Peek v. State
| Decision Date | 21 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2378-01.,No. 2377-01.,2377-01.,2378-01. |
| Citation | 106 S.W.3d 72 |
| Parties | Rosana and Robert Dale PEEK, Appellants, v. The STATE of Texas. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
John H. Hagler, Dallas, for Appellant.
Susan Hawk, Asst. DA, Dallas, Matthew Paul, State's Atty., Austin, for State.
KEASLER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court joined by KELLER, P.J., and MEYERS, PRICE, WOMACK, JOHNSON, HERVEY, and COCHRAN, JJ.
Rosana and Robert Dale Peek were tried together for injuring their daughter. After both sides closed, the defense sought to reopen the case. The judge denied the request. The appellate court found no error because the Peeks did not demonstrate that "the evidence would have materially changed the case." The Peeks contest the appellate court's use of the "material change" analysis. We conclude that this is the appropriate analysis.
The Peeks were accused of injuring their 4-month-old baby Serena by grabbing her and squeezing her. The evidence at trial showed that in the fall of 1996, Rosana and Serena were in Baytown staying with Rosana's parents. While there, Rosana took Serena to a hospital because she had a fever and a sore in her mouth. Upon their return to Mesquite, Serena was still not better, so the Peeks took her to Presbyterian Hospital the next day. She was transferred to the Children's Medical Center because child abuse was suspected. Serena had rib fractures, bruises on her jaw, a torn upper frenum (the tissue connecting the upper gum to the lip), a torn lingual frenum (the tissue connecting the tongue to the floor of the mouth), a torn lower gum, a bruise below her right nipple, bruises behind her left elbow and below her knees, abrasions on her nose, and a scratch below her ear. The Peeks denied intending to hurt or actually hurting Serena and suggested the injuries had occurred at the Baytown hospital or beforehand while Serena was with her grandparents.
Both parties rested on Friday, January 14, 2000. At the next session, on Tuesday January 18, the defense sought to reopen the case to introduce medical records from the Baytown hospital. The motion was made and denied in chambers that morning. Later in the afternoon, the judge memorialized the event for the record:
THE COURT: — you made a motion to reopen. We discussed this first thing this morning when I arrived. We discussed it in chambers. I denied the motion. I told you we would put this on the record at a later date.
But if I recall correctly, you wanted to reopen to introduce some medical records from Baytown. Not x-rays but the medical records on file.
[Prosecutor], you told me that, in all probability, you would recall Dr. Persaud to explain the statement in the medical records concerning a clear chest.
First, [defense counsel], did I state your motion appropriately?
In essence, the medical records would just bolster the testimony concerning the hospital trip, and that's undisputed. It doesn't shed any light on whether or not the Defendants committed the offense charged. If I allow the defense to reopen, the State certainly should be allowed to call rebuttal witnesses. That will cause a delay. The Court believes it's an unreasonable delay under the circumstances.
So, I am denying — I did previously deny your motion, and I want to put on the record the official denial.
During closing arguments, the defense argued that Serena's injuries occurred either while she was at the Baytown hospital or while she was with her grandparents beforehand. Defense counsel contended that the Peeks took Serena to Presbyterian Hospital Counsel also reminded the jury of Rosana's testimony "that the child, while at her side, was attended by a physician in Houston, and he grabbed the child to try to do something with the blisters in the child's mouth."
The prosecutor responded:
And I want to comment about that, the Baytown hospital. We have to prove our case beyond a reasonable doubt, but they can bring any witness in here to testify. They can admit any kind of evidence that is favorable to their defense. So, where are the medical records from Baytown? Where are they? Where is the doctor that saw that child in Baytown? Because Rosana wanted to blame the doctor for the injuries. I mean, that's just absurd. No doctor at a hospital is going to force a child enough on their face to cause bruises.
It's easy to come in here and say that, but where is that doctor? Where are those medical records?
The jury convicted both of the Peeks, and the trial judge sentenced Robert to 15 years in prison and Rosana to one year in a state jail.
The Peeks filed a motion for new trial arguing that they had received ineffective assistance of counsel. They claimed their lawyer failed to introduce medical records from the Baytown hospital and other hospitals as well. The motion asserted that the Baytown records "would have established the physical and medical condition of the child and were exculpatory in nature."
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, the Peeks introduced all the medical records into evidence. The Baytown records contained the following comments, which the defense emphasized during the hearing:
• an oral ulcer on Serena at the time of her admission;
• "inflammation of lower gums"; and
•
Defense counsel argued that the records demonstrated that Serena had pre-existing injuries and showed that the Peeks were not guilty. Though he did not elaborate, the trial record indicates that the defense would have used these records to show that Serena's chest injuries had occurred during her stay at the Baytown hospital and her mouth injuries had occurred during her time with her grandparents before she was admitted to Baytown.
The judge denied the motion for new trial and the Peeks appealed. They argued, among other things, that the judge erred in refusing to allow them to reopen their case to introduce the Baytown records. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It stated that "[i]f the defendant seeks to reopen, there is abuse of discretion only if the evidence would have materially changed the case in the defendant's favor."1 It concluded that the medical records "probably would not have materially changed the result in [the Peeks'] favor."2
The Peeks petitioned for discretionary review, arguing that the "material change" test is "contrary to the standard set out in numerous decisions of this Court."3 Our courts of appeals are split on whether a party seeking to reopen must demonstrate that the evidence would "materially change the case" in his favor in order to show error.4 We granted review to resolve this conflict.
We construe statutes according to their plain language.5 If that language is ambiguous or leads to an absurd result which the legislature could not possibly have intended, we may then review extratextual factors.6
Article 36.02 governs a party's right to reopen a case. It provides that the trial court "shall allow testimony to be introduced at any time before the argument of a cause is concluded, if it appears that it is necessary to a due administration of justice."7 Nothing in the statute's plain language mentions anything about a "material change." But that phrase could conceivably (and has, as we shall see) come within the concept of evidence being "necessary to a due administration of justice." The real question, then, is what is meant in the statute by "a due administration of justice."
Article 36.02 has existed under various incarnations since 1856.8 Its wording has remained unchanged, but our interpretation of that wording has varied over the years.
Criminal cases were originally appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. In one of the first cases to address the statute, Harris v. State,9 that Court found that the proffered evidence was not "necessary to a due administration of justice" because there was "no reason to believe that the evidence so offered ... was of a character to materially change the state of the case favorably for the defendant ...." So when the Supreme Court was reviewing criminal cases, a "due administration of justice" encompassed the notion of "material change."
Shortly after Harris was decided, the Supreme Court stopped reviewing criminal cases. From 1876 to 1892, criminal cases were reviewed by the Texas Court of Appeals, the predecessor to this Court. In 1877 the Court of Appeals decided Treadway v. State,10 in which the Court followed the Supreme Court's Harris opinion and stated that the trial judge did not err in refusing to allow the defendant to reopen his case because "there [wa]s no reason to believe that the evidence so proposed to be offered was of a character to materially change the state of the case favorably for the defendant." And in 1881, the Court of Appeals found that...
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