Peasley v. State

• Decision Date: 11 February 1980
• Docket Number: No. 60244,60244
• Citation: 102 Misc.2d 982,424 N.Y.S.2d 995
• Parties: John J. PEASLEY, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Blanche W. Peasley, Deceased, Claimants, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant. Claim
• Court: New York Court of Claims

Page 995

424 N.Y.S.2d 995

102 Misc.2d 982

John J. PEASLEY, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Blanche W. Peasley, Deceased, Claimants, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant.

Claim No. 60244.

Court of Claims of New York.

Feb. 11, 1980.

William J. Cade, Albany, for claimants; Laurence F. DeLucia, Albany, of counsel

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., by Carl Rosenbloom, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

DECISION

THOMAS J. LOWERY, Jr., Judge.

On November 18, 1974, the State appropriated 87.82 acres of land, together with improvements, situated in the Town of Lake Pleasant, Hamilton County and within the Adirondack Park. ¹ It comprised the easterly portion of Lot 24, Township 2 of the Totten and Crossfield's Purchase. ² The appropriation map divided the property into two parcels, "A", containing .56 acres, and "B", containing 87.26 acres.

Title Issue

This proceeding is the culmination of many years of dispute with respect to the ownership of the subject property. Initially, the State argues that the claimants have failed to establish their title to the property taken. In order to resolve this issue, an examination of the history of the title to Lot 24 is necessary.

The evidence establishes that there is an unbroken chain of title to all of Lot 24 from the date Letters Patent were issued in 1786 to 1797, when title vested in William Spier. Thereafter, record title to the westerly 100 acres, not the subject of this proceeding, is clear. Through mesne conveyances, title to this parcel vested in the State of New York in 1901. Although there is no record that William Spier, or his heirs, ever conveyed the disputed easterly portion of Lot 24, the State asserts that it became the owner of this parcel through various alleged tax sales.

In 1923 William Demarest and his wife Cora B. Demarest occupied the southerly portion of Lot 24, including a portion of the disputed property. This occupation was under the mistaken belief that the land was part of a 50 acre conveyance, which in fact lay wholly in Lot 12. A cabin was constructed on a portion of the occupied property that is designated in this proceeding as parcel "A". This portion ultimately came into the possession of Joseph Peasley, the claimant John J. Peasley's father.

In 1942, the State commenced an action in ejectment against Cora B. Demarest ³ and Joseph Peasley. The subject matter of this action was 8.445 acres of Lot 24, of which 7.885 acres was situated in the westerly portion of the lot. The remaining .56 acres (parcel "A"), containing the Peasley cabin, was situated in the disputed easterly portion. It should be noted that there is no evidence that the easterly portion of Lot 24 was divided into separate parcels prior to 1942. The designation of parcels "A" and "B" in this proceeding was apparently based upon the arbitrary northern limit of the ejectment action.

In the 1942 ejectment action, the State relied on a tax sale conducted in 1843 and, in addition, sought to support its claim to the westerly 100 acres by an independent chain of title from William Spier. Tax sales for the years 1900 and 1905 were introduced into evidence as well.

Judgment was granted in favor of the State for the 7.885 acres in the westerly portion of Lot 24. The complaint was dismissed with respect to the .56 acres (parcel "A") in the easterly portion of the lot. The dismissal was solely predicated on the finding that the State had no title to any portion of the 87.82 acres that is the subject matter of this proceeding.

In 1974 the claimants commenced an action, pursuant to Article 15 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, against all persons known and unknown who may have derived their interest from or through William Spier. The action sought a judgment determining the title to the disputed easterly portion of Lot 24. The action was founded on adverse possession by written instrument. Reliance was placed on two deeds. The first was a conveyance in 1942 from Cora Demarest to Joseph Peasley and the second was a conveyance in 1961 from Blanche Peasley, devisee of Joseph Peasley, to the claimant, John Peasley. ⁴

Although the summons in the 1974 action did not specifically designate the State as a defendant, a copy of the summons, along with a copy of the complaint, was personally served upon the Attorney General. The complaint set forth that the State had no interest in the property by reason of the 1942 judgment and that the State was being served in order that it might represent the interest of unknown defendants. In response to the service, the State filed a standard Notice of Appearance. It did not, however, subsequently participate in the action. Rather, a stipulation was entered into wherein it was provided that any person who was adjudicated to be the owner of the property would pay the Transfer Tax. Thereafter, judgment ⁵ was granted declaring John Peasley to be the owner in fee of the entire 87.82 acres, with Blanche Peasley being declared as having a life use in the camp occupied by her.

