In re Boies' Estate

• Decision Date: 05 October 1896
• Docket Number: 217
• Citation: 35 A. 724,177 Pa. 190
• Parties: Estate of Joseph M. Boies, deceased. Appeal of Luther Laflin Mills, Executor and Trustee under the Will of Matthew L. Boies, deceased
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

35 A. 724

177 Pa. 190

Estate of Joseph M. Boies, deceased. Appeal of Luther Laflin Mills, Executor and Trustee under the Will of Matthew L. Boies, deceased

No. 217

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

October 5, 1896

Argued February 28, 1896

Appeal, No. 217, Jan. T., 1896, by Luther Laflin Mills executor of Matthew L. Boies, deceased, from decree of O.C Lackawanna Co., No. 566, Series A, distributing estate of Joseph M. Boies, deceased. Reversed.

Exceptions to account of testamentary trustee.

The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.

Errors assigned were in overruling exceptions to account.

Decree reversed, with costs to be paid by the appellee, and record remitted to the court below with instructions to distribute the fund in controversy to the person or persons entitled thereto under the will of Matthew L. Boies.

James H. Torrey and Peter Cantine, for appellant. -- Matthew's want of right of possession during his natural life is not inconsistent with his right to dispose of the estate by will: Holt v. Holt, 114 N.C. 241; Wellford v. Snyder, 137 U.S. 521.

In cases of doubtful construction, the law leans in favor of an absolute rather than a defeasible estate: Smith's App., 23 Pa. 9; Weber's App., 17 Pa. 479; Leiter v. Sheppard, 85 Ill. 242; Ducker v. Burnham, 146 Ill. 9.

The presumption is against partial intestacy: Redding v. Rice, 171 Pa. 305; 2 Jarman on Wills, 768. Courts will so construe a will as to include all testator's property in order that the testator may not die intestate as to any part of his estate: Boards of Missions' App., 91 Pa. 507; Scofield v. Olcott, 120 Ill. 374; Missionary Soc. v. Mead, 131 Ill. 339; Raudenbach's App., 87 Pa. 51; Miller's App., 113 Pa. 459, 467; Jacob's Est., 140 Pa. 268; Sweitzer's Est., 142 Pa. 541; Reimer's Est., 159 Pa. 212, 219; Whitcomb v. Rodman, 156 Ill. 116; Hayward v. Loper, 147 Ill. 41; Brown v. Hastey, 90 Ga. 208; Adamson v. Armitage, 19 Ves. 416; Hellman v. Hellman, 4 Rawle, 450; Garret v. Rex, 6 Watts, 14; 2 Roper on Legacies, 331; Parker's App., 61 Pa. 484; Millard's App., 87 Pa. 457; McCune v. Baker, 155 Pa. 503; Brownfield's Est., 8 Watts, 465; Forsythe v. Forsythe, 108 Pa. 129; Merkel's App., 109 Pa. 235; Follweiler's App., 102 Pa. 581; Cox v. Simms, 125 Pa. 522; Boyle v. Boyle, 152 Pa. 108; Diehl's App., 36 Pa. 120.

Merely negative words (much less ambiguous expressions) are not sufficient to exclude the heir or next of kin: Hitchcock v. Hitchcock, 35 Pa. 393; Bender v. Dietrick, 7 W. & S. 284.

If possible the court will reconcile two dispositions apparently inconsistent, and in so doing will endeavor not to disturb the first further than is absolutely necessary to give effect to the second: 29 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 363; Hart v. Stoyer, 164 Pa. 523; Jones v. Strong, 142 Pa. 496; Sheetz's App., 82 Pa. 213. A clear and explicit bequest of an absolute estate in one clause of a will, will not be limited to a life or contingent estate by a subsequent clause unless the intent so to limit the estate is plain, obvious and beyond a question of a doubt: Keller's Est., 11 Lanc. L. Rev. 185; Pendleton v. Bowler, 28 P.L.J. 313.

Alfred Hand, with him Wm. J. Hand, for appellee. -- Matthew took only a life estate. Reiff and Umstead's App., 60 Pa. 363; Sheaffer's App., 8 Pa. 38; Brown's Est., 38 Pa. 289; Ritter's Est., 148 Pa. 577; Urich's App., 86 Pa. 386; Eichelberger's Est., 135 Pa. 171; Sieber's App., 9 A. 863; Donahue v. Helme, 5 W.N.C. 539; Fisher v. Herbell, 7 W. & S. 63; Bentley v. Kauffman, 86 Pa. 99; Flickwir's App., 136 Pa. 374; Smathers v. Moody, 17 S.E. 532; Howland v. Clendenin, 134 N.Y. 305; Beech's Est., 22 N.Y. 1079; McClure's Will, 136 N.Y. 238; Schouler on Wills, sec. 562; Eldridge v. Eldridge, 9 Cush. 516; Birdsall v. Hewlett, 1 Paige, 32; Stockton v. Thorn, 1 Stockt. 702; Stokes v. Weston, 142 N.Y. 433; Bartlett v. Patton, 33 W.Va. 71; Boston S. Dep. Co. v. Coffin, 152 Mass. 95; Peckham v. Lego, 57 Conn. 553.

