Pearson v. Reynolds Sch. Dist. # 7, Ivan L. Leigh
| Decision Date | 24 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:12–CV–01146–HU.,3:12–CV–01146–HU. |
| Parties | Marie PEARSON, Plaintiff, v. REYNOLDS SCHOOL DISTRICT # 7, Ivan L. Leigh, and Jeff Gilbert, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
William J. Macke, Law Offices of William J. Macke, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff.
Blake H. Fry, Barrett C. Mersereau, Peter R. Mersereau, Mersereau & Shannon, LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendants.
Magistrate Judge Dennis James Hubel issued Findings and Recommendation (# 47) on November 18, 2013, in which he recommends the Court grant in part and deny in part Defendants' Motion (# 34) for Summary Judgment. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge recommends the Court:
(1) grant Defendants' Motion as to all claims against Defendants Ivan L. Leigh and Jeff Gilbert;
(2) grant Defendants' Motion as to Plaintiff's Title VII claim for disparate treatment;
(3) grant Defendants' Motion as to Plaintiff's Title VII claim for retaliation for filing a complaint with the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industry (BOLI);
(4) grant Defendants' Motion as to Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress;
(5) grant Defendants' Motion as to Plaintiff's claim for negligent supervision;
(6) grant Defendants' Motion as to Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages;
(7) deny Defendants' Motion as to Plaintiff's Title VII claim for retaliation claim as related to retaliation for Plaintiff's April 2010 internal discrimination complaint;
(8) deny Defendants' Motion as to Plaintiff's Title VII claim for hostile work environment; and
(9) dismiss Defendants Ivan L. Leigh and Jeff Gilbert from this matter as improper parties.
Defendants filed timely Objections to the Findings and Recommendation in which they object to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to deny Defendants'Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's Title VII claim for hostile work environment and to deny in part Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim. Plaintiff filed untimely 1 Objections to the Findings and Recommendation in which Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to grant Defendants' Motion as to Plaintiff's Title VII claim for retaliation for filing a complaint with BOLI. The matter is now before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b).
When any party objects to any portion of the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation, the district court must make a de novo determination of that portion of the Magistrate Judge's report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See also Dawson v. Marshall, 561 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir.2009); United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003) ( en banc ).
In their Objections Defendants and Plaintiff reiterate the arguments contained in the Motion for Summary Judgment, Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, and Reply and stated at oral argument. This Court has carefully considered the Objections of Defendants and Plaintiff and concludes they do not provide a basis to modify the Findings and Recommendation. The Court also has reviewed the pertinent portions of the record de novo and does not find any error in the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation.
The Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Hubel's Findings and Recommendation (# 47) and, therefore, GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motion (# 34) for Summary Judgment as follows:
(1) GRANTS Defendants' Motion as to all claims against Defendants Ivan L. Leigh and Jeff Gilbert;
(2) GRANTS Defendants' Motion as to Plaintiff's Title VII claim for disparate treatment;
(3) GRANTS Defendants' Motion as to Plaintiff's Title VII claim for retaliation for filing a complaint with the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industry (BOLI);
(4) GRANTS Defendants' Motion as to Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress;
(5) GRANTS Defendants' Motion as to Plaintiff's claim for negligent supervision;
(6) GRANTS Defendants' Motion as to Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages;
(7) DENIES Defendants' Motion as to Plaintiff's Title VII claim for retaliation claim as related to retaliation for Plaintiff's. April 2010 internal discrimination complaint;
(8) DENIES Defendants' Motion as to Plaintiff's Title VII claim for hostile work environment; and
(9) DISMISSES Defendants Ivan L. Leigh and Jeff Gilbert from this matter as improper parties.
Accordingly, this matter proceeds only against Defendant Reynolds School District # 7 as to Plaintiff's (1) Title VII retaliation claim related to alleged retaliation for her April 2010 internal discrimination complaint and (2) Title VII claim for hostile work environment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The plaintiff Marie Pearson brings this action “pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” against her former employer Reynolds School District # 7 (“Reynolds”), its principal Jeff Gilbert, and Pearson's supervisor Ivan L. Leigh. Dkt. # 5, First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 2 & 4. Pearson alleges the defendants “subjected her to discriminatory and retaliatory treatment based on her race and gender, while she was employed as lead night janitor” at Reynolds High School (the “School”). Dkt. # 5, First Amended Complaint, ¶ 1. She asserts claims for race discrimination/retaliation, gender discrimination/retaliation, hostile work environment, negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id., ¶ ¶ 29–38. Pearson seeks economic, noneconomic, and punitive damages; prejudgment interest; and attorney's fees and costs. Id., ¶ 39.
The case is before the court on the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. # 34. The motion is fully briefed, and the court heard oral argument on the motion on September 10, 2013. The undersigned submits the following findings and recommended disposition of the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
As a preliminary matter, the parties agree the only proper defendant in the case is Reynolds. See Dkt. # 35, Defendants' brief, pp. 14–15; Dkt. # 41, Plaintiff's brief, pp. 8–9 (). Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted in favor of the individual defendants Ivan L. Leigh and Jeff Gilbert, on all of Pearson's claims. Id.
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court “must not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter but only determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir.2002) (citing Abdul–Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th Cir.1996)).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has described “the shifting burden of proof governing motions for summary judgment” as follows:
The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Where the moving party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. This burden is not a light one. The non-moving party must show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The non-moving party must do more than show there is some “metaphysical doubt” as to the material facts at issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In fact, the non-moving party must come forth with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In determining whether a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party's favor, all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
In re Oracle Corp. Securities Litigation, 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir.2010).
Notably, “[a]s a general matter, the plaintiff in an employment discrimination action need produce very little evidence in order to overcome an employer's motion for summary judgment.” Chuang v. Univ. of Calif. Davis, Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir.2000). The Chuang court explained that this minimal evidence standard is due to the nature of employment cases, where “ ‘the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a searching inquiry—one that is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder, upon a full record.’ ” Id. (quoting Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir.1996)).
Pearson was hired by Reynolds in January 2008, to work as a “Lead Swing Custodian” at the School. Previously, Pearson had worked in a custodial position at the Oregon Convention Center, where she received only positive performance reviews. Dkt. # 41, p. 3. At the School, Pearson was the custodian in charge of the “swing shift, or night shift,” and in that capacity, she “held some supervisory responsibilities over the other custodians working the same shift.” Dkt. # 35, p. 10; see Dkt. # 36–3, job description for “Lead Swing Custodian.” On June 8, 2009, the School's Assistant Principal John L. Olsen sent a “Letter of Expectation” to Pearson, regarding two occasions when he was unable to contact Pearson on her radio during her shift, and Pearson's failure to respond to a recent...
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