Peed v. McCrary

• Decision Date: 16 April 1894
• Citation: 21 S.E. 232,94 Ga. 487
• Parties: PEED, County Treasurer, v. McCRARY.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

21 S.E. 232

94 Ga. 487

PEED, County Treasurer, v. McCRARY.

Supreme Court of Georgia

April 16, 1894

Syllabus by the Court.

1. According to Speer v. City of Athens, 85 Ga. 49, 11 S.E. 802 the question of the preliminary advertisement of a local bill is for determination by the general assembly before passing the bill.

2. An act which does not purport to amend or repeal any particular law or section of the Code, but which by its title undertakes in general terms "to amend the county court laws as regards Taylor county, and to provide for the appointment of a county solicitor for said county, and for other purposes," is not within the inhibitory words of the constitution, declaring that "no law, or section of the Code, shall be amended or repealed by mere reference to its title, or to the number of the section of the Code, but the amending or repealing act shall distinctly describe the law to be amended or repealed, as well as the alteration to be made."

3. Under the title above recited, it was competent for the legislature in one and the same act to provide that the judge of the county court of Taylor county shall discharge all the duties that formerly devolved on the justices of the inferior court as to county business, and have the exclusive control and management of all public buildings and property belonging to the county; also that he might appoint one or more bailiffs to serve writs, precepts, warrants, executions summonses, and all orders issued by the county court or the judge thereof; also that the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, should appoint a county solicitor to represent the state in all cases in the county court, the act prescribing his duties, fixing his fees, and providing for their payment. Inasmuch as all these provisions of the act are pertinent and appropriate to a scheme or system of county court law for Taylor county, there is but one subject-matter and the title is comprehensive enough to embrace all the provisions of the act, and none of these provisions are different from, or at variance with, anything expressed in the title.

4. Although it may be true that the constitution, of its own vigor, does not confer power to borrow money by temporary loans to supply casual deficiencies of revenue, yet where the money of a lender has actually been applied to the legitimate uses of a county,--that is, to objects to which county revenue may rightly be devoted,--it...