Pedelahore v. Astropark, Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 November 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-3697,83-3697
• Citation: 745 F.2d 346
• Parties: Patricia PEDELAHORE, wife of/and Norman Pedelahore, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ASTROPARK, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 346

745 F.2d 346

Patricia PEDELAHORE, wife of/and Norman Pedelahore Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ASTROPARK, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 83-3697.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 2, 1984.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Dec. 28, 1984.

Badeaux, Discon, Cumberland & Sherman, John G. Discon, J. Michael Cumberland, New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Christovich & Kearney, Michael M. Christovich, W.K. Christovich, New Orleans, La., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before POLITZ, WILLIAMS and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Circuit Judge:

Patricia Pedelahore, a Louisiana resident, was injured on a ride at Astroworld, an amusement park in Houston, Texas, owned and operated by Astropark, Inc., a Delaware corporation authorized to do business in Texas. Pedelahore and her husband invoked diversity jurisdiction and filed suit in the district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Astropark challenged the court's in personam jurisdiction. The district court found personal jurisdiction lacking and dismissed the suit. Concluding that the district court has personal jurisdiction over the Pedelahores' claims against Astropark, Inc. under the Louisiana long-arm statute, La.R.S. 13:3201, we reverse and remand.

The sole question posed on appeal is whether the federal court a qua had personal jurisdiction over the nonresident Astropark, Inc. Whether personal jurisdiction exists is generally determined by examining the: "(1) assertion of jurisdiction by the law of the forum; (2) conformity of the law with the Constitution; and (3) authority for the means of service of process. The first two tests determine a defendant's amenability to jurisdiction ... the third ... gauges whether that amenability was asserted through the proper means." Lapeyrouse v. Texaco, Inc., 693 F.2d 581, 584-85 (5th Cir.1982). As we capsulated in Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 515 F.2d 1208, 1211 (5th Cir.1975):

Resolution of the issue whether a state may properly assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant involves a dual inquiry. [Citation omitted.] The first question is whether the state has by statute provided for the assertion of jurisdiction in the context of the situation under scrutiny. Assuming the initial inquiry is answered affirmatively, the question then arises whether the assertion of jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible.

A defendant is amenable to the personal jurisdiction of a federal court sitting pursuant to diversity jurisdiction to the same extent that he would be amenable to such jurisdiction in a state court of the forum. Lapeyrouse. This amenability involves inquiries one and two posed above. Applying state law, the court must first determine whether the forum state would assert long-arm jurisdiction. Lapeyrouse; Terry v. Raymond International, Inc., 658 F.2d 398 (5th Cir.1981), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 667 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928, 102 S.Ct. 1975, 72 L.Ed.2d 443 (1982). The court must then determine that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident is consonant with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" and that the nonresident defendant had sufficient "minimal contacts" with the forum state so as to avoid offending the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); Lapeyrouse and cases cited therein.

Scope of the Louisiana statute

The Louisiana long-arm statute, La.R.S. 13:3201, provides:

A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the nonresident's

(a) transacting any business in this state;

(b) contracting to supply services or things in this state;

(c) causing injury or damage by an offense or quasi offense committed through an act or omission in this state;

(d) causing injury or damage in this state by an offense or quasi offense committed through an act or omission outside of this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state;

(e) having an interest in, using or possessing a real right or immovable property in this state;

(f) non-support of a child or spouse or a former spouse domiciled in this state to whom an obligation of support is owed and with whom the nonresident formerly resided in this state; or

(g) parentage and support of a child who was conceived by the nonresident while he resided in or was in this state.

Astropark maintains that the Louisiana statute is more stringent and embraces less than the limits allowed by the due process clause. We do not agree. This court and the Louisiana Supreme Court have consistently held that the Louisiana long-arm statute extends to the maximum limits permitted by due process. See e.g. Burstein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.1982); Quasha v. Shale Development Corp., 667 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.1982); Standard Fittings Co. v. Sapag, S.A., 625 F.2d 630 (5th Cir.1980); Adcock v. Surety Research and Inv. Corp., 344 So.2d 969 (La.1977); Drilling Engineering, Inc. v. Independent Indonesian Am. Petroleum Co., 283 So.2d 687 (La.1973). This conclusion is consistent with the official comments appended to the statute by the Louisiana State Law Institute in 1964:

R.S. 13:3201 through 13:3207 were adopted on the recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute to permit the courts of this state to tap the full potential of jurisdiction in personam over nonresidents permitted by International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945); and McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957).

As noted, due process advances a two-pronged test: (1) the nonresident must have minimal contacts with the forum, and (2) subjecting the nonresident to jurisdiction must be consistent with traditional notions of fair play. Product Promotions v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.1974). Astropark contends that the Louisiana statute requires more, arguing that there must be a causal nexus between the minimal contact in Louisiana and the incident giving rise to the action. In support of this contention Astropark cited to the district court and now cites to us two cases--Bernhard v. Holiday Travels, No. CO914 (La.App. 4th Cir. Aug. 10, 1983); and Rush v. Matson Navigation Co., 221 So.2d 265 (La.App. 2d Cir.1969). We do not find these citations persuasive. The Bernhard case has not been reported; apparently the court did not select it for publication. And Rush does not represent the current position of Louisiana's Second Circuit Court of Appeal. That court has discarded the three-pronged test and its rulings are now consistent with Louisiana's other intermediate appellate courts, the Louisiana Supreme Court, and this court. See U.S. Fidelity v. Hi-Tower Concrete Pumping, 434 So.2d 506 (La.App. 2d Cir.1983). We therefore conclude that under the Louisiana long-arm statute there need not be a causal relationship between the nonresident's contacts within the state and the incident giving rise to the action. Louisiana law does not require the causal connexity, nor does federal due process. Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp., 554 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.1977), where, as the Supreme Court recently stated, the contacts are "continuous and...