Pease v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 September 2007
• Docket Number: Docket: Lin-06-566.
• Parties: Jason PEASE v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

931 A.2d 1072

2007 ME 134

Jason PEASE v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY.

Docket: Lin-06-566.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: May 22, 2007.

Decided: September 20, 2007.

James M. Bowie (orally), Thompson & Bowie, LLP, Portland; Michael P. Turndorf, Brunswick, for plaintiff.

Robert V. Hoy (orally), Hoy & Main, P.A., Gray, for defendant.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, LEVY, SILVER, and MEAD, JJ.

Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, LEVY, and MEAD, JJ.

Concurrence: SILVER, J.

MEAD, J.

[¶ 1] Jason Pease appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Lincoln County, Cole, J.) granting State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's motion for a summary judgment on Pease's complaint for uninsured motorist (UM) coverage under his State Farm personal insurance policy. Pease contends that the court erred in its determination that State Farm's UM policy exclusion for vehicles furnished for the insured's regular use is valid pursuant to Maine's UM statute, 24-A M.R.S. § 2902(1) (2005).¹ Because we conclude that the policy exclusion does not apply to the vehicle stolen from Pease, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] The facts are not disputed. On December 25, 2002, Jason Pease, a detective sergeant in the Lincoln County Sheriff's Office, was at home off-duty when he was dispatched to a reported disturbance at a home in Jefferson. Pease drove his unmarked patrol vehicle to the scene. Upon arrival, Pease got out of his vehicle, leaving the engine running. He approached Michael Montagna, the individual causing the disturbance. Montagna told Pease that he had been drugged and that people were out to get him. At some point during the encounter, Montagna ran away and got into the driver's seat of Pease's vehicle. Pease tried to pull Montagna out of the vehicle, but was knocked down by the car door as Montagna drove in reverse. Montagna then drove over Pease's leg and dragged him for about fifty feet. Pease sustained severe injuries to his knee and suffered lacerations and contusions to other parts of his body.

[¶ 3] Montagna has few resources, and Pease is unable to recover under Montagna's State Farm policy because we determined in an earlier case that Montagna's policy does not cover his unlawful possession of Pease's patrol vehicle. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Montagna, 2005 ME 68, 874 A.2d 406. Ordinarily, Pease would then look to the uninsured or underinsured provisions of the policy covering the car he was driving.² That car was owned and insured by Lincoln County. The County, however, chose not to carry UM coverage for its employees injured on the job. Thus, Pease sought insurance coverage for his injuries through the UM coverage of his personal insurance policy issued by State Farm.

[¶ 4] State Farm's UM coverage policy loosely tracks the language of the uninsured motorist statute,³ 24-A M.R.S. § 2902 (2005), and also contains some exclusions to UM coverage. The UM policy provisions read, in part:

We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be sustained by an insured and caused by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.

. . . .

An uninsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle:

1. insured under the liability coverage of this policy;

2. furnished for the regular use of you, your spouse or any relative;

3. owned or operated by a self-insurer under any motor vehicle financial responsibility law, a motor carrier law or any similar law;

4. owned by any government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies;⁴

5. designed for use mainly off public roads except while on public roads; or

6. while located for use as premises.

(Last emphasis added.) Applied to Pease, State Farm's "regular use" exclusion prevents Pease from recovering for injuries he sustained when struck by a vehicle furnished for his regular use. State Farm maintains that this exception applies even though Montagna stole and unlawfully operated Pease's patrol vehicle.

[¶ 5] Pease filed a complaint against State Farm in Superior Court, arguing that he was entitled to coverage under his UM policy. State Farm filed a motion for a summary judgment, which the Superior Court granted. The Superior Court determined that the "regular use" exclusion is valid because it "comports with the intent of Maine's uninsured motorist statute to compel insurers to, `for a premium, compensate otherwise uninsured injuries.'" The court further explained: "For State Farm to extend coverage to a patrol car owned by the Lincoln County Sheriff's Department and used regularly by [Pease] for both private and law enforcement purposes, it would be assuming a large, and uncompensated risk. Such risk is properly assumed by the Sheriff Department's insurance carrier." Pease filed this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 6] Pease argues that the "regular use" exclusion is invalid because it contravenes the UM statute and is void against public policy. In the alternative, Pease argues that under the facts of this case, the patrol vehicle was not furnished for regular use, contending that the vehicle was provided for the regular use of the Lincoln County Sheriff's Department, and not solely for his regular use. We do not reach the question of the validity of the policy exclusion because we agree with Pease's contention that under the facts of this case, the vehicle was not furnished for his regular use, though under a different rationale than that argued by Pease.⁵

