Peebles v. Minnis
| Decision Date | 03 May 1988 |
| Citation | 402 Mass. 282,521 N.E.2d 1372 |
| Parties | Jack PEEBLES v. Iris MINNIS et al. 1 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Edward Rabinovitz, Boston, for plaintiff.
Michael Frederickson (Richard L. Alfred, Boston, with him), for defendants.
Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.
The plaintiff, Jack Peebles, appeals from the dismissal in the Superior Court of his complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, by which he sought removal of the defendants' attachment on property he owns with his wife, Maureen, as tenants by the entirety. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the individual creditors of one spouse may attach property held in tenancy by the entirety while it remains the principal residence of the other, nondebtor spouse. Because we conclude that such property may be attached, we affirm.
The defendants have commenced a tort action against Maureen for damages suffered in a motor vehicle accident. As security for any judgment they may be awarded, they have attached the Peebleses' marital residence. The plaintiff contends that G.L. c. 209, § 1 (1986 ed.), prohibits the attachment so long as the property remains his principal residence.
With certain exceptions not relevant in this case, "[a]ll real and personal property liable to be taken on execution" is subject to attachment. G.L. c. 223, § 42 (1986 ed.). The plaintiff argues that the property in question is not "liable to be taken on execution," because G.L. c. 209, § 1, provides that "[t]he interest of a debtor spouse in property held as tenants by the entirety shall not be subject to seizure or execution by a creditor of such debtor spouse so long as such property is the principal residence of the nondebtor spouse." It is undisputed that the plaintiff owes no debt to the defendants, and that the property attached is his principal residence.
By its terms, G.L. c. 209, § 1, protects a nondebtor spouse's principal residence from "seizure or execution." It does not exempt such property from attachment. It would be an unwarranted extension of the protections afforded by the statute to construe it as also prohibiting attachment of the debtor-spouse's interest in such property. The purpose of the protections afforded is to safeguard the nondebtor-spouse's right to continued possession of his principal residence. This right is unaffected by a creditor's attaching the...
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Bakwin v. Mardirosian
...as the property is his or her principal residence (and in certain other circumstances not applicable here). Id. Peebles v. Minnis, 402 Mass. 282, 283, 521 N.E.2d 1372 (1988). Additionally, each holder of a tenancy by the entirety has an indestructible right of survivorship. Should the debto......
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In re Chinosorn, Bankruptcy No. 99 B 03025.
...This would be consistent with the interpretation of similar entirety provisions in other states. See, e.g., Peebles v. Minnis, 402 Mass. 282, 283, 521 N.E.2d 1372, 1373 (1988) (entirety property that, under statute, was not "liable to be taken on execution" was nevertheless subject to attac......
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In re Yotis
...and Rhode Island which have allowed attachment of liens but not execution on the property. Id. (citing Peebles v. Minnis, 402 Mass. 282, 283, 521 N.E.2d 1372 (1988) ; Cull v. Vadnais, 122 R.I. 249, 257–58, 406 A.2d 1241 (1979) ). These cases articulated a policy of balancing the rights of c......
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Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Sav. Bank
...paragraph of G.L. 209, § 1, would prohibit the bank from executing on any interest it acquired in the property. Cf. Peebles v. Minnis, 402 Mass. 282, 521 N.E.2d 1372 (1988).We express no view on the rights of the spouses or of the creditors of either as to property held by spouses as tenant......