Pearson v. Treadwell
| Decision Date | 04 September 1901 |
| Citation | 61 N.E. 44,179 Mass. 462 |
| Parties | PEARSON et al. v. TREADWELL et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Richard W. Hale and Frank W. Grinnell, for plaintiffs.
Solomon Lincoln, for defendant John P. Treadwell.
This is a suit to enforce an alleged trust arising out of a written agreement between the heirs at law of Daniel H. Treadwell. They are also the legatees named in his will. Daniel H Treadwell died in 1864, and his will was duly admitted to probate in 1865. The agreement was signed by some of the parties in December, 1874, and was signed by the others, and became operative and binding, in 1875. The case was referred to a master, and, at the request and with the consent of the parties, was reserved by the presiding justice 'for the full court, upon the pleadings, the master's report, the exceptions of the defendant John P. Treadwell,' which were overruled pro forma, 'and the agreement of the parties relative to such exceptions; such decree to be entered as law and justice require.' The defendant John P. Treadwell is the only party who made any objections to the master's report, or who has taken any exceptions thereto. The exceptions taken by him are numerous, but we shall confine ourselves to the matters relied on by him in his brief and at the argument, assuming that the others either have been waived or are not now insisted upon by him.
He contends, in the first place, that in respect to the undivided income which the trustees had in their hands, and which was intermingled with the estate, the effect of the agreement was, as between Mrs. Phillips and the trustees, to convert their relation into that of debtor and creditor, and that the claim now presented by her executor in respect thereof is barred by the statute of limitations. But the effect of the agreement, it seems to us, was not to do away with the relation of trustee and cestui que trust, but to fix the rights of the parties as between themselves, and to provide for the execution and carrying out of the trust in accordance with the terms thus established. It is true that the agreement declares that the undivided income represented on the books of the trustees by the 'undivided income account' is the property of the heirs at law 'individually, free and clear of any trust, * * * and forms no part of the trust estate.' But the object of that declaration, when considered in connection with the rest of the agreement, was, as already observed, not to convert the relation between the trustees and their cestuis into that of debtor and creditor, but to remove any question as to the right of the parties as between themselves and the trustees to the undivided income. It is clear, we think, that the trustees were to continue to hold in trust the property represented by the 'undivided income account,' and that they were to account for it as trustees. The agreement goes in to provide that interest shall be paid on it out of the trust estate, and that the share of George L. Treadwell shall be applied on his notes held by the trustees,--provisions which are inconsistent with any other relation than that of trustee and cestui que trust, and which manifestly contemplate a continuance of that relation in regard to the undivided income account. Further, the agreement provides for the payment by the trustees of the income of the trust estate for 1874 and for each and every year subsequent thereto, defines the trust estate which shall pass to the last survivor, and provides for the payment evidently by the trustees, of a mortgage created by the testator out of the capital of the trust instead of out of the income. It is plain, therefore, we think, that the object of the agreement was to adjust the rights of the parties inter sese, and that it contemplated a continuance of the trust as thus modified. The respondent John P. Treadwell does not contend that, if the relation of trustee and cestui que trust existed, as we think it did, between himself and the other trustees and Mrs. Phillips, the statute of limitations operates as a bar to the claim made by the executor. But he further contends that the executor has been guilty of such laches in presenting and prosecuting his claim as will prevent a recovery. Mrs. Phillips died April 12, 1890. Her husband, the plaintiff Phillips, was duly appointed executor of her will. It is not stated in the master's report when he was appointed, but it is alleged in the bill that he was appointed in December, 1890, and this allegation is admitted in the answers of the respondents Robert O. and George L. Treadwell. The bill was filed July 12, 1898. As drawn, the complainant Pearson was the sole party plaintiff, and the executor of Mrs. Phillips was a...
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