Pearson v. Old Stone Sav. Bank, No. 76-108-A
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
| Writing for the Court | DORIS; PAOLINO |
| Citation | 119 R.I. 836,383 A.2d 1029 |
| Decision Date | 23 March 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 76-108-A |
| Parties | John E. PEARSON et al. v. OLD STONE SAVINGS BANK et al. ppeal. |
Page 1029
v.
OLD STONE SAVINGS BANK et al.
[119 R.I. 840] Letts, Quinn & Licht, Frank Licht, Richard A. Licht, Providence, for plaintiffs.
Tillinghast, Collins & Graham, Peter J. McGinn, Robert W. Edwards, Jr., Providence, for defendants.
[119 R.I. 837] DORIS, Justice.
This civil action was brought to enjoin the foreclosure of a mortgage upon certain real estate and condominium units located in Cumberland, Rhode Island, and for substantial damages. The defendants also filed a counterclaim for damages in connection with the mortgage transaction. The case was heard by a justice of the Superior Court sitting without a jury. The trial justice entered a judgment which denied the injunctive relief but reserved for further proceedings the claims for damages. The plaintiffs now appeal to this court from that portion of the judgment which denied the injunction.
The plaintiffs, John E. Pearson and William E. Bailey, as trustees of the Maple Woods Farm Condominium Trust, entered into a loan agreement with defendants, Old Stone Savings Bank and Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, on January 18, 1974. This loan agreement was to provide the financing for the construction of 93 condominium
Page 1030
units on a 35-acre parcel of land in Cumberland. The principal documents included in the transaction were a construction loan agreement, a promissory note, and a mortgage deed which contained a power of sale in the event of default.Construction began on the project in March 1974, and seven model units were completed for a formal opening of the development in September 1974. No major problems had arisen between the parties up to this time. However, an economic recession in the fall of 1974 caused market conditions in real estate to decline and interest rates to climb. The plaintiffs experienced significant increases in construction costs and were unable to meet the contract requirements for obtaining further advances of loan proceeds. Consequently, the parties attempted to modify the terms of the original agreement in order to allow the project to proceed. However, plaintiffs found themselves no more able to meet their obligations under the modified contract than under the original agreement. Therefore, on March 27, 1975, [119 R.I. 838] defendants informed plaintiffs that they were in default and subsequently initiated foreclosure proceedings.
On May 13, 1975, plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants from foreclosing the mortgage. A temporary restraining order was obtained pending a hearing on the preliminary injunction. Prior to trial, plaintiffs filed two amended complaints seeking substantial damages as well as injunctive relief. The defendants also filed a counterclaim for damages. The hearing on the preliminary injunction was consolidated with the hearing on the...
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Jolicoeur Furniture Co., Inc. v. Baldelli, No. 93-143-A
...within twenty days of the entry of judgment on December 15, 1989. Sup.Ct.R. 4; § 9-24-1. However, in Pearson v. Old Stone Savings Bank, 119 R.I. 836, 383 A.2d 1029 (1978), where a party appealed from a Rule 54(b) judgment that decided the issue of liability and injunctive relief but reserve......
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Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Dial Media, Inc., No. 78-129-A
...it should terminate all litigation arising out of the cause between the parties on the merits. Pearson v. Old Stone Savings Bank, R.I., 383 A.2d 1029 (1978); McAuslan v. McAuslan, 34 R.I. 462, 83 A. 837 (1912). Clearly, not all litigation arising out of the cause between the parties in the ......
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Webster v. Perrotta, No. 2000-333-Appeal.
...Court "only from a final judgment, decree, or order of the Superior Court" that terminates the controversy. Pearson v. Old Stone Bank, 119 R.I. 836, 838, 383 A.2d 1029, 1030 (1978). By the terms set forth in the judgments, the litigation was not terminated and the case was ordered to a hear......
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Metro v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 2006-296-Appeal.
...final when it "terminate[s] all litigation arising out of the cause between the parties on the merits." Pearson v. Old Stone Savings Bank, 119 R.I. 836, 839, 383 A.2d 1029, 1030 (1978). Although the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final disposition, this Court will, in cert......
-
Jolicoeur Furniture Co., Inc. v. Baldelli, No. 93-143-A
...within twenty days of the entry of judgment on December 15, 1989. Sup.Ct.R. 4; § 9-24-1. However, in Pearson v. Old Stone Savings Bank, 119 R.I. 836, 383 A.2d 1029 (1978), where a party appealed from a Rule 54(b) judgment that decided the issue of liability and injunctive relief but reserve......
-
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Dial Media, Inc., No. 78-129-A
...it should terminate all litigation arising out of the cause between the parties on the merits. Pearson v. Old Stone Savings Bank, R.I., 383 A.2d 1029 (1978); McAuslan v. McAuslan, 34 R.I. 462, 83 A. 837 (1912). Clearly, not all litigation arising out of the cause between the parties in the ......
-
Webster v. Perrotta, No. 2000-333-Appeal.
..."only from a final judgment, decree, or order of the Superior Court" that terminates the controversy. Pearson v. Old Stone Bank, 119 R.I. 836, 838, 383 A.2d 1029, 1030 (1978). By the terms set forth in the judgments, the litigation was not terminated and the case was ordered to a ......
-
Metro v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 2006-296-Appeal.
...it "terminate[s] all litigation arising out of the cause between the parties on the merits." Pearson v. Old Stone Savings Bank, 119 R.I. 836, 839, 383 A.2d 1029, 1030 (1978). Although the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final disposition, this Court will, in certa......