Pegram v. Herdrich

• Decision Date: 12 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-1949.,98-1949.
• Citation: 530 U.S. 211
• Parties: PEGRAM et al. v. HERDRICH
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

530 U.S. 211

PEGRAM et al. v.HERDRICH

No. 98-1949.

United States Supreme Court.

Argued February 23, 2000.

Decided June 12, 2000.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioners.With him on the briefs were Virginia A. Seitz and Richard D. Raskin.

James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal.With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Allen H. Feldman, and Mark S. Flynn.

James P. Ginzkey argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.^*

Justice Souter, delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question in this case is whether treatment decisions made by a health maintenance organization, acting through its physician employees, are fiduciary acts within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),88 Stat. 832, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.(1994 ed. and Supp. III).We hold that they are not.

I

Petitioners, Carle Clinic Association, P. C., Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc., and Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc.(collectively Carle), function as a health maintenance organization (HMO) organized for profit.Its owners are physicians providing prepaid medical services to participants whose employers contract with Carle to provide such coverage.Respondent, Cynthia Herdrich, was covered by Carle through her husband's employer, State Farm Insurance Company.

The events in question began when a Carle physician, petitionerLori Pegram,¹ examined Herdrich, who was experiencing pain in the midline area of her groin.Six days later, Dr. Pegram discovered a six by eight centimeter inflamed mass in Herdrich's abdomen.Despite the noticeable inflammation, Dr. Pegram did not order an ultrasound diagnostic procedure at a local hospital, but decided that Herdrich would have to wait eight more days for an ultrasound, to be performed at a facility staffed by Carle more than 50 miles away.Before the eight days were over, Herdrich's appendix ruptured, causing peritonitis.See154 F. 3d 362, 365, n. 1(CA71998).

Herdrich sued Pegram and Carle in state court for medical malpractice, and she later added two counts charging statelaw fraud.Carle and Pegram responded that ERISA preempted the new counts, and removed the case to federal court,² where they then sought summary judgment on the state-law fraud counts.The District Court granted their motion as to the second fraud count but granted Herdrich leave to amend the one remaining.This she did by alleging that provision of medical services under the terms of the Carle HMO organization, rewarding its physician owners for limiting medical care, entailed an inherent or anticipatory breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty, since these terms created an incentive to make decisions in the physicians' self-interest, rather than the exclusive interests of plan participants.³

Herdrich sought relief under 29 U. S. C. § 1109(a), which provides that

"any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary."

When Carle moved to dismiss the ERISA count for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the District Court granted the motion, accepting the Magistrate Judge's determination that Carle was not "involved in these events as" an ERISA fiduciary.App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a.The original malpractice counts were then tried to a jury, and Herdrich prevailed on both, receiving $35,000 in compensation for her injury.154 F. 3d, at 367.She then appealed the dismissal of the ERISA claim to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which reversed.The court held that Carle was acting as a fiduciary when its physicians made the challenged decisions and that Herdrich's allegations were sufficient to state a claim:

"Our decision does not stand for the proposition that the existence of incentives automatically gives rise to a breach of fiduciary duty.Rather, we hold that incentives can rise to the level of a breach where, as pleaded here, the fiduciary trust between plan participants and plan fiduciaries no longer exists (i. e., where physicians delay providing necessary treatment to, or withhold administering proper care to, plan beneficiaries for the sole purpose of increasing their bonuses)."Id., at 373.

We granted certiorari, 527 U. S. 1068(1999), and now reverse the Court of Appeals.

II

Whether Carle is a fiduciary when it acts through its physician owners as pleaded in the ERISA count depends on some background of fact and law about HMOs, medical benefit plans, fiduciary obligation, and the meaning of Herdrich's allegations.

A

Traditionally, medical care in the United States has been provided on a "fee-for-service" basis.A physician charges so much for a general physical exam, a vaccination, a tonsillectomy, and so on.The physician bills the patient for services provided or, if there is insurance and the doctor is willing, submits the bill for the patient's care to the insurer, for payment subject to the terms of the insurance agreement.Cf. R. Rosenblatt, S. Law, & S. Rosenbaum, Law and the American Health Care System 543-544 (1997)(hereinafter Rosenblatt)(citing Weiner & de Lissovoy, Razing a Tower of Babel: A Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans, 18 J. Health Politics, Policy & Law 75, 76-78 (Summer 1993)).In a fee-for-service system, a physician's financial incentive is to provide more care, not less, so long as payment is forthcoming.The check on this incentive is a physician's obligation to exercise reasonable medical skill and judgment in the patient's interest.

Beginning in the late 1960's, insurers and others developed new models for health-care delivery, including HMOs.Cf. Rosenblatt 546.The defining feature of an HMO is receipt of a fixed fee for each patient enrolled under the terms of a contract to provide specified health care if needed.The HMO thus assumes the financial risk of providing the benefits promised: if a participant never gets sick, the HMO keeps the money regardless, and if a participant becomes expensively ill, the HMO is responsible for the treatment agreed upon even if its cost exceeds the participant's premiums.

Like other risk-bearing organizations, HMOs take steps to control costs.At the least, HMOs, like traditional insurers, will in some fashion make coverage determinations, scrutinizing requested services against the contractual provisions to make sure that a request for care falls within the scope of covered circumstances (pregnancy, for example), or that a given treatment falls within the scope of the care promised (surgery, for instance).They customarily issue general guidelines for their physicians about appropriate levels of care.Seeid., at 568-570.And they commonly require utilization review (in which specific treatment decisions are reviewed by a decisionmaker other than the treating physician) and approval in advance (precertification) for many types of care, keyed to standards of medical necessity or the reasonableness of the proposed treatment.SeeAndresen, Is Utilization Review the Practice of Medicine?, Implications for Managed Care Administrators, 19 J. LegalMed. 431, 432(Sept. 1998).These cost-controlling measures are commonly complemented by specific financial incentives to physicians, rewarding them for decreasing utilization of health-care services, and penalizing them for what may be found to be excessive treatment, see Rosenblatt 563-565;Iglehart, Health Policy Report: The American Health Care System— Managed Care, 327 New EnglandJ. Med. 742, 742-747(1992).Hence, in an HMO system, a physician's financial interest lies in providing less care, not more.The check on this influence (like that on the converse, fee-for-service incentive) is the professional obligation to provide covered services with a reasonable degree of skill and judgment in the patient's interest.See Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae 17-21.

The adequacy of professional obligation to counter financial self-interest has been challenged no matter what the form of medical organization.HMOs became popular because fee-for-service physicians were thought to be providing unnecessary or useless services; today, many doctors and other observers argue that HMOs often ignore the individual needs of a patient in order to improve the HMOs' bottom lines.See, e. g., 154 F. 3d, at 375-378(citing various critics of HMOs).⁴In this case, for instance, one could argue that Pegram's decision to wait before getting an ultrasound for Herdrich, and her insistence that the ultrasound be done at a distant facility owned by Carle, reflected an interest in limiting the HMO's expenses, which blinded her to the need for immediate diagnosis and treatment.

B

Herdrich focuses on the Carle scheme's provision for a "year-end distribution," n. 3, supra, to the HMO's physician owners.She argues that this particular incentive device of annually paying physician owners the profit resulting from their own decisions rationing care can distinguish Carle's organization from HMOs generally, so that reviewing Carle's decisions under a fiduciary standard as pleaded in Herdrich's complaint would not open the door to like claims about other HMO structures.While the Court of Appeals agreed, we think otherwise, under the law as now written.

...