Before STERRETT, C.J., GREEN, McCOLLUM, MITCHELL and FELL, JJ.

OPINION

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STERRETT:

This case hinges on the proper construction of the residuary clause of Joseph M. Boies' will, which is in the following words:

"Sixth. -- All the rest, residue and remainder of both my real and personal estate, I give, devise and bequeath to my son Henry M. Boies, to my daughter Mari L. Brainard, wife of Thomas C. Brainard, to my daughter Ella B. Mills, wife of Luther Laflin Mills, and my son Matthew L. Boies, to be equally divided between them, on the following conditions: The shares going to my son Henry M. Boies and my daughters Mari and Ella. B. shall be held each of them in trust for their children, and the share going to my son Matthew L. Boies shall be held in trust by my son Henry M. Boies. My son Henry M. Boies shall pay to my son Matthew L. Boies the income from his share in quarterly payments each and every year during his natural life, and my son Henry M. Boies may in his discretion, in case my said son Matthew L. Boies shall reform and abstain from the use of all intoxicating drinks for two years, pay to him, my said son Matthew L., from three thousand to five thousand dollars to enable him to engage in business."

At the date of his will -- November 15, 1880 -- the testator owned the mansion house, but in 1883 he sold it. On March 17, 1891, he made the following codicil to his will, declaring therein that it was sealed in the city of Chicago, Illinois:

"I desire to have it known and understood by all interested in my last will and testament, and I so will, that it is my intention that my children surviving me, to whom I have left property in trust for their children, shall have the free use and benefit during their lives of the income of such trust, without the necessity of accounting to their children for such income, and that they shall have power to sell and reinvest the principal at their discretion, in such manner as shall, in their judgment, best preserve the principal sum for their heirs. Nothing herein, however, is to effect the original provisions of my will concerning my youngest son, Matthew."

None of the remaining provisions of the will appears to afford any assistance in construing the residuary clause above quoted.

On April 22, 1891, the testator died at the home of his daughter Mrs. Mills in Chicago; and, on January 17, 1894, his son Matthew died at Middletown, New York, unmarried and leaving no issue. By his last will, executed at Chicago, November 27, 1891, he made a specific bequest to the appellant Luther Laflin Mills in trust for Matthew Mills, son of said trustee, and left the residue of his estate to his sisters, Mrs. Mills and Mrs. Brainard. This will was duly probated, and, as executor and trustee therein named, appellant claims the corpus bequeathed to Matthew L. Boies in trust, etc., by the will of his father Joseph M. Boies.

The first specification of error involves the construction -- claimed by appellant -- of the residuary clause above quoted. The second and fourth specifications -- depending on the construction thus claimed -- present the question of distribution under the will of Matthew L. Boies. The third specification may be dismissed with the remark that there appears to be no error in the finding of fact therein recited.

There is no question as to the amount of the estate involved; nor, is it doubted that, if the corpus of Matthew's share did not pass to and vest in him under his father's will, it remained undisposed of, and to that extent the testator died intestate. The validity of Matthew's will is not denied, nor can it be doubted that, if he had any right or title, beyond an equitable life interest, in or to the share given him by his father, the same passed to appellant by Matthew's will. There is no dispute as to who are the legal heirs of Joseph M. Boies; so that, if he died intestate as to the corpus of Matthew's one fourth, the distribution confirmed by the court is correct. The case, therefore, appears to resolve itself into the question whether Matthew took more than an equitable interest for life only in the share given him by his father's will; and that, of course, depends on the proper construction of the residuary clause above quoted.

In construing a will, regard must, of course, be had to the established rules of construction, one of which requires that all the parts thereof must be considered with reference to each other, or as it is sometimes expressed, the testator's intention (the ascertainment of which is generally the purpose of construction) must be gathered from the four corners of the instrument. Another rule requires that (so far as is consistent with the will as a whole) effect must be given to the words and, if possible, all the words of the testator used in their ordinary and natural signification, etc. Other rules are that the presumption is always against intestacy, that the law regards with favor the heir or the first taker, and that an estate will always be construed to be a fee rather than a less estate. But, as was well said by the learned judge who specially presided in this case, these rules "are to be applied when the meaning of the words is doubtful; for no rule, except a hard and fast one adopted for some reason of policy, or a rule upon which titles...