Stanley v. Carrier Mills-Stonefront School, 05-CV-4203-JPG.

• Citation: 459 F.Supp.2d 766
• Decision Date: 21 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-CV-4203-JPG.,05-CV-4203-JPG.
• Parties: Lora L. STANLEY et al., Plaintiffs, v. CARRIER MILLS-STONEFORT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2 et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois

459 F.Supp.2d 766

Lora L. STANLEY et al., Plaintiffs, v. CARRIER MILLS-STONEFORT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2 et al., Defendants.

No. 05-CV-4203-JPG.

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois.

September 21, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jason R. Craddock, Sr., Law Offices of Jason Craddock, Sauk Village, IL, for Plaintiff.

Scott B. Dolezal, Stephen R. Miller, Myers, Miller & Krauskopf, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GILBERT, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' amended complaint (Doc. 44). Plaintiffs have responded to defendants' motion (Doc. 46) and defendants have replied (Doc. 48). Also pending before the Court is plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 3). For the following reasons, defendants' motion will be DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART and plaintiffs' motion will be DISMISSED for lack of standing.

BACKGROUND

Lora Stanley (Stanley) has custody of nine children — three are her own and six are foster children with special needs.¹ As of November 1, 2004, all the children attended school in the Carrier Mills-Stonefort School District (Carrier Mills or the District). November 1, 2004 was the first day of the District's annual Spirit Week. Each day of that week had a theme, and the District encouraged its students to dress accordingly. Those who did received a reward; those who did not could receive a reward if they donated a canned good.²

November 1 was "Opposite Sex Day." As the name suggests, on that day, the District encouraged students to dress as a member of the opposite sex. Stanley knew how this day affected the student population because her children attended school on Opposite Sex Day the previous year. Stanley complained in 2003 after hearing that her children were offended by the goings-on, but Carrier Mills did nothing. Because she did not want her children cross-dressing, exposed to cross-dressing or stigmatized by the other children for not cross-dressing, Stanley kept her children out of school on Opposite Sex Day 2004. Her objection to Opposite Sex Day is a religious one — she believes cross-dressing is anathema to the Christian values she seeks to instill in her children. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 22:5 (New International Version) ("A woman must not wear men's clothing, nor a man wear women's clothing, for the LORD your God detests anyone who does this.").

Though unrelated to Opposite Sex Day, Stanley also complained to District officials of jokes that appeared in District publications, which she and her children felt were demeaning to women. Carrier Mills did not respond to her complaints about the jokes.

Stanley spoke to members of the media of her opposition to Opposite Sex Day. Soon after, she learned one of her foster children, James Roller, was not receiving the special education services due him under his Individualized Education Plan (IEP). In January 2005, Stanley became aware that defendant Richard Morgan, the superintendent of the District, had contacted the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and reported Stanley as an "unfit" parent. He told DCFS staffers he removed his own children from Stanley's daycare because the conditions were "filthy." He also told them Stanley was "crazy," that she had "deep seeded problems" and that her children were "in danger." He made it clear to DCFS personnel that he would continue to complain until DCFS took remedial action. Based on Morgan's complaint, DCFS conducted an investigation.

Stanley believes her comments to the media so angered Carrier Mills's officials that they punished her kids excessively and undeservedly. Specifically, she claims one of her foster children, Kristi Nixon, received an excessive number of detentions from Morgan's mother, a substitute teacher. Morgan's mother also questioned Kristi "intrusively and extensively about her home, groceries, bedrooms and sleeping arrangements," Eventually, Stanley felt she had no other choice, and moved her family to a new home so her children would not have to attend school in the District.

Based on the foregoing, Stanley has asserted claims for violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights (via 42 U.S.C. § 1983), defamation, First Amendment retaliation, sexual harassment under Title IX, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants claim all these claims for relief fail as a matter of law. Morgan also contends he is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.

ANALYSIS

Defendants have moved for dismissal of all plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. Moranski v. General Motors Corp., 433 F.3d 537, 539 (7th Cir.2005); Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 402 (7th Cir.2000). The Court should not grant a motion to dismiss unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiffs cannot prove their claims under any set of facts consistent with the complaint. McDonald v. Household Intern., Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 428 (7th Cir. 2005).

Generally, a court should not grant a motion to dismiss merely because the complaint is vague or lacking in detail so long as it pleads "the bare minimum facts necessary to put the defendant on notice of the claim so that he can file an answer." Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir.2002). On the other hand, a plaintiff can plead herself out of court by including allegations of facts in the complaint which demonstrate she is not entitled to relief. Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1992).

I. Stanley's Free Exercise and Substantive Due Process Claims under § 1983

Stanley claims Opposite Sex Day deprived her of the right to raise her children according to her Christian beliefs in violation of her rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. Though her children were not technically required to cross-dress, she claims they would have been compelled to do so by the stigma of being "nonparticipating" students. She also claims their mere presence at school that day would have interfered with her right to raise them according to her beliefs and that Opposite Sex Day was unconstitutional as overbroad. Carrier Mills claims the complaint plainly discloses that cross-dressing was not compulsory, insofar as it makes clear that the District did not force students to cross-dress and that non-participating students could receive the reward (the only admitted, overt form of district-sponsored enticement) if they donated a canned good.

The First Amendment forbids the States from "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940); Ben's Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir.2003). It "guards the individual's practice of her own religion against restraint or invasion by the government." Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 970 (7th Cir.1997).

A parent has a First Amendment right to raise and educate her children according to her religious beliefs. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). When a parent challenges state action as an impingement on this right, a court must undertake a two-step inquiry. First, it must determine whether the state action complained of substantially burdened the parent's free exercise rights. Fleischfresser v. Directors of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 689 (7th Cir.1994). If so, the court must balance that burden against the government interest in the challenged activity. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214, 92 S.Ct. 1526.

Opposite Sex Day was substantially burdensome if it had a "coercive effect" that operated against Stanley's practice of religion. Fleischfresser, 15 F.3d at 689. Id. The key issue here is, therefore, coercion. Courts have addressed coercion in a number of contexts. In Fleischfresser v. Directors of Sch. Dist. 200, parents claimed the District's reading curriculum, which included books dealing with wizards, sorcerers, giants and other supernatural beings, violated their right to direct the religious training of their children. Id. at 683. The Court rejected this claim for several reasons. Most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, it held that the parents failed to show the requisite coercion to state a claim. Including books with fantastical characters simply did not compel the students to do or not do anything of a religious nature. Id. at 690. The Court went on to find, however, that the government interest in the reading program clearly outweighed the slight burden imposed on the parents. Similarly, in Sherman v. Comm. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21 of Wheeling Township, 980 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir.1992), the Court held that public schools could lead the pledge of allegiance in classrooms without violating the free exercise clause, so long as the students were not compelled to participate. It concluded that nothing in the record supported the conclusion that the students were coerced into reciting the pledge. The teachers did not force children to stand, put their hands across their hearts or speak, and the other students did not harass or bully the nonparticipating students. Id. at 442-43. Sherman does not stand, as the District suggests, for the proposition that peer pressure can never amount to actionable coercion. On the contrary, the Court implied that peer pressure might be sufficient under certain circumstances. See id.

In her amended complaint, Stanley alleges that her children "would ... bear the stigma of being singled out" if they attended school and did not participate. (Doc. 28 at 6). Depending on the circumstances, peer pressure accompanied by tacit approval from the administration could...