Peckham v. Lego

• Decision Date: 09 September 1889
• Citation: 57 Conn. 553,19 A. 392
• Parties: PECKHAM v. LEGO et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

19 A. 392

57 Conn. 553

PECKHAM

v. LEGO et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Sept. 9, 1889.

Case reserved from superior court, New Haven county.

G. P. Ingersoll, for the heirs at law. S. A. York, for defendant Grace A. Peckham.

LOOMIS, J. This suit was brought to obtain a judicial construction of the last will of Mary Yemmans, which is as follows:"(1) I give and bequeath to my brother, John Lego, five hundred dollars. (2) I give and bequeath to W. Frank and his wife, Grace A. Peckham, the use and improvement of the whole of the remainder of the estate of which I may die possessed, both real and personal, during their natural lives. Should it be necessary for their personal comfort to use any portion of said property, it is my will that they do so, exercising good judgment, and saving as much of it as possible for the children born to them. (3) I appoint W. Frank and Grace A. Peckham executors of this my last will and testament."

The following facts are found by the court: The heirs at law in this case are John Lego, a brother of the testatrix, and the children of deceased brothers and sisters. Grace A. Peckham, one of the defendants, is a niece of the testatrix, and lived with and was brought up by her as a member of her family. After the marriage of W. Frank Peckham with said Grace, she and her husband and the testatrix lived together, with occasional intermissions, until the death of the testatrix. About the time of the execution of the will the testatrix went to live with Mr. Peckham and his wife, and continued to reside with them to the time of her death. The other heirs at law, though not intimate, were on friendly terms with the testatrix. The property and estate of the testatrix came to her by the will of her late husband, Joseph Yemmans. A few days after the death of her husband, the testatrix made and executed the will, it having been drawn by Rev. E. E. Beardsley, of New Haven. The first question is whether, under the second section of the will, Mr. and Mrs. Peckham take a fee or a life-estate. The intention of the testatrix, which is to control, must here be ascertained from the language employed by her in making the gift. In the first section she employed direct and fitting words in making an absolute gift to her brother, and, had she intended a similar gift of the residue to the Peckhams, similar language most naturally would have been employed, being already in her mind. Instead of that, however, we find language of a contrary import; language which is irreconcilable with the idea that she intended to give other than a life-estate.

The language is doubly restrictive. In the first place the bequest is guarded by the words "use and improvement," which alone would distinguish the gift from a fee, but, to put it beyond all controversy, the tenure of the holding is expressly given as "during their natural lives." If the section stopped here, it is conceded that a doubt as to the meaning would be impossible; but the words which follow, "should it be necessary for their personal comfort to use any portion of said property, it is my will that they do so, exercising good judgment, and saving as much as possible for the children born to them," it is contended remove the restriction twice applied in the preceding language, and enlarge what was plainly only a life-estate, and convert it into a fee. We fail to discover any such intention. The language necessarily implies a consciousness on the part of the testatrix that she had given only a life-estate; but it occurs to her that the income may be so limited, and their circumstances so reduced, that they may lack the means of comfortable support, and she adds the clause under consideration to meet such an emergency, but this clause was never intended to sweep away the life-estate. It was only to be called into play by an emergency,—by the needs of her beneficiaries. The right to resort to the principal was founded on necessity, and restricted by necessity. The words are, "should it be necessary." If it should not be necessary, it is all a mere life-estate; if it is, then the restriction is that all, except the necessary portion so taken, remains a mere life-estate. It is said that the words "necessary for their personal comfort," are indefinite in meaning, and practically unrestricted, and therefore inconsistent with any remaining life-estate. "We cannot accept this view. One of the definitions of "comfort" given in Webster's Dictionary, as applied particularly in law, as well as in some other things, is "support." The language, therefore, must be held to mean, "necessary for their support."

But it is said that it is again rendered indefinite by being all left to the judgment and discretion of the legatees as to the kind and extent of the support needed; that they may use the principal to gratify their mere whims and fancies. We do not think any such authority is given. For the time being, they exercise their judgment, but are not the ultimate judges of what is necessary; but the superior court, as a court of equity, and perhaps in some cases the probate court, will review and revise their judgment, and determine whether the exigency had arisen to give them any right to resort to the principal, and, if so, whether they have exceeded the liberty given them. But our attention has been called particularly to the concluding words enjoining the exercise of good judgment on their part. We do not think the question of necessity is to be so determined. But the good judgment enjoined is to be exercised in saving as much as possible for the children within the field given of what is necessary. What is necessary in law does not always—nor often—mean a strict, absolute necessity. It is a relative term, and variable according to circumstances. It means here, as in the case of the obligation of a husband to furnish necessaries for his wife, what is needed in reference to the situation and condition in life, and within those limits much may be saved by the exercise of good judgment. If they act within the legal limits of a necessity in law, they may not be responsible; but are, if they appropriate a portion of the principal when not needed for their support. If, now, we have discovered the intention of the testatrix as evidenced by the language of her will, a reference to artificial rules of interpretation would seem unnecessary; but, as some of these rules were referred to in the discussion of this case as being opposed to the construction we have adopted, a brief discussion of the matter may seem desirable. Hull v. Culver, 34 Conn. 404, was referred to as indorsing the principle that "when an estate for life is given, with power in the devisee to sell and dispose of it at his own discretion and for his own use, he takes a fee." In Lewis v. Palmer, 46 Conn. 458, CARPENTER, J., in giving the opinion of this court, very properly calls attention to the fact that the above proposition was stated as one which the counsel on both sides conceded, and that the court, without discussing it, immediately passed to the consideration of another question regarded as controlling, namely, whether the power of sale as there given was absolute or contingent. The language to be interpreted was as follows: "I give all my estate to my beloved husband, ...