Peek v. Equipment Service Co. of San Antonio, s. C-8182

• Court: Supreme Court of Texas
• Citation: 779 S.W.2d 802
• Docket Number: Nos. C-8182,C-8426,s. C-8182
• Parties: Lucie Allen PEEK, et al., Petitioner, v. EQUIPMENT SERVICE COMPANY OF SAN ANTONIO, et al., Respondents. Lucie Allen PEEK, Individually, and as Wife of Clyde Peek, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Clyde Peek, et al., Petitioner, v. Burton O. NEESWIG, M.D., Respondent.
• Decision Date: 08 November 1989

Page 802

779 S.W.2d 802 Lucie Allen PEEK, et al., Petitioner,
v.
EQUIPMENT SERVICE COMPANY OF SAN ANTONIO, et al., Respondents.
Lucie Allen PEEK, Individually, and as Wife of Clyde Peek,
and as Administratrix of the Estate of Clyde Peek,
et al., Petitioner,
v.
Burton O. NEESWIG, M.D., Respondent. Nos. C-8182, C-8426. Supreme Court of Texas. Nov. 8, 1989.

W. James Kronzer, Jr., Leslie C. Taylor, R. Gary Stephens, Joe B. Stephens, Houston, for petitioner.

Stephen Dittlinger, Jeffrey C. Anderson, San Antonio, for respondents.

OPINION

PHILLIPS, Chief Justice.

These cases present the question of whether a plaintiff seeking damages under the wrongful death and survival statutes invokes the jurisdiction of a district court by filing a petition which fails to allege either a specific amount of damages or that the damages sustained exceed the court's minimum jurisdictional limits. The district court held that its jurisdiction was not invoked by such a pleading. Because plaintiffs did not file a pleading properly alleging

Page 803

damages until after the applicable statute of limitations had run, the district court dismissed the suit. The court of appeals, in two unpublished opinions, affirmed. ¹ We reverse the judgments of the court of appeals and remand this consolidated cause to the trial court because the original pleading, although defective, was sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction and prevent the running of limitations.

This matter arose out of the murder of Clyde Peek on December 18, 1984. The plaintiffs were Clyde's widow, Lucie Allen Peek, acting in her individual capacity and as representative of Clyde's estate, and Clyde's four surviving children. They brought suit on November 18, 1986, under the wrongful death and survival statutes. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 71.001-.003, § 71.021 (Vernon 1986). The Peeks sued six defendants: Marvin Wiley DeBerry, Jr., who shot and killed Peek; Equipment Service Company, DeBerry's employer; Victor J. Weiss, M.D. and Burton O. Neeswig, M.D., two doctors who had treated DeBerry for mental illness; Suzanne Cude, DeBerry's estranged wife; and Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc., the owner of the store in which DeBerry purchased the murder weapon. The Peeks plead for lost care, nurture, guidance, education, wages in the past and future, pain and suffering, mental anguish, grief, loss of companionship, and loss of enjoyment of life (hedonic damages), together with interest and costs. What they did not plead, however, was the amount of damages sought, either by properly alleging that damages exceeded the minimum jurisdictional limits of the court, see Tex.R.Civ.P. 47(b), or by alleging a sum certain.

The Peeks amended their petition on December 16, 1986, but made no changes in their defective allegations of damages. In a second amended pleading, filed January 14, 1987, the Peeks sought $3,750,000 actual damages and $5,000,000 exemplary damages against the defendants, jointly and severally. This pleading, however, came more than two years after Clyde's death. All defendants except Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc. filed motions to dismiss, alleging that the Peeks had failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court prior to the running of the two-year statute of limitations. ² Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.003(b) (Vernon 1986). The trial court granted these motions at various times, and severance orders were signed so that these judgments became final. ³

The Peeks timely appealed to the court of appeals, which affirmed the judgments of the trial court in two opinions. From both judgments of the court of appeals, the Peeks applied to this court for writ of error. After granting both writs, we consolidated the two causes for oral argument and decision.

The parties here have assumed the minimum monetary jurisdictional limit of the district court to be $500.00. Although recent constitutional and legislative changes call this assumption into question, ⁴ we will

Page 804

also assume, for purposes of our decision, that the jurisdiction of the district court does not extend to controversies involving sums of less than $500.00.

In this case, all parties agree that the trial court's jurisdiction was invoked not later than the filing of the Peeks' second amended petition. The respondents, however, argue that the...