The State, upon being served with a copy of the judgment, neither appealed nor sought to have the judgment vacated. Instead, the State appropriated the property.

Fundamental to the resolution of the title to the disputed parcel is the effect of the 1974 judgment. The claimants seek to assert this judgment as a muniment of their title, thus establishing an unbroken chain to the disputed parcel from William Spier, or his heirs, through the judgment to themselves. The State argues that the 1974 judgment is in no way binding on them, since it was neither a party nor privy to a party in the action.

It is the general rule that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable only to parties or their privies in the previous action. (Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d 481, 414 N.Y.S.2d 308, 386 N.E.2d 1328; Schwartz v. Public Administrator of the County of Bronx, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725.) It is a well settled exception, however, that a judgment is admissible to prove the rights of relations established between the parties to the first action. (Railroad Equipment Co. v. Blair, 145 N.Y. 607, 39 N.E. 962.) Therefore, as between William Spier, or his heirs, and the claimants, the 1974 judgment may be used as a muniment of title. (Greenleaf v. Brooklyn, Flatbush and Coney Island R. Co., 132 N.Y. 408, 30 N.E. 762.) The 1974 judgment, however, may not be used to divest a right or interest of a person, not a party or privy thereto. (Railroad Equipment Co. v. Blair, 145 N.Y. 607, 39 N.E. 962, supra.) Hence, where a judgment is used as a link in a chain of title, a third person is free to raise his own superior title to break the chain. This being done, the judgment then becomes irrelevant. If, however, a person cannot establish his own superior title, he may not collaterally attack the prior judgment. ⁶ For a party may not create issues which only affect the rights of others. (Matter of Holland, 84 Misc.2d 922, 377 N.Y.S.2d 854.)

Assuming the State was not a party to the 1974 action, ⁷ it would appear that it may assert its own title to refute the claimants' title. This presents an interesting question. May the State appropriate property and yet assert its own title and thereby, in effect, seek to prove that it was not necessary to appropriate the property in the first instance? Despite the apparent self contradiction and illogic of such a position, there is authority that it may be done. (See People ex rel. Palmer v. Travis, 223 N.Y. 150, 119 N.E. 437.) The latter case rests on the proposition that, unlike a municipal taking where a court proceeding is initiated by the condemnor, the taking by the State is not an admission of the State's lack of title, since the court proceeding is initiated by the property owner. This rule, however, ignores the significance of the filing of the appropriation map, which act purports to transfer title to the State. Further, the rule allows the State to utilize an appropriation proceeding to determine its title to property, thus circumventing the proper procedures established under Article 15 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law. Were it not for the fact that this court is bound by the holding in People ex rel. Palmer v. Travis, 223 N.Y. 150, 119 N.E. 437, supra, the court would hold that the State may not utilize an appropriation proceeding in such a manner. The court urges that the aforesaid rule be re-evaluated with the view towards limiting its application to those circumstances where only the extent of an appropriation is in question (i. e., boundary disputes), rather than to those circumstances where the State is attempting to clear its own title to the entire parcel purportedly taken.

Turning now to the issue of the State's title, the claimants contend that the 1942 judgment collaterally estops the State from asserting any title to the entire disputed parcel. The first question is whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel can be applied to the State where the original judgment was not entered by a judge of the Court of Claims. This court concludes that it can (contra, Duverney v. State of New York, 96 Misc.2d 898, 906, 410 N.Y.S.2d 237, 243 ⁸). Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act specifically sets forth: "The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined In accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations . . ." (emphasis added) The latter statement would presumably apply to collateral estoppel. This is especially true where the State has instituted a prior action for ejectment in Supreme Court. To hold otherwise would allow the State to first invoke the jurisdiction of Supreme Court to determine its title to property, and then, if it was not satisfied with the results there, to take the property and again raise the very same issue de novo in...