worth that sum; and this plaintiff says, that said pretended sale at twenty cents per acre was at a grossly inadequate price, procured by the fraudulent contract and contrivances of said Reese and said defendant Burditt; and further, that said Reese fraudulently appropriated to his private use thirty cents per acre, or $442.80 of the price for which said land was actually sold, and that said Burditt was a party to, and contracted with said Reese for such fraudulent appropriation thereof. Wherefore this plaintiff says, that all said contracts, sales and deeds, made and procured by and between said Reese and said Burditt, were and are fraudulent and void. And this plaintiff further charges, that said Burditt has been in the possession of said land for the period of nine years from the time of his taking possession thereof under said private contract to the filing of this amendment, using and enjoying the same in person and by tenants under him, and receiving the rents, issues and profits of said land; that there are good dwelling-houses and out-houses thereon, and three hundred and twenty-five acres of land in cultivation, and that the same is worth the reasonable annual rent of two thousand dollars per annum. Plaintiff therefore prays as heretofore for a judgment for the possession of said land and for his damages, and also judgment for the rents and profits thereof at the rate of two thousand dollars as aforesaid, and for such general relief as the facts of his case will authorize and equity sanction, etc.”

At the same time the interveners filed a petition setting forth substantially the same facts as are contained in the foregoing amended petition of plaintiff.

The defendant pleaded the statute of limitations for three years, and filed an amended answer as follows, to wit:

“And now on this day comes the defendant, Giles H. Burditt, by his attorneys, leave of the court being had, and for answer to amended petition of the plaintiff, Pearson, administrator, etc., filed on the 16th March, 1858, and by way of amendment to his, the said defendant's former pleas and defenses herein filed, and says:

I. That it is not true, as stated in the aforesaid amended petitions of said plaintiff and interveners, that the administrator's deed or title for the land in controversy heretofore set up by this defendant, executed by Charles K. Reese as the administrator of Albert Silsbee, deceased, was and is fraudulent and void. But, on the contrary, this defendant avers that said title so pleaded as aforesaid is and was a good and valid legal title, fairly acquired for a valuable consideration.

II. And defendant, further answering said amended petition, says that it is true, as stated in said amendments,...