Pegump v. Rockwell Intern. Corp.
| Decision Date | 07 March 1996 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3-94-CV-30187. |
| Citation | 963 F.Supp. 1518 |
| Parties | Starlet L. PEGUMP, Plaintiff, v. ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Local 1634 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 1634, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
Wallace L. Taylor, Cedar Rapids, IA, William A. Price, Price Law Firm, Des Moines, IA, for Starlet L. Pegump.
Wilford H. Stone, Lynch Dallas Smith & Harman, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Rockwell Intern. Corp.
Kay M. Johansen, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Local 1634 Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local Union 1634.
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motions for summary judgment. On October 17, 1994 Plaintiff Starlet Pegump filed a state court petition against defendant Rockwell International Corporation ("Rockwell") and defendant Local 1634 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("Union") in the Iowa District Court for Johnson County asserting claims under the federal Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). Defendants removed the case from state court to this Court on November 15, 1994.1 Jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. section 1441 and 29 U.S.C. section 185. The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge and the case was assigned to the undersigned on April 7, 1995. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
On September 14, 1995, defendant Rockwell filed a motion for summary judgment. In support of its motion Rockwell filed a statement of undisputed material facts, a brief, and a record of exhibits. Rockwell's motion asserts that as a matter of law its suspension of Plaintiff and request for medical evaluation following an incident where Plaintiff allegedly threatened violence against other employees did not constitute a breach of the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). Rockwell further asserts the Union's actions in representing Plaintiff did not constitute a breach of the Union's duty of fair representation.
On October 16, 1995, Plaintiff filed a resistance to Rockwell's motion, a brief, and a record of exhibits in support of the resistance. Plaintiff subsequently filed a statement of disputed facts.2 Plaintiff contends Rockwell is not entitled to summary judgment because issues of fact remain as to both claims. Specifically, she urges that (1) Defendants ignored the fact she denied making the alleged threats; (2) the Union failed to take appropriate action to investigate the incident and to process a grievance on her behalf; and (3) Rockwell did not have the authority to demand a medical evaluation and release of records before processing her grievance. Rockwell later filed a reply brief to Plaintiff's resistance; Plaintiff also filed a response to the reply brief.
On October 19, 1995, Defendant Union filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) its actions did not breach the duty of fair representation, and (2) Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her remedies under the CBA. In support of its motion the Union also filed a statement of undisputed facts, a brief, and a record of exhibits. The Union's arguments are substantially similar to those set forth in Rockwell's filings. On November 28, 1995 Plaintiff filed a resistance to the Union's motion incorporating her prior submissions.
Hearing on the above motions was held on December 1, 1995. At the hearing defendant Rockwell was represented by Wilford Stone and defendant Union was represented by Kay Johansen. Plaintiff was represented by Wallace Taylor. The motion is fully submitted.
Defendants' motions for summary judgment are subject to the following well-established standards. A party is entitled to summary judgment only when the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wabun-Inini v. Sessions, 900 F.2d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.1990) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)); accord Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir.1994); Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir.1990). An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record. Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir.1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552-53 (1986)). A genuine issue of fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 ).
The moving party has the burden of asserting that the nonmoving party is without evidence to support a crucial element of its case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 273-74 (1986). Rule 56 does not require the moving party to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. The nonmoving party must present admissible evidence sufficient to withstand the motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d at 274-75. The necessary proof that the nonmoving party must produce is not precisely measurable, but the evidence must be "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d at 212 (1986). The nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts" and "must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d at 552 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis omitted); see also Teleconnect Company v. Ensrud, 55 F.3d 357, 360 (8th Cir.1995).
In assessing a motion for summary judgment a court must determine whether a fair-minded jury could reasonably return a verdict for the nonmoving party based on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d at 211-12. The court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d at 552-53; accord Munz, 28 F.3d at 796; Kopp v. Samaritan Health System, Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269 (8th Cir.1993). The court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue meriting a trial. Grossman v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 47 F.3d 969, 971 (8th Cir.1995); Johnson v. Enron Corp., 906 F.2d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir.1990). A conflict between the parties' evidence ordinarily indicates a question of fact to be resolved by the jury. Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.1983).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment care should be exercised to avoid taking genuine factual issues from juries. Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238. Thus, "[s]ummary judgment `should not be entered unless the movant has established its right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and unless the other party is not entitled to recover under any discernable circumstances.'" Teleconnect Company, 55 F.3d at 359 (quoting Kegel v. Runnels, 793 F.2d 924, 927 (8th Cir.1986)). Summary judgment, however, is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather one designed to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S. Ct. at 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d at 276; see also Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 396; Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238.
The following facts appear to be undisputed. Plaintiff Starlet Pegump began working at defendant Rockwell's manufacturing facility in Coralville, Iowa on August 22, 1988. At the time of her suspension Plaintiff held the position of assembly operator in the postcoat department.3 Defendant Union is a labor union representing employees at the Rockwell plant.
Plaintiff's employment during the relevant period was governed by a CBA between Rockwell and the Union. See Rockwell Exhibit B, at 1-18.4 Plaintiff understood she was a bargaining unit employee at Rockwell. For the purpose of collective bargaining Rockwell recognizes the Union as the exclusive representative of its production employees. Id. at 1. Under the CBA the Union Business Manager, Chief Stewards, and Stewards represent the employees. Id. at 3. Article VII of the CBA sets forth the following complaint and arbitration procedures:
STEP 1. Within three (3) normally scheduled working days of any action causing an alleged complaint, or within three (3) normally scheduled working days of the alleged complaint becoming known to the employee or the UNION, an employee can present the complaint verbally to his/her facilitator. The employee will be accompanied by their Union Steward. The facilitator will render an answer within two (2) normally scheduled working days.
STEP 2. If a satisfactory settlement is not reached during Step 1 of this procedure, the Steward, within two (2) working days of the first step answer, can present the alleged complaint to the next level of management for resolution. The next level of management must render an answer within two (2) working days.
STEP 3. If a satisfactory settlement is not reached during Step 2 of this procedure, the Steward, within two (2) working days, must reduce the complaint to written grievance form and present the grievance to the Plant Manager. The Plant Manager has three (3) working days during which to render an answer.
STEP 4. If a satisfactory settlement is not reached during Step 3 of this procedure, either party can, within three (3) additional working...
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...442, 445 (8th Cir.1997). In Pegump, the employer's handbook prohibited disruptive or offensive behavior. Pegump v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 963 F.Supp. 1518, 1532 (S.D.Iowa 1996). The plaintiff in that case made a joke to co-workers about bringing a gun to work and the individuals who overhe......