Pelletier v. Bilbiles

• Decision Date: 28 February 1967
• Citation: 227 A.2d 251,154 Conn. 544
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Joel PELLETIER et al. v. William BILBILES et al.

Page 251

227 A.2d 251

154 Conn. 544

Joel PELLETIER et al. v. William BILBILES et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Feb. 28, 1967.

Neil F. Murphy, Bristol, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Stephen M. Riley, Hartford, for appellee (defendant Arthur Bilbiles).

Before KING, C.J., and ALCORN, HOUSE, THIM and RYAN, JJ.

THIM, Associate Justice.

Joel Pelletier, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, and his mother brought this action against Arthur Bilbiles, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, and his son, William Bilbiles, hereinafter referred to as William, to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff as a result of a beating administered to him by William, who was at the time of the incident in the employ of the defendant. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and his mother against the defendant and William. On motion by the defendant, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was rendered in his behalf. From this judgment the plaintiff and his mother have appealed.

In reviewing the court's action in rendering a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Petrizzo v. Commercial Contractors Corporation, 152 Conn. 491, 499, 208 A.2d 748; Hemmings v. Weinstein, 151 Conn. 502, 504, 199 A.2d 687; Lurier v. Danbury Bus Corporation, 144 Conn. 544, 547, 135 A.2d 597. If we so regard the evidence, the jury could have reasonably found the following facts: On April 20, 1958, the defendant was the proprietor of the Spa Confectionary in Bristol. His son, William, aged nineteen, worked part time for his father at the Spa. William had been instructed by the defendant neither to permit horseplay on the premises nor to allow anything to be thrown around inside the store. On the above date, the plaintiff, aged sixteen, entered the Spa and ordered a soda from William, who was working behind the counter at the time. The plaintiff was given a straw with the soda. The plaintiff blew the paper sheath off the straw onto the floor. William noticed this action, and he asked the plaintiff to leave the store with him. While they were still inside the store, words were exchanged between the plaintiff and William, and William's temper began to flare. The plaintiff had only recently come to the United States, and he was not too fluent in English. He though William was only joking with him and did not realize William was angry. William escorted the plaintiff outside of the store, and, at a point about fifty feet from the threshold of the Spa, he commenced to batter the plaintiff severely. The defendant, who was also working in the store at the time, noticed William walking out of the store with the plaintiff but said nothing to him. At the time of the incident, William was approximately six inches taller and fifty pounds heavier than the plaintiff.

William's liability for the battery is not questioned on the appeal. The only issue raised is whether there was evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant, as William's employer, was also liable for the battery.

A master is liable for the wilful torts of his servant committed within the scope of the servant's employment and in furtherance of his master's business. Rappaport v. Rosen Film Delivery System, Inc., 127 Conn. 524, 526, 18 A.2d 362; Antinozzi v. A. Vincent Pepe Co., 117 Conn. 11, 13, 166 A. 392; Son v. Hartford Ice Cream Co., 102 Conn. 696, 699, 129 A. 778.

The trial court felt that, because nothing of a physical nture occurred until after William and the plaintiff were outside the store and because the plaintiff made no attempt to forcibly reenter the store, there was no evidential basis from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the battery was inflicted within the scope of William's employment and in the furtherance of the defendant's business.

Ordinarily, it is a question of fact as to whether a wilful tort of the servant has occurred within the scope of the servant's employment and was done ot further his master's business. See, e.g., Rappaport v. Rosen Film Delivery System, Inc., supra. But there are occasional cases where a servant's digression from duty is so clearcut that the disposition of the case becomes a matter of law. Bradlow v. American District...