Pearson v. Walden Univ.

• Decision Date: 30 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–CV–7840 (KMK).,13–CV–7840 (KMK).
• Citation: 144 F.Supp.3d 503
• Parties: Marcia PEARSON, Plaintiff, v. WALDEN UNIVERSITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

144 F.Supp.3d 503

Marcia PEARSON, Plaintiff,

v.WALDEN UNIVERSITY, Defendant.

No. 13–CV–7840 (KMK).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed Oct. 30, 2015.

Marcia Pearson, Valley Cottage, NY, pro se.

Matthew R. Paul, Esq., Paul & Paul, LLC, Westport, CT, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS

, District Judge:

Plaintiff Marcia Pearson (“Plaintiff”) brings this pro se action alleging that “due to [the] negligence of faculty and staff” employed by Defendant Walden University (“Defendant” or “University”), she “incurred student loan[ ] debt of $203,035.34.” (Am. Compl. ¶ III.C (Dkt. No. 15).) Plaintiff seeks one million dollars in damages “for pain, suffering, and loss of work.” (Id. ¶ V.) Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 20.) For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The Court accepts the following facts as true for the purpose of resolving the pending Motion. Defendant, headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota, is an online, for-profit degree-granting university that requires its doctoral students to complete coursework known as Knowledge Area Modules (“KAMs”) before beginning the dissertation-writing process. (See Am. Compl. ¶ I.B); Pl.'s Aff'n in Opp'n to Mot. (“Pl.'s Aff'n”) at unnumbered 2 (Dkt. No. 23); see generally Am. Compl. Ex. B (KAMs Handbook). The completion of KAMs is contingent on the approval of student work by a “University Research Reviewer” (“URR”). (See Am. Compl. ¶ III.C; see generally id. Ex. B.) According to Plaintiff, the “[d]octoral programs that require ... KAMs[ ] use a continuous enrollment model, in which[ ] the registrar's office automatically registers students each term[,]” such that students have to “pay tuition continuously ... until the time they graduate, request a leave of absence, or withdraw from the university.” (Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. To Dismiss (“Pl.'s Opp'n”) at unnumbered 3 (Dkt. No. 25).)¹

Plaintiff, a resident of Valley College, New York, was enrolled as a student at the University between September 6, 2005, and August 25, 2013. (See Am. Compl. ¶ III.B.) Plaintiff maintains that she “mostly maintained a 4.0 grade point average and adhered to [the] Walden University Student Handbook [,] ... graduat[ing] with a grade point average of 3.90.” (Pl.'s Opp'n at unnumbered 1.) Plaintiff alleges that, upon enrollment, she was told by an unspecified member of the University staff that “after a few classes of coursework,” she “would have to write two KAMs and that [she] was almost finish [ed].” (Id. at unnumbered 4.) It ultimately took Plaintiff eight years to receive her degree, and in the process she “incurred student loan[ ] debt of $203,035.34.” (Am. Compl. ¶ III.C.)² More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that her KAMs, which “students must complete ... before starting the dissertation process,” took two years to finish. (Id. ) Further, Plaintiff contends that her dissertation proposal took three years to write because her “former mentors[ ] would not read her work” until the proposal was complete, and one of her mentors “advised that [she] rewrite [the proposal] if [she] wanted to work with him.” (Id. )³ Plaintiff contends that the delay cost her $39,200 in tuition. (Pl.'s Opp'n at unnumbered 4.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that she was told in an April 30, 2013 email that the URR had until May 13, 2013 to review her work, which was necessary before Plaintiff “could proceed to the next step of the dissertation process, the Form and Style review.” (Am. Compl. ¶ III.C.) Plaintiff alleges that the URR completed his review 3 days late, on May 16, 2013, (id. ), and that throughout this time, the URR was “unprofessional, unavailable, and uncommunicative by refusing to respond to e-mails and telephone calls sent by the Office of Student Research Administration, ... [P]laintiff's mentor and committee members, and ... [P]laintiff herself,” which was inconsistent with Defendant University's policies, (Pl.'s Opp'n at unnumbered 2).⁴ Plaintiff claims that the delay cost her $163.00 in “continuous enrollment tuition,” as well as “nervousness, anxiety, fear, and stress.” (Id. )

Throughout this time period, Plaintiff claims that University faculty and staff exhibited a “lack of timely response and feedback,” attributing her debt to their lack of diligence. (Am. Compl. ¶ III.C.) Plaintiff also claims that, in general, Defendant “fail[ed] to disclose all pertinent information about KAMs” and “to facilitate, guide, and evaluate student learning and professional development necessary for [P]laintiff to meet her academic objectives[,] such as to graduate in a timely manner.” (Pl.'s Opp'n at unnumbered 4.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this Action against Defendant on November 4, 2013. (Dkt. No. 2.) Following a pre-motion conference held on July 25, 2014, (see Dkt. (minute entry for July 25, 2014)), Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on July 30, 2014. In it, Plaintiff requested that the “Court ... investigate the practices and policies of Walden University's money[-]making tactics targeting poor and minority students who incur high student loan debts leading to poverty, depression and poor health.” (Id. ¶ V.) In her Opposition, however, Plaintiff for the first time made clear that she wished to allege claims for “negligence and breach of contract.” (Pl.'s Opp'n at unnumbered 2.)

Plaintiff filed a motion for the appointment of pro bono counsel on July 30, 2014, (Dkt. No. 14), which the Court denied on November 10, 2014, (Dkt. No. 26). The Court also held a second pre-motion conference on September 19, 2014, (see Dkt. (minute entry for Sept. 19, 2014)), at which it adopted a briefing schedule, (Dkt. No. 19). In accordance with that schedule, Defendant filed its Motion To Dismiss and supporting papers on October 2, 2014. (Dkt. Nos. (See Pl.'s Opp'n at unnumbered 2; Pl.'s Aff'n at unnumbered 2.) 20–22, 24.) Plaintiff preemptively filed an Affirmation in Opposition on September 25, 2014, (Dkt. No. 23), and then filed a second Opposition on October 16, 2014, (Dkt. No. 25).⁵ Defendant filed its Reply on November 11, 2014. (Dkt. No. 27.)

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his [or her] entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Instead, a complaint's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level....” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A plaintiff must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” but if a plaintiff has not “nudged [his or her] claim[ ] across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” (citation omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) )); id. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”).

“[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)

; see also

Dixon v. United States, No. 13–CV–2193, 2014 WL 23427, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2014) (“For the purpose of this motion to dismiss, we assume that the facts alleged in [the plaintiff's] complaint are true.”). Further, “[f]or the purpose of resolving [a] motion to dismiss, the Court ... draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Daniel v. T & M Prot. Res., Inc., 992 F.Supp.2d 302, 304 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (citing Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.2012) ). Additionally, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.1999)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Hendrix v. City of New York, No. 12–CV–5011, 2013 WL 6835168, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013) (same).

Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court must “construe[ ] [her] [Amended Complaint] liberally and interpret[ ] [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir.2013)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also

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