Peet v. Mills

• Decision Date: 28 November 1913
• Citation: 136 P. 685,76 Wash. 437
• Parties: PEET v. MILLS.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

136 P. 685

76 Wash. 437

PEET v. MILLS.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 28, 1913

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Everett Smith Judge.

Action by Horace E. Peet against E. M. Mills. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Chas P. Spooner and George R. Biddle, both of Seattle, for appellant.

Kerr &amp McCord and J. N. Hamill, both of Seattle, for respondent.

MORRIS J.

By this appeal we are again called upon to review the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1911 (Laws 1911, c. 74) under appellant's contention that the act is applicable only where recovery is sought upon the ground of negligence of the employer. The facts upon which appellant predicates his right of action are these: On January 22, 1912, while in the employ of the Seattle, Renton & Southern Railway Company as motorman, he was injured in a collision between two of the railway company's trains. Respondent was then the president of the railway company, and it is sought to hold him personally responsible for the injuries because of the allegations that, when he assumed the control and management of the railway company, it was equipped with a block signal system for use in foggy weather, which respondent negligently failed to operate; and that, when complaint was made by the train operators of the great danger of operating the trains without the aid of the block signals, a promise was made by respondent to have the block signals working during foggy weather, which promise respondent failed to keep, and as a consequence of his negligence in so failing appellant was injured. The court below sustained a demurrer to the complaint, and, appellant electing to stand upon his complaint, the action was dismissed, and this appeal taken.

It is the contention of appellant, conceding he was at the time of his injury a 'workman' within the meaning of the act, and that as such he has no right of action against the railway company, his employer, that the act in no way infringes upon his right of action against respondent, because: (1) The act itself is in derogation of the common law, and, since it does not expressly abolish the doctrine of negligence as a ground of recovery except as against employers, it should be strictly construed; (2) even though it be admitted that the body of the act is in itself sufficient to abolish negligence as a ground of recovery of damages against all persons within the scope of the act, the title to the act is not broad enough to include such abolition as against any one except employers. Our recent discussion of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1911, as found in State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466, and State v. Mountain Timber Co., 135 P. 645, renders unnecessary any further review of the act except in so far as may be necessary to notice the contentions here raised. The act contains its own declaration of legislative policy, in reciting in section 1 that the common-law system in dealing with actions by employés against employers for injuries received in hazardous employments is inconsistent with the modern industrial conditions, uneconomic, unwise, and unfair, and that as the welfare of the state depends upon its industries, and even more uon the welfare of its working men, the state of Washington in the exercise of its police and sovereign power declares its policy to withdraw all phases of the premises from private controversy, regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding, or compensation except as provided in the act, 'and to that end all civil actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished, except as in this act provided.'

It is a well-accepted rule that remedial statutes, seeking the correction of recognized errors and...