Pegram v. Nelson

Decision Date13 April 1979
Docket NumberNo. C-77-359-G.,C-77-359-G.
Citation469 F. Supp. 1134
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
PartiesChester Lawrence PEGRAM, Jr., Chester Lawrence Pegram, Plaintiffs, v. Ralph R. NELSON, E. P. Pearce, Jr., Howard E. Carr, James P. Miller, H. Vance Pegram, Walter L. Salmon, Jr., Franklin J. Teague, Guilford County Board of Education, Defendants.

Judith G. Behar, Cooperating Atty., for North Carolina Civil Liberties Union, and Anne R. Littlejohn, Greensboro, N. C., for plaintiffs.

Suzanne Reynolds, J. Donald Cowan, Jr., McNeill Smith of Smith, Moore, Smith, Schell & Hunter, Greensboro, N. C., John W. Hardy of Douglas, Ravenel, Hardy, Crihfield & Bullock, Greensboro, N. C., for defendants.

Elizabeth C. Bunting, North Carolina Dept. of Justice, Raleigh, N. C., for amicus curiae.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HIRAM H. WARD, District Judge.

This matter came on for hearing before the Court upon cross-motions by plaintiffs and defendants for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff, Chester Lawrence Pegram, Jr.,1 alleges he was deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process because of the disciplinary actions taken against him by defendant Ralph R. Nelson, Principal of Northeast Junior High School. Plaintiff further alleges that N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115-147 is unconstitutional and that the Guilford County School Discipline Policy is unconstitutional as it relates to student suspensions of ten days or less.

In 1976, disciplinary procedures of the Guilford County public schools were contained in an Information Bulletin entitled "Discipline Policy and Access to Student Records." The plaintiff had received a copy of this Information Bulletin prior to the time of the incident which resulted in his suspension.

The Discipline Policy contained, inter alia, the following with regard to suspensions of up to ten days:

In dealing with alleged misconduct, the principal shall make a reasonable investigation of the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident. The student shall be encouraged to raise any defense he thinks relevant. If the student requests that other witnesses be questioned, the principal should talk to them if possible. If the student makes a reasonable claim of other defensive matter that, if true, would free him from blame but is not immediately available, the principal should postpone disciplinary action for a reasonable time until such evidence can be presented to him.
. . . . .
If the principal investigates a student's alleged misconduct and decides to take disciplinary action, he must investigate and take action on all alleged misconduct known to him at that time. Consequently the most serious action he can take on his own authority for any and all misconduct by a particular student known to him at any one time, is to give the student a ten (10) day suspension. If the principal thinks that additional penalties are appropriate, he may seek the Superintendent's approval to initiate the procedure for obtaining a long term suspension or expulsion.
. . . . .
A short term suspension is a suspension of a student from school attendance and all other school functions for any period of time up to ten (10) days. The principal may invoke a short term suspension only after investigating the misconduct. . .

A school principal is given the power to suspend a student by N.C.Gen.Stat. § 115-147, which provides in part that "the principal . . . shall have authority to suspend or dismiss any pupil who willfully and persistently violates the rules of the school or who may be guilty of immoral or disreputable conduct, or who may be a menace to the school . . .."

On Monday evening, January 26, 1976, Alvin Long, Wayne Botts, and the plaintiff attended a basketball game at their school, Northeast Junior High, in Greensboro, North Carolina. The plaintiff was fourteen years old and in the ninth grade. Mrs. Jean Trantham was also present at the game and while there discovered that her billfold, which contained about $65, had been stolen. She informed defendant Nelson, the principal, about the theft and that three boys, including plaintiff, had been sitting behind her. She explained that the boys had left the gymnasium just before she noticed her billfold missing. The gatekeeper, Mr. Sechrest, told Nelson that he had seen the boys leave the building.

Nelson observed Long, Botts, and Pegram walking together away from the school. When he yelled for the three to stop, one of them put his hands down the front of his pants. The boys returned with the principal to his office. A search of Long and Botts by Nelson revealed $20 on one boy and $22 on the other. No money was found on Pegram. The plaintiff believed that he had been searched because he was suspected of taking part in the theft.

Nelson directed plaintiff to accompany him to retrace the steps that the three students had taken that evening. Trantham's billfold was found in the boys' bathroom. The principal and Pegram returned to the office and discussed the matter further. Plaintiff was confronted with written statements made by Long and Botts accusing him of stealing the money, but he denied having taken part in the theft.

Nelson, of his own accord, telephoned plaintiff's father. After the father arrived at the office, the principal discussed the incident with him in the presence of plaintiff and the gatekeeper. Nelson told him that Long, Botts, and his son were suspected of having taken money from Trantham's pocketbook, and that Long and Botts had made written statements accusing plaintiff of taking the money. Pegram did not at this time give Nelson any names of persons who could support his denial or who had knowledge of the incident.

