Peart v. Board of Sup'rs of Santa Clara County
| Decision Date | 08 October 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 16820,16820 |
| Parties | R. M. PEART and Margaret Peart, and Alfred Anderson, Petitioners and Appellants, v. The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF the COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, State of California; and A. W. Brown, Sam P. Della Maggiore, Ed R. Levin, J. M. McKinnon and Walter S. Gaspar, as members of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Santa Clara, State of California, Respondents. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Burnett, Burnett & Somers, San Jose, for appellants.
Spencer M. Williams, County Counsel, John R. Kennedy, Deputy County Counsel, San Jose, for respondents.
Appellants and other owners of land in unincorporated territory of Santa Clara County filed a petition with the board of supervisors of that county for the incorporation of a new city to be known as the City of South San Jose. It is conceded that the petition complied with the statutory provisions for organization of new cities. Government Code, §§ 34300-34332. After hearings upon the petition, respondent board excluded from the proposed city much of the land described in the petition for incorporation, with the result that the boundaries of the proposed city included less than the required 500 inhabitants. The board then refused to call an election upon the issue of incorporation because of this deficiency in population.
Petitioners brought this proceeding in mandamus, alleging that the exclusionary act of the board was arbitrary, and seeking a peremptory writ 'annulling said acts of the Board of Supervisors, and having the boundaries of the proposed City of South San Jose, as described in the petition for incorporation, filed with the Board of Supervisors; and ordering the Board of Supervisors to call an election * * *.' Respondents answered, denying the allegations of arbitrary and capricious action, and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court filed a memorandum opinion expressing its view that the board's action could be reviewed only if it were fraudulent or corrupt, granted petitioners leave to amend their petition, and ordered that if there were no amendment the motion for judgment be granted. Petitioners declined to amend and judgment for respondents on the pleadings was ordered. Petitioners appeal. The parties agree that the issue of the sufficiency of the petition is properly before us.
Appellants rely upon general statements in several decisions that the acts of the board in creating districts are judicial in character, and thus are subject to review by the courts. Respondents reply that these cases are distinguishable in that they deal with districts, rather than cities (an argument which we reject as too narrow), and rely upon general statements in a number of cases that the board's determinations, in creating cities or districts, are legislative in character, and thus are beyond the control of the courts. In our view, the claimed conflict in the two lines of cases cited is more apparent than real, and is fully resolved by a careful study of the acts sought to be reviewed and the statutes under which the several subordinate legislative bodies acted.
It is an oversimplification to group together all acts of a board of supervisors in the creation of a new city or district, and stamp all such acts, as a group, as either within or beyond the scope of court review. Rather, each statute authorizing such action places upon the subordinate legislative body some restrictions which are conditions for its exercise of jurisdiction, and which require finding of specified facts. Thus, a board's finding as to sufficiency of the notice of hearing, Imperial Water Co. No. 1 v. Board of Supervisors, 162 Cal. 14, 120 P. 780; Wheatley v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. 722, 279 P. 989, or of the petition, Borchard v. Board of Supervisors, 144 Cal. 10, 77 P. 708, whether such findings be termed 'judicial,' 'quasijudicial,' or otherwise, are clearly subject to some review by the courts under sufficient pleadings in a proper form of proceeding.
Similarly, where the board is required by statute to act when certain facts are established, the courts will intervene when the required facts are clearly shown. Inglin v. Hoppin, 156 Cal. 483, 105 P. 582. Also, where the discretion to be exercised by the board is itself limited by the statute, the courts may inquire whether the limitations have been recognized and properly honored by the board. Thus, where the statute limits inclusion in an irrigation district to lands irrigable from a proposed source of water, Imperial Water Co. No. 1 v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 162 Cal. 14, 120 P. 780, or the consolidation of school districts to lands within a fixed distance, Broyles v. Mahon, 72 Cal.App. 484, 237 P. 763, the courts may review the board's decision.
However, neither of these situations exists here. The parties concede that all conditions precedent to the hearing by the board were properly met. The sole complaint is as to the board's decision excluding from the proposed city a substantial part of the land described in the petition for incorporation. The board acted under Government Code, section 34312, which provides:
'Establishment of the boundaries and determination of the size and shape of a proposed city are matters for the sound discretion of the board of supervisors.'
It is solely in the light of this language that we can consider whether the discretion exercised by the board is reviewable by the courts.
This statute prescribes no limitation whatever upon the discretion of the board. No vested right is here involved to bring into play broad constitutional limitations. The only right of those seeking incorporation is to have the statute, including the grant of broad discretion to the board, applied to them. The legislature has not exceeded constitutional limitations in conferring broad powers upon the board of supervisors, People ex rel. Russell v. Town of Loyalton, 147 Cal. 774, 776, 85 P. 620, and it does not rest with the courts to impose limitations. Moreover, if a court sought to exercise jurisdiction, it could find in the statute neither guide-post, landmark nor sextant to plot a course toward any result to be reached by it. Clearly, the question to be determined by the board is legislative or political in its essence, and is beyond consideration by the courts.
'The power devolved on boards of supervisors * * * to determine boundaries of a proposed town is...
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