Thompson v. United States
| Docket Number | 2:22-cv-01459-JAM-JDP |
| Decision Date | 27 October 2023 |
| Parties | VICTORIA THOMPSON INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF DECEDENT RUSSELL GENE THOMPSON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on Defendant United States of America's (“Defendant”) motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Def.'s Mot. for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 37. Defendant's motion is based on two grounds: (1) Plaintiff Victoria Thompson, individually and on behalf of decedent Russell Gene Thompson, (“Plaintiff”) is judicially estopped from asserting the claims in the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”); and (2) Plaintiff cannot maintain this action under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because she is not a real party in interest. Def.'s Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“Mot.”), ECF No. 37-1 at 1-2. Defendant's motion stems from Plaintiff's nondisclosure of an administrative tort claim filed against the Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”) during the pendency of Plaintiff's earlier bankruptcy. Id. at 1-2.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion for summary judgment on both grounds.[1]
I DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of six documents in support of its motion under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Def.'s Req. for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), ECF No. 37-3. The documents consist of Plaintiff's underlying administrative tort claim filed against the Department of Veterans Affairs on October 6, 2021 (Exhibit 7) and documents from Plaintiff's chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding that are in the court's records (Exhibits 4-6, 8-10) . Id. Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant's requests. See Opp'n, ECF No. 40.
As documents that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” and in the absence of Plaintiff's objection, see Opp'n, the Court takes judicial notice of exhibits four through ten, inclusive, as requested. See Fed.R.Evid. 201(b); Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (); In re Calder, 907 F.2d 953, 955 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990) (); Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis 267 F.3d 1042, 1048 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) (). The Court only takes judicial notice of the contents, or lack of contents, within the matters noticed but not the truth of those contents. See In re Calder, 907 F.2d at 955 n.2; Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001).
II. BACKGROUND AND UNDISPUTED FACTS
Russell Gene Thompson (“Decedent”) was a patient at (1) the VA medical facility in Martinez, California from March 19, 2021, to May 7, 2021, and (2) the VA medical center in San Francisco, California from August 19, 2021 to October 6, 2021. Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) No. 1, ECF No. 40-4. Decedent passed away on October 6, 2021. SUF No. 12. The same day, Plaintiff, as Decedent's surviving spouse, submitted an administrative tort claim with the VA to recover damages for the injuries allegedly sustained in connection with Decedent's care and treatment at both facilities (the “VA Claim”). SUF Nos. 12, 13.
Approximately five years earlier, on June 20, 2016, Plaintiff and Decedent filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California, Case No. 16-23970. SUF No. 5. Plaintiff and Decedent filed a statement of financial affairs and schedules of assets with their chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. SUF No. 7. The bankruptcy court confirmed Plaintiff and Decedent's chapter 13 plan on September 14, 2016. RJN No. 5 at 24. On July 30, 2019, Decedent was dismissed as a debtor from the bankruptcy case, leaving Plaintiff as the only remaining debtor. SUF No. 14. On March 7, 2022, the bankruptcy court entered an order of discharge for Plaintiff, SUF No. 15, and the case was closed on March 22, 2022. RJN No. 5 at 19.
Plaintiff and Decedent did not disclose the VA Claim in their initial bankruptcy filings, and Plaintiff never amended the filings to disclose the VA claim during the pendency of the bankruptcy case. SUF Nos. 7, 11, 16.
After several pleadings and a consolidation of cases, Plaintiff filed the operative second amended complaint in this action on June 28, 2023, individually and as the personal representative of Decedent's estate, to recover damages for the injuries allegedly sustained in connection with the care and treatment Decedent received at both facilities. Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”), ECF No. 33; SUF Nos. 2-4.[2] ,[3]
III. OPINION
A Court must grant a party's motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying [the documents] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of a material fact.” Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Once the movant makes this initial showing, the burden rests upon the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. An issue of fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
Defendant argues Plaintiff is judicially estopped from bringing this action because she failed to disclose the VA Claim during the pendency of her chapter 13 bankruptcy. Mot. at 1-2.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel ‘“prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.”' New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227 n.8 (2000)). The purpose of the doctrine is to protect the integrity of the judicial process. Id. at 750.
In New Hampshire, the Court identified three factors that “firmly tip the balance of equities in favor of” estopping a party: (1) a party's later position is clearly inconsistent with an earlier position; (2) the earlier court accepted the party's prior position; and (3) the inconsistent positions would give the party an unfair advantage or unfairly disadvantage an opposing party. Id. at 750-51.
District courts have adopted a default rule of applying judicial estoppel in matters involving bankruptcy given the critical importance of full disclosure in those proceedings: “If a plaintiff-debtor omits a pending (or soon-to-be-filed) lawsuit from the bankruptcy schedules and obtains a discharge (or plan confirmation), judicial estoppel bars the action.” Ah Quin v. Cnty. of Kauai Dep't of Transp., 733 F.3d 267, 271, 273-74 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 208 (5th Cir. 1999)). However, despite the default rule, “[j]udicial estoppel is a discretionary doctrine, applied on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 272 (citing New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751). Upon closer review of Ah Quin and the cases relied upon to articulate this default rule, the Court finds that the rule should not be applied here given that the undisclosed claim was neither pending nor soon-to-be-filed as of the commencement of the bankruptcy action but rather did not exist until five years after the chapter 13 plan was confirmed. RJN No. 5; SUF Nos. 12.
Turning to the three New Hampshire factors, even if Defendant's SUF establishes the first two, Defendant has not shown Plaintiff obtained an unfair advantage, or that an opposing party was unfairly disadvantaged, when she failed to disclose the VA Claim on October 6, 2021. Defendant asserts Plaintiff received an unfair advantage when she obtained a “discharge without allowing the creditors to learn of the pending lawsuit.” Mot. at 5. However, Defendant's authority does not support that a lack of knowledge amounts to an unfair advantage. Rather, the unfair advantage exists in these circumstances only if the already-confirmed plan could be modified to allow the creditors to receive greater payments under the plan. Thus, Defendant must show that the already-confirmed chapter 13 plan could have been modified on or after October 6, 2021. Defendant has not made this showing.
A chapter 13 bankruptcy plan may be modified after confirmation but before completion of plan payments. 11 U.S.C § 1329(a); In re Flores, 735 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Payments under a chapter 13 plan cannot exceed five years from the date the first payment is due, whether or not the plan is later modified after confirmation. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(d), 1325(b)(4), 1329(c); In re Mrdutt, 600 B.R. 72, 83 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2019). The first payment is due 30 days after the chapter 13 bankruptcy petition is filed, unless otherwise ordered by the...
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