According to the plaintiff, he was told on the following day at school that he would be suspended, beginning January 29, for ten school days, and that he would not be allowed on school grounds after 3:15 p. m. for the rest of the school year. Plaintiff's parents received a letter from Nelson, dated January 28, 1976, informing them that:

. . . your son is suspended from Northeast Junior High School for ten school days, starting on January 29, 1976. He may return to school on Thursday, February 12, 1976.
Also, Lawrence is not to be on the Northeast Junior High School grounds except during regular school hours. He may not attend any after school activities. This is to be for the remainder of the 1975-76 school year.2

Pegram's father called Nelson after receiving the letter and discussed the incident further.

On Friday, January 30, 1976, Nelson talked with plaintiff's father in his office.3 At that meeting, the father offered names of four students who might have evidence bearing on the incident. Nelson agreed to talk with these four persons, but declined to do so in the presence of plaintiff's father. After talking to the students, the principal apprised the father that the information obtained from them did not alter his findings.

The only time that plaintiff asked the principal if he could attend an after-school extracurricular function, the prom in May of 1976, Nelson conditioned his assent upon receipt of notes from plaintiff's teachers that he was making passing marks. As soon as plaintiff presented Nelson with the requested notes, he was allowed to attend the prom. The only other extracurricular activity in which plaintiff expressed an interest was track.4 He did not, however, ask the principal whether he could participate in track.5

The plaintiff filed a complaint on July 27, 1977, against principal Nelson, E.P. Pearce, Jr., superintendent of schools, and the members of the Guilford County Board of Education. The attorney general of North Carolina has been allowed to appear as amicus curiae. The plaintiff and the defendants have now moved for summary judgment.

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975), is the leading case on the applicability of due process to student discipline. There, the Supreme Court held that where a student has a "legitimate entitlement to a public education,"6 such entitlement constituted "a property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause and which may not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures required by that Clause." Goss, 419 U.S. at 574, 95 S.Ct. at 736. Additionally, it was noted that when a student's suspension is based on charges of misconduct, a liberty interest in reputation is implicated.7

Having found property and liberty interests, the Court announced that:

due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story. Goss, 419 U.S. at 581, 95 S.Ct. at 740.

The Court emphasized that the required hearing could be informal:

The disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred. We hold only that, in being given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts at this discussion, the student first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation is.
. . . . .
We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause to require . . . that hearings in connection with short suspensions must afford the student the opportunity to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify his version of the incident. Goss, 419 U.S. at 582, 583, 95 S.Ct. at 740 (emphasis added).8

An informal hearing is thus permissible when a student is given a short suspension. The Supreme Court addressed itself solely to the short suspension not exceeding ten days, and warned that "suspensions longer than ten days or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal...

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12 cases
  • Bailey v. Truby
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • July 11, 1984
    ...of equal protection principles) and cases cited therein, rev'd on other grounds, 682 F.2d 147 (8th Cir.1982); Pegram v. Nelson, 469 F.Supp. 1134, 1140 (M.D.N.C.1979) (total exclusion from extracurricular activities for a lengthy period of time "could" under certain circumstances be a suffic......
  • Palmer v. Merluzzi
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • May 2, 1988
    ...the degree of exclusion from extracurricular activities in determining whether procedural due process is implicated. Pegram v. Nelson, 469 F.Supp. 1134, 1140 (M.D.N.C.1979). For example, in Pegram the court found that the denial of a student's opportunity to participate in one or several ex......
  • Jeffrey v. Board of Trustees of Bells Isd
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas
    • May 12, 2003
    ...courses and interscholastic activities); Dallam v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Disk, 391 F.Supp. 358, 361 (M.D.Pa.1975); Pegram v. Nelson, 469 F.Supp. 1134, 1140 (M.D.N.C.1979). As the Dallam court aptly stated: [T]he property interest in education created by the state is participation in the en......
  • C.G.A. v. Iredell-Statesville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
    • August 5, 2021
    ...limitations that could reasonably amount to a student's ‘total exclusion' from school.” Brattain, 2020 WL 6364718, at *4 (quoting Pegram, 469 F.Supp. at 1138)). When school prevents a child from receiving access to regular instruction and instead provides segregated instruction for the chil......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Schoolhouse Property.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 131 No. 5, March 2022
    • March 1, 2022
    ...Supp. 69, 72 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding no protected property interest in participating in the school marching band); Pegram v. Nelson, 469 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (M.D.N.C. 1979) ("The opportunity to participate in extracurricular activities is not, by and in itself, a property (178.) See, e.g.,......

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