A. Standard of Review

[¶ 7] "A summary judgment is proper if the record discloses that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Apgar v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 683 A.2d 497, 498 (Me.1996). The interpretation of an insurance contract exclusion and its applicability is a matter of law reviewed de novo. Acadia Ins. Co. v. Mascis, 2001 ME 101, ¶ 9, 776 A.2d 617, 620. "Exclusions and exceptions in insurance policies are disfavored and are construed strictly against the insurer." Foremost Ins. Co. v. Levesque, 2005 ME 34, ¶ 7, 868 A.2d 244, 246 (citation omitted). We "must construe the policy and the statutory provision to achieve the primary purpose of the enactment." Wescott v. Allstate Ins., 397 A.2d 156, 167 (Me.1979) (quotation marks omitted).

B. Whether the Patrol Vehicle Was Furnished for Regular Use

[¶ 8] The threshold issue in this case is whether the patrol vehicle was "furnished for the regular use of you, your spouse or any relative." If we conclude that the policy exclusion does not apply to the patrol vehicle, then we need not evaluate whether the "regular use" exclusion is valid under Maine's UM statute, 24-A M.R.S. § 2902(1).

[¶ 9] In interpreting this policy provision, both parties fail to address what meaning, if any, to ascribe to the fact that Montagna stole the patrol vehicle from Pease before injuring him with it. We find this fact to be dispositive. At the moment Montagna stole the vehicle, it stopped being a vehicle furnished for the deputy's use, and was simply a stolen vehicle.

[¶ 10] We find that a construction of the policy that excludes vehicles stolen from the insured from the "regular use" exclusion is consistent with the "legislative intent . . . to benefit all insured motorists by throwing the burden of compensating for injuries which would otherwise go without redress from the individual victim to the insurance industry for a premium." Wescott, 397 A.2d at 166.

[¶ 11] Our decision is also in accordance with other jurisdictions that have confronted the UM coverage issue of "the insured being injured by an uninsured stealing the insured's own car." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nissen, 851 P.2d 165, 167-68 (Colo.1993) (concluding that where insured was severely injured while attempting to stop thief from stealing car, and insurer denied coverage on ground that thief was nonpermissive user of car, insured's car became "uninsured motor vehicle" eligible for coverage); see Comet Cas. Co. v. Jackson, 125 Ill.App.3d 921, 81 Ill.Dec. 569, 467 N.E.2d 269 (1984) (concluding that insured's automobile was uninsured for purposes of UM coverage claim for injuries resulting from being struck by unknown thief while trying to prevent theft of automobile); Am. Prot. Ins. Co. v. Parker, 150 Ga.App. 732, 258 S.E.2d 540, 544 (1979) (permitting UM coverage for insured who granted and subsequently withdrew permission to drive automobile to uninsured, and was subsequently attacked and run over by uninsured after withdrawal of permission); Longo v. Market Transition Facility of N.J., 326 N.J.Super. 316, 741 A.2d 149, 152-53 (App.Div.1999) (concluding that an intoxicated passenger's car driven by a thief or joy rider was an "uninsured motor vehicle" and not a vehicle furnished for regular use because a literal application would produce absurd result of denying UM coverage for a passenger who is a victim of a car-jacking); see also Guiberson v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 217 Mont. 279, 704 P.2d 68, 74 (1985) (concluding that UM coverage was available for employee injured while attempting to stop thief from stealing delivery truck because exclusion of innocent insured from coverage violated public policy); Fontanez v. Texas Farm Bureau Ins. Cos., 840 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tx.App.1992) (concluding that UM coverage available for insured struck and killed by uninsured thief attempting to steal vehicle because contrary interpretation would violate purpose and intent behind UM statute). Accordingly, the UM "regular use" policy exclusion is inapplicable in this case, and we do not address whether the exclusion is valid under Maine's UM statute.

The entry is:

Summary judgment vacated and remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings...