Peel v. Reibel

Decision Date16 June 1939
Docket Number32056.
PartiesPEEL v. REIBEL.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; Carlton McNally, Judge.

Action by Ida Nelson Peel against John Reibel, administrator of the estate of George A. Peel, to determine who was entitled to the proceeds of a life policy which had been given by George A. Peel to the plaintiff. From an order denying the defendant's alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding or a new trial, the defendant appeals.

Order affirmed.

Where assignment of certificate evidencing that insured's life was insured under a group policy was made in good faith and not as cover for the initial issuance of insurance in favor of one with no insurable interest in insured's life, it was not necessary that the assignee should have such insurable interest.

Syllabus by the Court .

1. Like any other chose in action, a policy of life insurance may be the subject of a gift.

2. That is true of the individual certificate of insurance issued to an employe insured by his employer under a ‘ master policy’ on the group plan, the certificate evidencing the employe's personal insurance.

3. The provision in the master policy that no assignment by the employe of his personal insurance ‘ shall be binding upon the Company until the original or a duplicate thereof shall be filed at the Company's Home Office is for the benefit of the insurer. It does not limit otherwise the power of the insured to dispose of his certificate by assignment or gift.

4. Where an assignment is made in good faith and not as cover for the initial issuance of a life insurance policy in favor of one with no insurable interest in the life of the insured it is not essential that the assignee have such insurable interest.

George G. Chapin, of St. Paul, for appellant.

Smith & Whitacre, of St. Paul, for respondent.

STONE Justice.

The one issue is whether plaintiff, in her own right as donee from the insured of a policy of life insurance, or the administrator of the estate of the deceased insured, is entitled to the proceeds of the policy. The verdict was for plaintiff. Defendant appeals from the order denying his alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding or a new trial.

As of August 1, 1937, the First National Bank of St. Paul insured the lives of a group of its employes under a ‘ group’ policy issued by the Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company. The ‘ master policy’ was issued and delivered to the bank. Each of the insured employes got a certificate to evidence the fact and amount of insurance on his own life. Decedent, George A. Peel, was one of the employes so insured. He died October 29, 1937. He had designated, and his certificate recited, that the beneficiary of his insurance should be the executors or administrators' of his estate.

1. The case for plaintiff is based as to its law upon the general rule that a policy of life insurance may be the subject of a valid gift, like any other chose in action. Rahders Merritt & Hagler v. People's Bank, 113 Minn. 496, 130 N.W. 16, Ann.Cas.1912A, 299; Redden v. Prudential L. Insurance Co., 193 Minn. 228, 258 N.W. 300; Janesville State Bank v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 200 Minn. 312, 274 N.W. 232, 111 A.L.R. 705. See 12 R.C.L. p. 943, § 20.

Conceding the rule, defendant's argument is that the evidence fails as matter of law to establish a gift from Peel to plaintiff. With that we can not agree. There is evidence that Peel made a manual delivery of his certificate to plaintiff, accompanied by declarations upon which the jury could easily have inferred his intention to make the transfer absolute and unconditional. That is, the jury could have found (and did so) all the legal elements of a completed gift.

After plaintiff received the policy, she put it into a trunk to which Peel, as well as herself, had access. Thereafter he did remove from the trunk some of his personal effects. He did not take the policy.

The manual transfer of possession, accompanied by declarations indicating intention to make an unconditional gift, was adequately shown by evidence.

Such cases as Ward v. New York Life Insurance Co., 225 N.Y. 314, 122 N.E. 207, are distinguishable for the simple reason that the combinations of circumstances relied upon to establish the gift were found to be lacking in one or more of the essentials. For example, in the Ward case, there was no delivery of possession. The supposed...

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