Peel v. State
| Decision Date | 19 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2017-KA-01051-COA,2017-KA-01051-COA |
| Citation | 283 So.3d 203 |
| Parties | Fabiyonne PEEL a/k/a Fabiyonne K. Peel, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES, JACKSON
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ABBIE EASON KOONCE, JACKSON
EN BANC.
GREENLEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. The Madison County Circuit Court denied Fabiyonne Peel's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, a new trial. Peel appeals. He asserts that: (1) the circuit court erred when it limited his cross-examination of Investigator Ready; (2) there was not sufficient evidence to convict Peel of motor-vehicle theft; (3) his motor-vehicle theft conviction violates the Double Jeopardy Clause; and (4) the guilty verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence. We affirm the circuit court's judgment.
¶2. After a report of a burglary with theft of property, Investigator Adrian Ready questioned a man named Pates. Pates had been caught on video using a stolen credit card at a Jackson-area store. Local people had reported the card stolen after their apartment was burglarized. In addition to the credit card, the burglars stole an iPad and a car.
¶3. During questioning, Pates implicated Fabiyonne Peel and three other men in the burglary and theft. Investigator Ready then questioned Pates's girlfriend, who confirmed seeing Peel drive a group to the stolen car and watching the group drive away. With that information, Investigator Ready obtained an arrest warrant for Peel. Upon entering Peel's home, he found Peel hiding under a pile of clothes near the bed. Investigator Ready also found the stolen iPad.
¶4. A grand jury indicted Peel for burglary of a dwelling, conspiracy to commit burglary of a dwelling, motor-vehicle theft, and conspiracy to commit motor-vehicle theft. A Madison County Circuit Court jury acquitted Peel of the charge for conspiracy to commit motor-vehicle theft; however, a mistrial was declared on the remaining counts because the jury could not reach a unanimous decision.
¶5. Several months later, Peel's second trial was held, and a jury found him guilty of burglary of a dwelling, conspiracy to commit burglary of a dwelling, and motor-vehicle theft. The circuit court sentenced Peel as a violent habitual offender to three concurrent terms of life imprisonment in the Mississippi Department of Corrections' custody.
¶6. Peel moved for a JNOV or, in the alternative, a new trial, which the circuit court denied. He appeals, alleging that: (1) the circuit court erred when it limited his cross-examination of Investigator Ready; (2) there was not sufficient evidence to convict Peel of motor-vehicle theft; (3) his motor-vehicle theft conviction violates the Double Jeopardy Clause; and (4) the guilty verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence.
¶7. Peel asserts that the circuit court erred when it did not allow him to cross-examine Investigator Ready regarding his interrogation of Peel. Therefore, he requests a new trial.
¶8. "Regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence, we employ an abuse-of-discretion standard of review." Robinson v. State , 248 So.3d 892, 896 (¶ 15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). "A defendant's failure to contemporaneously object to the admission of evidence at trial, as required by Mississippi Rule of Evidence 103, effectively waives the issue on appeal." Carter v. State , 227 So.3d 416, 421 (¶ 14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).
¶9. On direct examination of Ready, the State asked if Peel asserted an alibi:
Peel made no objection. Then, during cross-examination, Peel attempted to question Investigator Ready about the interrogation, and the circuit court limited his line of questioning after objection by the State because it was "hearsay being brought out by the Defendant." This decision was a proper application of our evidentiary law, as "[h]earsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Fullilove v. State , 101 So.3d 669, 675 (¶ 19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). But Peel asserts that had the court allowed his questioning of Investigator Ready, the testimony would have shown that Peel told Investigator Ready about where he obtained the iPad and other exculpatory evidence.1
¶10. Peel only asserted that the State got "hearsay evidence in and when our side [did not]." However, Peel failed to contemporaneously state that the prosecution had opened the door or cite Mississippi Rule of Evidence 106, which provides, "If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time."
¶11. The circuit court, in its motion in limine ruling, had previously reviewed the interrogation by Investigator Ready and found that it would be excluded as hearsay. Therefore, we find that by not bringing to the court's attention the previous ruling in limine, and then not asserting that the full statement should be admitted under Rule 106, such issue was waived on appeal and is procedurally barred from being asserted as error at the circuit court level. We also note that the circuit court was correct in holding that the contents of the interrogation were hearsay when offered by the defendant and that the circuit court was within its discretion in prohibiting that testimony.
¶12. Peel asserts that evidence was insufficient to convict him of motor-vehicle theft because he had no prior knowledge of the theft and did not participate or assist in the theft.
¶13. When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction, this Court asks, "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Brown v. State , 217 So.3d 805, 807 (¶ 5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ).
¶14. The State offered much testimonial evidence at trial that indicated Peel was guilty of motor-vehicle theft. The jury heard testimony that Peel drove the group of burglars to the apartment, that Peel was inside of the apartment when the keys were stolen and the car was driven away, and that Peel drove a group following the stolen car and watched that group drive away. Importantly, the jury heard that Peel was present during the entire theft.
¶15. The jury was then instructed:
¶16. The jury found the essential elements were met beyond a reasonable doubt. And, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of motor-vehicle theft beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶17. Peel's conviction of motor-vehicle theft is supported with sufficient evidence. We therefore find that the circuit court properly denied Peel's JNOV motion.
¶18. Peel contends that because a jury had already acquitted him of conspiracy to commit motor-vehicle theft, that acquittal precluded any other conviction based on aiding and abetting motor-vehicle theft. He therefore claims that his motor-vehicle theft conviction violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
¶19. "We apply a de novo standard of review to claims of double jeopardy." Kelly v. State , 80 So.3d 802, 804 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2012) (quoting Boyd v. State , 977 So.2d 329, 334 (¶ 14) (Miss. 2008) ). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]" U.S. Const. amend. V ; see Benton v. Maryland , 395 U.S. 784, 787, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969) (); see also Miss. Const. art. III § 22 (1890) ().
¶20. We typically evaluate claims of double-jeopardy violations using the Blockburger test, where the United States Supreme Court held that "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Blockburger...
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Willis v. State
...case noting that an acquittal on conspiracy does not necessarily mean one cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting. Peel v. State , 283 So. 3d 203 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). We are unconvinced that Willis has successfully alleged error, but assuming arguendo there was error, it was harmless. ......