Peery v. Ill. Cent. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 October 1913
• Citation: 123 Minn. 264,143 N.W. 724
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: PEERY v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.

123 Minn. 264

143 N.W. 724

PEERY

v.ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Oct. 31, 1913.

Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; Hascall R. Brill, Judge.

Action by Robert H. Peery against the Illinois Central Railroad Company. Verdict directed for defendant. From denial of new trial, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.

Syllabus by the Court

In an action for personal injuries, based upon the federal Employers' Liability Act (Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1322]), it is held, that on the facts stated in the opinion plaintiff, an employé of defendant, an interstate carrier of freight and passengers, was, at the time of his injury, engaged in interstate commerce, and entitled to the benefits of the federal statute. Samuel A. Anderson and A. F. Storey, both of St. Paul, for appellant.

Butler & Mitchell, of St. Paul, for respondent.

BROWN, C. J.

The facts in the case are in substance as follows:

Defendant is a railroad corporation and operates a line of road extending into and through Kentucky, Tennessee, and other states, and as such was at the time here in question engaged in the interstate carriage of passengers and freight for hire. Among the various lines so operated one extended from Paducah, Ky., in a southerly direction into and through the state of Tennessee, over and upon which it transacted a general interstate and intrastate transportation business. Plaintiff was in its employ as a conductor of one of its freight trains operated on this line. Plaintiff's run was between Paducah and Fulton, both points being in the state of Kentucky, Paducah on the north and Fulton on the south boundary of the state. The run is termed in the record as a ‘turn around run’; that is, plaintiff and his crew would take a train from Paducah to Fulton, a distance of about 45 miles, and immediately return to Paducah the same day, repeating the operation from day to day. On the return trip the train would be composed of such cars as were at Fulton ready to be taken north, or if there were no such cars on a particular day the engine and caboose would alone compose the train on the return trip. Paducah was the terminal point of this crew. The trains so in charge of plaintiff were almost wholly composed of interstate shipments; freight consigned to points in Tennessee and in other Southern states on the south-bound trip, and consignments to points in the Northern states on his return trip, and comparatively speaking there was very little local traffic. The trains at Fulton were taken to their destination by other train crews, and by them brought to that point from the south and taken on north by plaintiff and his crew. This had been the general scope and character of plaintiff's employment for several years prior to the accident complained of, and was such at that time.

On the particular day he had taken an interstate train of cars to Fulton, and was on the return trip when injured. It happened that there were no loaded cars to be taken north, and he was directed to couple onto some flat cars upon which was loaded a pile driver, owned by the company, and side track them at an intermediate point. There was also a partially disabled locomotive in the Fulton yards, which he was required to take into the train and to Paducah for repairs. With his train so composed, plaintiff proceeded on the return to Paducah. The piledriving outfit was left at the point directed, namely, Mayville, and from that point the train was composed of the regular locomotive, the disabled locomotive, and the caboose. A freight train followed plaintiff's train, and was directed to run about 10 minutes behind. When about 10 miles from the station where the pile driver was left, the second train collided with plaintiff's train, on a curve in the road, striking the caboose, in which plaintiff was riding at the time, with great violence, and seriously injuring his person.

In this action to recover for his injuries the complaint charges that the collision of the trains was due to the negligence of defendants, and facts bringing the case within the federal Employers' Liability Act. There was an attempt, also, to charge liability under the common law of Kentucky, the state wherein the injury occurred. At the trial below the court ruled that plaintiff was not engaged in interstate commerce at the time of his injury, and that he could not recover under the federal act. The court also held the complaint insufficient to support evidence of the common law of Kentucky, denied a request to amend the complaint, and directed a verdict for defendant at the close of plaintiff's case. Plaintiff appealed from an order denying a new trial.

The result of our consideration of the record is that plaintiff was at the time of his injury engaged in interstate commerce, and entitled to the protection of the federal Employers' Liability Act, at least that the question should have been submitted to the jury, and it becomes unnecessary to consider the question of the liability of defendant under the common law of Kentucky. Since liability exists under the federal law, the state law disappears. The federal statute controls the case. The opinion is therefore limited accordingly.

Upon all questions involving the construction of the federal statute and its application to particular facts, we look to and are controlled by the decisions of the federal courts, for in...